Optimal population and policy implications by Liu, Xiying
Graduate Theses and Dissertations Iowa State University Capstones, Theses andDissertations
2015
Optimal population and policy implications
Xiying Liu
Iowa State University
Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/etd
Part of the Economics Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations at Iowa State University
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Liu, Xiying, "Optimal population and policy implications" (2015). Graduate Theses and Dissertations. 14539.
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/etd/14539
  
 
Optimal population and policy implications 
 
 
by 
 
 
Xiying Liu  
 
 
 
 
 
A dissertation submitted to the graduate faculty 
 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 
Major: Economics 
 
Program of Study Committee: 
Juan Carlos Cordoba, Major Professor 
Joydeep Bhattacharya  
David M Frankel  
Gray Calhoun 
Weerasinghe Ananda 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Iowa State University 
 
Ames, Iowa 
 
2015 
 
 
 
Copyright © Xiying Liu, 2015. All rights reserved.
ii 
 
 
DEDICATION 
 
This dissertation is dedicated to my husband Xin, my daughter Catherine, and my 
parents whose unconditional love supported me each step of the way.  
iii 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
              Page 
LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................  vi 
LIST OF TABLES ..................................................................................................  viii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ......................................................................................  ix 
ABSTRACT……………………………….............................................................  x 
CHAPTER 1  INTRODUCTION........................................................................  1 
CHAPTER 2  EFFICIENT POPULATION ON A FINITE PLANET ...........  4 
      2.1 Introduction...................................................................................................  4 
 2.2 The Basic Dynastic Altruistic Model............................................................  9 
    2.2.1 Social Planner’s Problem........................................................................  9 
         2.2.2 Decentralization ......................................................................................  16 
 2.3 An Overlapping Generation Model ..............................................................  19 
    2.3.1 Environment............................................................................................  19 
         2.3.2 Complete Market Model .........................................................................  22 
    2.3.3 Incomplete Market Model.......................................................................  23 
    2.3.4 Simulations of Deterministic Models .....................................................  27 
      2.4 Stochastic Model...........................................................................................  30 
    2.4.1 Environment............................................................................................  30 
    2.4.2 Law of Motion of Population and Distribution.......................................  31 
         2.4.3 Equilibrium .............................................................................................  33 
    2.4.4 Simulations of the Stochastic Model ......................................................  34 
 2.5 Conclusion ....................................................................................................  39 
 
CHAPTER 3       FERTILITY, SOCIAL MOBILITY,  
AND LONG RUN INEQUALITY ...........................................  40 
      3.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................  40 
 3.2 The Basic Model of Dynastic Altruism ........................................................  45 
         3.2.1 Preliminaries ...........................................................................................  45 
    3.2.2 Recursive Formulation............................................................................  47 
         3.2.3 Persistence...............................................................................................  48 
    3.2.4 The Fertility-ability-bequest Relationship ..............................................  50 
 3.3 Data and Calibration .....................................................................................  51 
         3.3.1 Data ........................................................................................................      52 
iv 
 
 
3.3.2 Calibration...............................................................................................  58   
      3.4 Results ........................................................................................................      61 
 3.5 Policy Experiments .......................................................................................  64 
    3.5.1 Estate Taxes ............................................................................................  65 
         3.5.2 Family Planning Policies ........................................................................  66 
 3.6 Concluding Comments..................................................................................  66 
 
CHAPTER 4 ACCOUNTING FOR THE INTERNATIONAL  
QUANTITY-QUALITY TRADE-OFF .....................................  75 
      4.1 Introduction...................................................................................................  75 
 4.2 The Benchmark Model .................................................................................  78 
    4.2.1 The Model...............................................................................................  78 
         4.2.2 Consumption and Bequest ......................................................................  82 
    4.2.3 Human Capital Accumulation.................................................................  85 
         4.2.4 Educational Expenditure.........................................................................  85 
         4.2.5 Steady State Wage ..................................................................................  88 
      4.3 Calibration ....................................................................................................  88 
    4.3.1 Parameters Common Across Countries ..................................................  88 
         4.3.2 Parameters Specific for Different Countries...........................................  91 
      4.4 Results ........................................................................................................      91 
    4.4.1 Model’s Fit..............................................................................................  91 
    4.4.2 Counterfactual Exercises ........................................................................  93 
 4.5 Conclusion ....................................................................................................  96 
 
CHAPTER 5  ALTRUISM, FERTILITY AND RISK......................................  97 
 5.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................  97 
 5.2 A Deterministic Model ................................................................................  102 
    5.2.1 Complete Markets ...................................................................................  103 
         5.2.2 Incomplete Markets ................................................................................  105 
 5.3 Idiosyncratic Shocks .....................................................................................  106 
         5.3.1 Environment............................................................................................  107 
    5.3.2 Complete Markets ...................................................................................  110 
         5.3.3 Incomplete Markets ................................................................................  113 
 5.4 Welfare Analysis of Fertility Policies............................................................  119 
    5.4.1 Fertility Policies and Income ..................................................................  119 
         5.4.2 Fertility Policies and Individual Welfare................................................  120 
    5.4.3 Fertility Policies and Social Welfare ......................................................  121 
 5.5 Quantitative Exploration...............................................................................  125 
         5.5.1 Example ..................................................................................................    125 
    5.5.2 Benchmark Calibration ...........................................................................  126 
5.5.3 Results.....................................................................................................    129 
5.5.4 Policy Experiments .................................................................................  129 
v 
 
 
 5.6 Conclusion ....................................................................................................  133 
 
CHAPTER 6 STOCHASTIC DOMINANCE AND DEMOGRAPHIC 
                           POLICY EVALUATION A CRITIQUE...................................    135 
 6.1 Introduction...................................................................................................  135 
 6.2 Distribution and Social Welfare with Exogenous Fertility...........................  141 
    6.2.1 Abilities...................................................................................................    141 
    6.2.2 Fertility and the Distribution of Abilities................................................  142 
         6.2.3 Social Welfare.........................................................................................  144 
 6.3 An Economic Model of Fertility...................................................................  145 
    6.3.1 Individual and Aggregate Constraints ....................................................  145 
         6.3.2 Individuals Problem................................................................................  147 
    6.3.3 Optimal Fertility......................................................................................  148 
    6.3.4 Dynamics of the Income Distribution.....................................................  151 
         6.3.5 Fertility Policies and Individual Welfare................................................  152 
 6.4 Family Planning and Social Welfare Reconsidered......................................  153 
    6.4.1 Analytical Results ...................................................................................  153 
         6.4.2 Calibration and Simulations....................................................................  156 
 6.5 Conclusion ....................................................................................................  160 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...................................................................................................  187 
 
APPENDIX A   EFFICIENT POPULATION ON A FINITE PLANET...........  192 
APPENDIX B ACCOUNTING FOR THE INTERNATIONAL  
QUANTITY-QUALITY TRADE-OFF .....................................  202 
APPENDIX C   ALTRUISM, FERTILITY AND RISK .....................................  211  
APPENDIX D    STOCHASTIC DOMINANCE AND DEMOGRAPHIC 
                             POLICY EVALUATION A CRITIQUE.................................  220 
vi 
 
 
LIST OF FIGURES  
 
                                                                                                                                       Page 
 
Figure 2.1     Credit Limit versus S.S. Capital and Population.................................  162 
Figure 2.2     Mapping from Credit Limit to Interest Rate........................................  163 
 
Figure 2.3     Bequest Policy, Consumption, Fertility and Distribution ...................  164 
 
Figure 2.4     Population and Interest Rate at Stationary Distribution ......................  165 
 
Figure 3.1.a  Optimal Bequest Policy with  
Exogenous Fertility Deterministic Case .............................................  166 
 
Figure 3.1.b  Optimal Bequest Policy with  
Endogenous Fertility Deterministic Case ...........................................  166 
 
Figure 3.2.a  Optimal Bequest Policy with  
Exogenous Fertility Stochastic  Case..................................................  167 
 
Figure 3.2.b  Optimal Bequest Policy with  
Endogenous Fertility Stochastic  Case................................................  167 
 
Figure 3.3     Model 3 (Alvarez) Policy Functions and Some Predictions ...............  168 
Figure 3.4     Model 3 (Alvarez) Persistence of Abilities,  
Labor Supply and Earnings.................................................................  169 
Figure 3.5     Model 6 (Exp. Disc + Dimin. Costs) 
Policy Functions and Some Predictions..............................................  170 
 
Figure 3.6     Model 6 (Exp. Disc + Dim. Costs) Persistence of Abilities, 
                      Labor Supply and Earnings.................................................................  171 
 
Figure 4.1     Schooling Data versus Fertility Data - 2005 .......................................  172 
 
Figure 4.2     Fertility in the Model and the Data - 2005 ..........................................  173 
 
Figure 4.3     Years of Schooling in the Model and the Data - 2005 ........................  174 
 
Figure 4.4     Fertility versus Years of Schooling .....................................................  175 
 
Figure 4.5     Fertility versus Wage...........................................................................  176 
 
vii 
 
 
Figure 4.6     Years of Schooling versus Wage.........................................................  177 
 
Figure 5.1     Fertility versus Earning Abilities.........................................................  178 
 
Figure 5.2     Effects of Limiting Fertility.................................................................  179 
 
Figure 5.3     Effects of Raising Fertility ..................................................................  180 
 
Figure 5.4     Policy Effects of Fertility Related Wage Taxes and Subsidies ...........    181 
 
Figure 5.5     Effects of Fertility Related Taxes and Subsidies on Steady State 
Average Social Welfare ......................................................................  182 
 
Figure 5.6     Robustness Checks ..............................................................................  183 
 
Figure 6.1     Effects of Fertility Restrictions: Upper Bound....................................  184 
 
Figure 6.2     Effects of Fertility Restrictions: Lower Bound ...................................  185 
 
Figure 6.3     Robustness Checks ..............................................................................  186 
 
 
viii 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES  
 
                                                                                                                                  Page 
Table 3.1 Targets.......................................................................................................  68 
Table 3.2 Parameter Values ......................................................................................  69 
Table 3.3 Means and Standard Deviations................................................................  70 
Table 3.4 Coefficients of Variation...........................................................................  71 
Table 3.5 Persistence and Other Statistics ................................................................  72 
Table 3.6 Estate Taxation .........................................................................................  73  
Table 3.7 Two Children Policy.................................................................................  74 
 
 
ix 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
I would like to take this opportunity to express my thanks to those who helped me with 
various aspects of conducting research and the writing of this dissertation. I owe my deepest 
gratitude to my major professor, Dr. Juan Carlos Cordoba, for his guidance, patience and 
support throughout this research and the writing of this dissertation. His insights and 
encouragement have often inspired me and renewed my hopes for pursuing an academic 
career. 
I would also like to thank Dr. Joydeep Bhattachraya and Dr. David Frankel for their 
valuable comments in the earlier stage of my dissertation. I am also indebted to Dr Rajesh 
Singh, Dr. Gray Calhoun and Dr. Ananda Weerasinghe for their efforts and contributions to 
this work. 
 
 
x 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation explores issues of efficient and inefficient population in complete and 
incomplete market economies with altruistic parents who cares about the welfare of their 
children. Altruistic models with idiosyncratic risks are central to modern macroeconomics, 
particularly when studying issues of inequality and redistribution. But this framework seems 
to fall apart when serious consideration is given to fertility decisions as Barro and Becker 
(1989) because some of the most appealing conclusions obtained under the exogenous 
fertility assumption are seriously altered. For example, optimal fertility choice tends to 
eliminate intergenerational persistence of inequality. A main goal of this dissertation is to 
recover key features of demographic facts using micro-founded macroeconomic theory and 
quantitative approaches and derive normative analysis regarding efficiency of population, 
long run inequality, education, and demographic policies. The consensus of my research is 
that family decisions made by altruistic parents have substantial aggregate socioeconomic 
consequences in dynamic environments. 
1CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
I am interested in the economics of family decisions and their effects at the macroeconomic level. This
dissertation focuses on understanding theoretical and empirical predictions of models where fertility deci-
sions are made by fully rational and altruistic parents. Given the significant demographic transitions being
experienced and forecasted for many countries, this work employs micro-founded macroeconomic models
to explain the key features of data and derives normative implications regarding the efficiency of population,
long run inequality, education, and demographic policies.
My dissertation consists of five chapters falling into four categories: (i) population efficiency, including
over and under-population; (ii) social mobility and inequality with endogenous fertility, (iii) consequences
of demographic policies, such as China’s One Child Policy, and (iv) international quantity-quality trade-off
related to schooling and fertility choices. The consensus of all chapters is that family decisions made by
altruistic parents have substantial aggregate socioeconomic consequences in dynamic environments.
The first chapter, "Efficient Population on a Finite Planet" examines issues of overpopulation in an envi-
ronment with altruistic parents and fixed resource, specifically, land. I derive the efficient level of population
in this benchmark, then compare it with the population level when markets are incomplete. The main find-
ing is that efficient long run population in the standard neoclassical growth model with endogenous fertility
choices can be zero or the maximal sustainable level. If the economy starts with low level of population,
labor value is high, then children are expensive because they take valuable parents’ time. This tends to
discourage fertility and leads to lower population in the next generation. Consequently, zero population
is possible in the long run. Next my research studies a decentralized model with land market and credit
frictions. I find that incomplete market produces under-population compared with the efficient level. The
mechanism is that in standard macroeconomics, interest rate is typically low with credit frictions. By stan-
dard arbitrage arguments, rent of land in incomplete markets tends to be low. So with a fixed amount of
available land, low rent implies a high land-labor ratio and low steady state population. Furthermore, I
2extend the benchmark model to incorporate uninsurable risk on lifetime earning abilities to evaluate conse-
quence of demographic policies, such as the One Child Policy. Surprisingly, my model suggests that such
policies increase long run population.
The second chapter, "Fertility, Social Mobility and Long Run Inequality", joint with Juan Carlos Cor-
doba and Marla Ripoll, investigates social mobility and long run inequality in the presence of endogenous
fertility and intergenerational transfer choices made by altruistic individuals facing uninsurable idiosyncratic
risk. Incorporating fertility choices in analyzing long run inequality is important because the differential
fertilities among rich and poor families lead to differences in intergenerational wealth transmission, social
mobility and long run inequality. Alvarez (1999) finds a counterfactual result that fertility choices by altru-
istic parents largely reduce intergenerational persistence and increase social mobility. The main contribution
of this research is to recover empirically plausible levels of persistence with altruistic models of endogenous
fertility. We show that a calibrated version of a Barro-Becker dynastic altruistic model of fertility choice
embedded into a Bewley framework of idiosyncratic risk is able to replicate three key aspects of the data: (i)
a negative fertility-income relationship; (ii) a negative relationship between family size and savings rates;
and (iii) a significant intergenerational persistence or lack of social mobility. We also show that the endoge-
nous fertility model improves upon the exogenous fertility model in a number of other dimensions such as
larger wealth dispersion. Our calibration exercise also sheds light on the technology of raising children, the
shape of altruism by parents, and the "intergenerational elasticity of substitution".
The third chapter "Accounting for the International Quantity-Quality Trade-off", joint with Juan Carlos
Cordoba and Marla Ripoll, provides a quantitative theory accounting for key empirical regularities of fertility
and schooling differences across countries. In our model a quantity quality trade-off arises due to financial
constraints and endogenous fertility choices. Our model predicts a negative association of fertility with both
schooling and income. We find that differences in wages explain most of the cross country dispersion of
3fertility and years of the schooling dispersion. In addition, schooling differences also come from differences
in education policies such as the availability of public schools, school funding, and compulsory schooling.
The fourth chapter, "Altruism, Fertility and Risk", joint with Juan Carlos Cordoba, studies fertility
choices and fertility policies when children’s earning abilities are random and parents are altruistic. The
main contribution of this chapter is to characterize equilibrium allocations arising in endowment economies
with complete or incomplete markets. In particular, consumption is proportional to the net financial cost of
raising children, which is different from the standard permanent income hypothesis. We find that fertility
policies are generally welfare detrimental in our models even when fertility is inefficiently high.
The fifth chapter, "Stochastic Dominance and Demographic Policy Evaluation: A Critique", joint with
Juan Carlos Cordoba, is related with stochastic dominance (SD), which is commonly used to rank income
distribution and assess social policies. We argue that SD is not a robust criterion for policy evaluation and
we show that fertility restrictions are generally detrimental to both individual and social welfare even SD
holds.
4CHAPTER 2. EFFICIENT POPULATION ON A FINITE PLANET
2.1 Introduction
As natural resource becomes scarcer in the world, the large population in many developing countries
have caused concerns on issues of overpopulation since one consequence of overpopulation and scarcity
of resource is poverty. For example, Bangladesh has one of the world’s highest population density, 1147
persons per square kilometer1. In this country a large majority of people engages in low-productivity manual
farming and a large fraction suffers from extremely high level of poverty.
In this chapter I want to ask the following questions. Whether a large population is harmful to the
social welfare? What is the optimal long run population for the earth with limited resource if welfare of all
individuals, those living now and will be born in the future, is taken into account. Whether markets, with and
without frictions, produce a socially efficient level of population, and if not, whether they produce higher
or lower population than the optimal level. Golosov, Jones and Tertilt (2007) have shown that population
is efficient in a dynastic altruist model with endogenous fertility, as in Barro and Becker (1989) and Becker
and Barro (1988) (BB henceforth). However, in the altruistic fertility literature, no market force guarantees
fertility stabilizing at the replacement rate so that efficient population either typically grows without bound
or shrinks toward zero.
In this chapter I seek to answer these questions in a standard neoclassical growth model where parents
are purely altruistic toward their children. Fertility is endogenous and costly, particularly in terms of parental
time. There exists a fixed resource, land, and a minimum subsistence level of consumption. The model is
appealing because it is a version of the standard growth model that allows for endogenous fertility, as in
BB. In the economy there is a maximum sustainable level of population, one that would drive everyone’s
consumption to subsistence, or to immiseration. This economy resembles Malthus’ economy but is one
with micro-foundation of fertility. I define and characterize the golden rule level of population and the
1POVERTY AT LARGE : A DARK SPOT IN HUMANITY, cited from http://povertyhci.weebly.com/index.html
5modified golden rule level of population, concepts analogous to those used in growth theory to characterize
the accumulation of capital. The first concept refers to the level of population that maximizes steady state
welfare while the second concept refers to the efficient level of population in steady state. I characterize
efficient allocations, and conditions under which a maximum sustainable population is efficient or not. To
evaluate the effects of market frictions, bequest constraints, on steady state population, I decentralize the
social planner’s problem using competitive land markets. A natural notion of over- and under- population
arises by comparing population in market economies relative to its efficient population.
The main findings are the following. First, maximum sustainable and zero population can be efficient
in the long run, but not always. More specifically, in the pure homothetic Barro and Becker model, efficient
steady state population reaches 0 or the maximum sustainable, and the maximum sustainable population is
infinite if subsistence consumption is zero. In the more general non-homothetic model efficient population
could be less than the maximum sustainable, and consumption is larger than subsistence, but I quantitatively
find that this finite level of population is unstable in general.
This is an important benchmark because it shows that Malthusian economies where consumption is
driven to subsistence are not necessarily inefficient. The intuition for this result is that if the economy starts
with a level of population higher than the steady state, labor value is lower with a fixed resource. When the
main opportunity cost of raising children is valuable parental time, children become cheaper. This increases
parents’ incentive to have children and leads to a higher population growth rate than the steady state growth
rate. Population in the next generation would be larger, which leads to a even lower opportunity cost of
having children. Then the fertility rate increases, which further raises the population in the next generation.
This process repeats overtime and leads to infinite population in the long run. If the population starts with
too low, similar mechanism goes through but in the opposite direction, which leads to zero population in the
long-term.
6If I slightly enrich the model to incorporate goods cost, stability of the well-defined finite population
could be obtained and infinite steady state population can be avoided. It is because no matter how cheap
children are in terms of parental time, there is a goods cost associated with raising children, and a large
population with fixed resource implies low production and low earnings of every individual. A parent with
low earnings can not afford too many children due to goods cost, which tends to prevent population from
growing without bound.
I then decentralize the social planner’s problem using land markets to evaluate the effects of market
frictions, bequest constraints, on steady state population. I find that steady state population in incomplete
markets is lower than the efficient population. Thus, market frictions similar with credit friction in macro-
economics would produce under-population in the long run rather than over-population. The intuition is that
the interest rate is typically low when credit frictions are binding particularly because parents would like
to borrow against children’s income but are not allowed by the constraint. Low interest rate and arbitrage
imply that the rent of land is also lower under credit frictions, and since (i) the rent is equal to the marginal
product of land; (ii) the marginal product is inversely related to the land-labor ratio; and (iii) land is fixed, it
follows that steady state population is low in the constrained economy.
I also evaluate the consequences of demographic policies, similar with China’s One Child Policy in in-
complete markets. Since individuals are homogenous in the deterministic model and a binding constraint
on fertility choices can not be steady state equilibrium, I extend the benchmark model to incorporate unin-
surable risks on earning abilities. Abilities are random and correlated between parents and children. The
extended model is essentially a Bewley model with endogenous fertility, credit friction and fixed land. This
framework is central to modern macroeconomics, particularly when studying issues of inequality and re-
distribution. To my surprise, one child policy that aims at restricting people’s fertility choices leads to an
increase of long run population.
7The mechanism through which policies restricting fertility choices increase population is the follow-
ing. Under such fertility policy, every individual tends to have fewer children than the steady state fertility
without any policy, which is 1 child per parent. So under the policy fertility is below 1 if prices of the two
economies are the same. At steady state, the wage in the economy under fertility policy must be smaller so
that the cost of children is lower and there is a force to induce people to have more children than the other
economy. A lower steady state wage of the economy with policies corresponds to a higher population in
presence of a fixed land.
Another contribution of this chapter is to show that a negative relationship between fertility and earning
ability arises from the stochastic model with uninsurable idiosyncratic risks of earning ability. This negative
relationship is not simple to obtain within dynastic altruistic models, as discussed by Jones, Schoonbroodt
and Tertilt (2011). In the framework of this chapter, it arises from the interplay of two opposite forces.
On the one hand, higher ability individuals face a larger opportunity cost of having a child as children take
valuable parental time. On the other hand, higher ability individuals enjoy a larger benefit of having children
when abilities are intergenerationally persistent because the utility of a child is positively related to parental
ability. I find that the effect of ability on the marginal cost dominates its effect on the marginal benefit if
the intergenerational persistence of ability is not perfect. Regression to the mean in abilities means that low
ability parents expect their children to be of higher ability on average while high ability parents expect their
children to be of lower ability. This explains why poor people have more children and rich ones have fewer
children in a fully rational and altruistic environment. Through a similar channel, Cordoba and Liu (2014)
and Cordoba, Liu and Ripoll (2014) are able to replicate the inverse correlation between ability and fertility
in a homothetic model. Compared with these two papers, this chapter is the first to replicate the feature in a
general equilibrium model with production.
In addition to the literature mentioned above, this chapter is closely related to Dasgupta (2005) who
studies optimal population in an endowment economy with fixed resource. My model is an extension of his
8model but is richer in production, altruism and the technology of raising children. Cost of raising children
is not considered in Dasgupta’s model. Moreover, Dasgupta studies a generation-relative utilitarianism, one
close to BB model but not BB. I go further than his paper to find that the steady state allocations are unstable
in general and to study the optimal population in a market structure with market imperfection.
Nerlove, Razin and Sadka (1986) is a related paper that proposes competitive equilibrium is efficient
under two possible externalities in the context in which parents care about future generations’ welfare. First,
larger population helps providing more public goods such as national defense. Second, larger population
reduces wage rate if there is a fixed amount of land. Eckstein, Stern and Wolpin (1988) show that population
can stabilize and non-subsistence consumption arises in the equilibrium when fertility choices is endoge-
nously introduced to a model with fixed amount of land. In a different line of the literature, parents have
warm glow altruism in that paper. Peretto and Valente (2011) study the interaction between technological
progress, resource scarcity and population dynamics. Their paper focuses on the market allocation while
this chapter focuses on the efficient allocation. My normative analysis on the stability of the steady state
efficient population under fixed land is consistent with their findings on a special case with Cobb-Douglas
production form, but the two papers solve the allocations in different environment since the parental altruism
in their model is not pure as in BB (1989). De la Croix (2012) studies sustainable population by proposing
non-cooperative bargaining between clans living on an island with limited resource. Children in his model
act like an investment good for parents’ old-age support.
This chapter is also related to a large literature on the role that demographic transition plays in the eco-
nomic development and transition. Galor and Weil (2000) develop a unified growth model that captures the
historical evolution of population, technology, and output. Parents in their model have warm glow altruism
toward children. There is no savings in their model. Issues of over- or under-population are neither the
focus of Galor and Weil (2000) nor Doepke (2003). Doepke (2003) develops a growth model to account for
the transition from stagnation to growth incorporating the endogenous fertility decisions made by altruistic
9parents. Land is a public good in that paper so the price of land is not valued. This chapter introduces the
limited resource, land, so that a finite level of long run population can be obtained in equilibrium. In Hansen
and Prescott (2002) or Kremer (1993), fertility moves mechanically and population grows exogenously.
There has been papers that study inefficiency of fertility in incomplete market models. For example,
Schoonbroodt and Tertilt (2014) (ST henceforth) show that under certain assumptions incomplete markets
models can result in inefficiently low fertility. Cordoba and Liu (2014) show that under certain different
assumptions incomplete markets models can result in inefficiently high fertility. But these papers focus on
predictions for fertility, the growth rate of population, not for population size. This chapter focuses on the
level of population at steady state.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 studies the basic dynastic altruistic fertility
models and the decentralization. I show that complete market model delivers the efficient population. Sec-
tion 2.3 studies decentralized models: overlapping generation complete and incomplete market models with
fixed land. The notion of over- and under-population are formalized as I compare the steady state population
in incomplete markets with the efficient level. The fourth section investigates the consequences of demo-
graphic policies similar with China’s One Child policy in the framework of Bewley model with endogenous
fertility and a fixed amount of land. Differential fertility rates arise in this model and are characterized in
the quantitative part. Section 2.5 concludes. Propositions are proved in the appendix.
2.2 The Basic Dynastic Altruistic Model
2.2.1 Social Planner’s Problem
Benchmark Model
In this section, I study an overlapping generation economy. Parents are altruistic toward children. There is
a benevolent social planner who has the same preference with the initial parent and makes all decisions for
individuals. I apply a modern altruistic approach to the demand for children along the lines of Becker and
10
Barro (1988) and Barro and Becker (1989) to study the efficient population of the economy. To obtain a
well-defined level of population, there is a fixed amount of land in the environment. Children are expensive
since there is an opportunity cost of raising children, the time cost. The model resembles Malthus’ model
but is different in providing the micro-foundation of the demand for children.
The social planner solves the following problem:
max
fNt+1;ct;ntg1t=0
X
t
tN1 t u (ct)
subject to
Nt+1 = ntNt; N0 is given
Ntct = zF
 
K; (1  nt)Nt

and
ct  c
where c is a subsistence level of consumption. Any consumption below this level is not big enough to make
a living.
 is the discount rate across generations. ct and nt are consumption and number of children of an
individual in generation t: For simplicity, I call nt fertility. Assuming every child costs parents  percentage
of time to raise them. Individuals allocate time between working and raising children. Leisure is not valued
in this model. Nt denotes population of generation t and N1 t is the weight that social planner assigns to
people of generation t: The weight that social planner puts on generation t is increasing in population at a
diminishing rate. When  = 0; the weight is linear in population and it does not decreases as population
increases. The first constraint implies that population grows at the rate of fertility, nt.
11
K is the fixed amount of resource, land. Production of generation t uses land K and the total labor supply
of the economy, (1  nt)Nt, which is every individual’s labor supply multiplies the population. The fixed
land assumption is crucial for obtaining a well-defined population because otherwise population could grow
to infinite or shrinks to zeros in the long run. The second constraint is a resource constraint. It requires total
consumption of every generation to be equal to the total production. I assume a non-homothetic preference,
u (c) = c
1 
1  + A; where A is a non-homothetic term that measures the utility from public goods. The
following restrictions on parameters are needed in order to have a well-behaved bounded problem.
Assumption 1 1   > ,  >  and 1  > :
The first two of the assumption are identical to the ones discussed by Barro and Becker (1988) to assure
strict concavity of the problem. The third one guarantees bounded utility as the effective discount factor, in
which case f1 t   1 < 1:2
Plugging fertility and consumption into the objective, the social planner’s problem can be alternatively
written as
max
fNt+1g1t=0
X
t
tN1 t u
 
zF
 
K;Nt   Nt+1

Nt
!
subject to
zF
 
K;Nt   Nt+1

Nt
 c
The optimality conditions for the social planner’s problem is
N1 "t+1 (ct+1)
 
"
zF2
 
K;Nt+1   Nt+2

Nt+1
  zF
 
K;Nt+1   Nt+2

N2t+1
#
+  (1  ")N "t+1u (ct+1)
= N1 "t (ct)
  zF2
 
K;Nt   Nt+1

Nt
2An upper bound for the social welfare or the initial old’s welfare is u(c)
1  1 :
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where
ct =
zF
 
K;Nt   Nt+1

Nt
The following proposition characterizes steady state efficient population and consumption.
Proposition 1 Steady state population and consumption are
N = 0; c =1
or
N =1; c = 0
or if   (1  ) >  1  (1  ), then
N = K (1  ) 1  (1 )

1
A (1  )
 1
(1 )

  

(1  ) +   
1   (1  )
 1
(1 )
z
1

c = z
 
K=N

(1  )1  :
Furthermore, consumption is independent of the technological progress measured by z.
Corollary 1 In the homothetic model, A = 0, the nondegenerate efficient population at steady state is zero,
or is infinity if the subsistence consumption c is 0. If c is bigger than 0, then nonzero steady state
efficient population is the carrying capacity, which is the maximum sustainable level of population.
N = K

z
c
 1

(1  ) 1 
In the pure homothetic Barro and Becker model, steady state efficient population reaches the maxi-
mum sustainable level or 0. The allocation with maximum sustainable population would drive everyone’s
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consumption to immiseration3 and population is infinite if subsistence consumption is zero. This is an im-
portant benchmark because in a version of the standard growth model that allows for optimal demand for
children it shows that two extreme cases are not necessarily inefficient in the long run. First, population is
so large that consumption is driven to subsistence or immiseration. Second, the society disappears in the
long run.
In the more general non-homothetic model, efficient steady state population could be less than the max-
imum sustainable and consumption could be larger than the subsistence consumption, e.g. c > c. From
Proposition 1, I can see that the existence of a finite efficient population is not guaranteed for all para-
meter settings. Existence requires the discount rate  to be low, or time cost of raising children  to be
high while both have to be in the interval (0; 1). When  obtains its upper limit, 1, then the condition
 
 (1  ) >  1  (1  ) is automatically satisfied because  > " and  < 1 by the assumption.
Proposition 1 also suggests that the BB model with a fixed amount of land is able to replicate the
Malthusian trap: population adjusts according to technological improvement but consumption does not
adjust. Although this model delivers Malthus property, it has different implication from Malthus model in
the sense that infinitely large population and immiseration can be efficient in the long run.
I define golden rule level of population Ngr and the modified golden rule level of population, N,
analogous to concepts used in growth theory to characterize the accumulation of capital. The first concept
refers to the level of population that maximizes steady state welfare. More specifically, Ngr maximizes the
following problem
max
N
N1 u
 
zF
 
K;N   N
N
!
:
3Immiseration implies consumption is very low such that it barely sustain individuals’ living. We are not the first to find that in
principle immiseration could be efficient. The optimal constract literature, in particular Atkeson and Lucas (1992), shows that the
optimal allocation of resource with private information leads to immiseration, a senario that every individual’s consumption goes
to zero and inequality grows to infinity.
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The second concept refers to the efficient population at steady state. According to Proposition 3 below, it is
the steady state population of the complete market economy.
It is well known that the modified golden rule level of capital is smaller than the golden rule level of
capital because of the impatience to save and to consume. With a similar taste, the modified golden rule
level of population N is smaller than the golden rule level of population Ngr. The reason is that children
are costly in terms of parental time and the impatience to produce children leads to a lower N.
Proposition 2 The modified golden rule level of population is no larger than the golden rule level of popu-
lation which attains the maximum sustainable level.
As proved in the appendix the golden rule level of population always attains the maximum sustainable.
Hence the modified golden rule level of population is smaller than or equal to the golden rule level. This
comparison is consistent with Dasgupta (2005). He compares the golden rule level of population with the
population that maximizes generation related welfare, one similar with the modified golden rule level in
this chapter but is not the same. His paper does not find that the golden rule level of population attains
the maximal because his model assumes linear altruism, linear production technology, and cost of raising
children is not considered.
Although non-homotheticity opens the possibility of a well-defined finite level of population, I log lin-
earize the system and quantitatively find that the finite population at steady state is typically not stable. The
parameters I use for this quantitative exercise are the following:  = 0:15;  = 0:4;  = 0:72;  = 0:30;
" = 0:57; A = 0:01; and z = 1. I set them using the calibrated parameters in stochastic model with earn-
ings risks and adjust  to guarantee the existence of a finite nonzero steady state population. The value of
parameters is not crucial to the instability of the nonzero finite steady state. The numerical exercise shows
that the instability is robust to a variation of parameters under which the steady state exists.
Why is the stability of the nonzero finite steady state population hard to obtain in standard growth model
with endogenous fertility? If the initial population is lower than the steady state population, with a fixed
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amount of land, the labor cost of raising a child is more expensive and parents tend to have fewer children
than the steady state. This lowers future population which makes children even more expensive to raise
in terms of parental time. More expensive children induces parents to have even fewer children, which
reinforces a lower population. This process iterates and population becomes 0 in the long run. On the other
hand, if the initial population is larger than steady state, children is very cheap since the opportunity cost
is low. Similar argument would lead to infinite population in the long run. This result is unappealing to
some extent because it implies that a standard Barro-Becker economy of endogenous children with fixed
resources would eventually explode or implode, and population would not stabilize in the future.
However, there are several ways to get around this feature and recover stability. One way is to introduce
a fixed goods cost to the model as I analyze in the next section.
Social Planner’s Problem with Goods Cost Assuming that every child costs not only parental time but
also a fixed amount of consumption goods : In addition to this assumption, everything else is the same
with the standard social planner’s problem of the previous section and the social planner’s problem can be
expressed as:
max
fNt+1; nt; ctg1t=1
X
t
tN1 "t u (ct)
subject to
Nt+1 = ntNt
and
Ntct + Nt+1 = zF
 
K; (1  nt)Nt
 (1)
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The optimality conditions are
N1 "t+1 (ct+1)
 
"
zF2
 
K;Nt+1   Nt+2

Nt+1
  zF
 
K;Nt+1   Nt+2

N2t+1
+
Nt+2
N2t+1
#
+ (1  ")N "t+1u (ct+1)
= N1 "t (ct)
  zF2
 
K;Nt   Nt+1

Nt
+N "t (ct)
  
for t  0 where
ct =

zF
 
K;Nt   Nt+1
  Nt+1 1
Nt
Log linearizing the system around the steady state, the numerical exercise shows that a fixed goods cost
brings stability back to the finite steady state efficient population, N, and prevents infinite population from
occurring in the long run. It is because no matter how cheap children are in terms of parental time, there
is a goods cost associated with raising children, and a large population with fixed resource implies low
production and low earnings of every individual. The zero steady state population is not stable because on
one hand, children is expensive in terms of taking parental time, but on the other hand they are cheap as rich
parents face a low marginal utility of consumption. If the second effect dominates the first, people tends to
have more children which promotes more population in the future.
Similar with the model without goods cost of raising children, the numerical exercise shows that the
modified golden rule level of capital per capita is 146.5, much bigger than the golden rule level, 0.0015. The
parameters I use for this exercise is the same with the previous model except that  = 0:21:
2.2.2 Decentralization
In this section I decentralize the social planner’s problem by a complete market economy with fixed
resource, land. The purpose is using the decentralized land market to study the effect of market frictions. I
show that the complete market economy obtains efficient allocations, in particular the efficient population.
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Individuals’ Problem Along the line of BB, Individuals live for one period. They maximizes the utility
from own consumption and value the welfare of children in an altruistic way.
Vt(at) = max
ct;bt+1;0ntn
u (ct) + (nt)Vt+1(at+1) (2)
subject to
ct + ntqtat+1 + nt  (qt + rt) at + wt (1  nt)
ct  c
As specified in the previous section, ct and nt denote consumption and fertility. at is the transfer of land
received from parents when young and at+1 is the transfer of land to every child when parents are old but
children are young. The price of land in terms of consumption goods at time t is qt:
Let (nt) = n1 t be the altruism function where  is the intergenerational discount rate. It is the
weight that parents place on their nt children.  is the altruism factor which controls how much parents
care about children. When  = 0 parents are perfectly altruistic toward children and they do not exhibit
decreasing altruism as more children are born. wt is wage and Rt is the return on land.
Firms’ Problem Firms produce using the Cobb–Douglas production function F ( K;Lt) = z KL1 
where K is the fixed amount of land, Lt is labor and z is total factor productivity. The per-labor production
function is f(kt) = F (
K;Lt)
Lt
where kt  KLt : Assuming the depreciation rate is 0. In competitive markets
rents and wage are determined by
rt = zk
 1
t and wt = (1  ) zkt : (3)
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Definition of Competitive Equilibrium A competitive equilibrium are price sequences fwt; Rtg1t=0, al-
locations fct; nt; at+1g1t=0 and population fNtg1t=0 such that: (i) allocations solve the individual’s problem
given prices; (ii) wt and rt satisfy (51), (iii) demand for land is equal to the stock of land,
K = Nt+1at+1
and (iv) the evolution of population satisfies
Nt+1 = ntNt:
Characterize the Steady State Allocations The complete market economy delivers the efficient solution,
as formalized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Complete market allocations (ct; nt; at+1; Nt) are efficient.
With a well defined efficient population, it would be interesting to investigate how market friction affects
long run population. The market friction I consider is similar with credit friction, an important driving
force of inequality in macroeconomics. Instead of restricting individuals from borrowing intertemporally, it
restricts parents from borrowing intergenerationally against children. We call this type of restriction "bequest
constraints". A particularly realistic constraint is the non-negative bequest constraint, which implies that
parents can not impose debt on children.
For this purpose, I extend the benchmark model to a dynastic altruistic model in which individuals live
for two periods, young and old. The extended model improves upon the dynastic altruistic model with
one period life by incorporating the life cycle savings property. The model with one period life is not
appropriate to study markets with frictions because a binding nonnegative transfer constraint would not lead
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to an equilibrium since people are homogenous and everyone transfers zero bequest (land) to children. One
alternative dynastic altruistic model is a deterministic model with two periods’ life.
2.3 An Overlapping Generation Model
2.3.1 Environment
Individuals’ and Firms’ Problem To consider the impact of bequest constraints on equilibrium popula-
tion, I extend the model to an overlapping generation model in which every individual lives for two periods.
The fixed goods cost of raising a child is not considered in this section partly because the life-cycle savings
property in this richer model could recover stability of the steady state. Also goods cost is taken into account
in children’s consumption. The fixed cost tends to complicate the model and destroy the inverse relationship
between fertility and earning abilities, an empirical regularity in the data.
In this overlapping generation model, people work, save and raise children when young, and retire when
old. The individuals’ problem for time t  0 is:
Vt(bt) = max
cyt ;c
o
t+1;at+1;bt+1;0ntn
u
 
cyt ; c
o
t+1

+ (nt)Vt+1(bt+1) (4)
subject to:
cyt + qtat+1  wt (1  nt) + bt (5)
cot+1 + ntbt+1  (qt+1 + rt+1) at+1 (6)
Let cyt and cot+1 denote the consumption when young and old, respectively. u
 
cyt ; c
o
t+1

= A +
 
cyt c
o
t+1

is the utility from consumption and public goods. Assuming 2 < 1: Young individuals at time t purchase
an amount of land at+1: They reap the land rent and sell the land at time t + 1 when they are old. qt is the
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price of land and rt is the rental rate of land. Following the notation of the previous section, bt is the bequest
received when young from parents while bt+1 is the bequest to every child.
For a young agent, consumption and the total value of land purchased is no more than the transfer
received from parents and her own labor income. For an old individual, consumption and transfer to children
is no more than the summation of rents and the value of land. The two periods’ budget constraints can be
written as a single one:
cyt +
 
cot+1 + ntbt+1

=Rt+1  bt + wt (1  nt) ; and bt+1  0: (7)
where
Rt+1 =
qt+1 + rt+1
qt
:
4 (8)
Notice that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is  1 while 1= (2) is the intergenerational elasticity
of substitutions. Savings are given by:
qtat+1 = bt + wt (1  nt)  cyt : (9)
Firms’ problem is the same with what’s described in the previous section. They pay rents and labor
income according to (3).
Since 2 in the model with two periods’ life corresponds to  in the model with one period life, I assume
2 > " to guarantee the concavity of individual’s problem.
Demographics Let Nt = Nyt +Not denotes the total population at time t. N
y
t and Not denote the popula-
tion at time t when young and old, respectively. The demographic structure satisfies the following identities:
Nyt = nt 1N
o
t ; N
o
t+1 = N
y
t ; Nt = (1 + nt 1)N
o
t (10)
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so
Nyt
Nt
=
nt 1
1 + nt 1
;
Not
Nt
=
1
1 + nt 1
;
Nt+1
Nt
=
1 + nt
1 + nt 1
nt 1:
Aggregate Resources Aggregate land is in fixed supply and the aggregate labor supply in the economy is
Lt = N
y
t (1  nt) : The aggregate resource constraint for output is:
Nyt c
y
t +N
o
t c
o
t = F (K;Lt)
Alternatively,
Nyt
Nt
cyt +
Not
Nt
cot =
Lt
Nyt
Nyt
Nt
f(kt):
or
nt 1c
y
t + c
o
t = (1  nt) f(kt)nt 1 (11)
Additionally, the resource constraint for land is
K = at+1N
y
t (12)
Definition of Competitive Equilibrium A competitive equilibrium are price sequences fqt; wt; rtg1t=0,
allocations fcyt ; cot ; nt; at+1; bt+1g1t=0 and a population distribution fNyt ; Not g1t=0 such that: (i) allocations
solves the individual problem given prices, (ii) wt and rt satisfy firms’ optimality conditions (3), and (iii) qt
clears the land market as defined by (12), (iv) the population distribution satisfies (10), and (v) a resource
constraint (11) is satisfied. Note that (12) can be written using (9) as:
kt+1 =
at+1N
y
t
Lt+1
= at+1
1
nt
1
1  nt+1 (13)
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The market clearing condition for intergenerational transfer bt+1 is not written because the amount is
transferred from parents to children when both are alive.
2.3.2 Complete Market Model
In this section, I show that steady state population in complete market model is efficient. I then compare
the steady state efficient population with the steady state population in incomplete markets when credit
constraints bind. The idea is to study whether incomplete markets produce too much or too little population.
Steady State
Proposition 4 The steady state allocations (nss; N ss; cyss; kss) and prices (Rss; ; rss; wss) of the complete
market economy are described by the following system:
N ss =
"

1 
 
 1  1  1 +  1 (1  )  (1    2)
1  
# 1
2
"
(1  ) z 
1 +  1
# 1   12A  12
cyss =
24 1  

 
 1  1 (1+ 1)1  (1  )  (1    2)
A
R
35 12
kss =
"
cyss
 
1 +  1

(1  ) z
# 1

; nss = 1; Rss =
1

and rss and wss follow by (51). If the utility function is homothetic, e.g. A = 0; the steady state
population goes to 0 or infinite unless a knife edge condition
 (R  1) (n+R) = n (1  n) where    (1  )
n   2
holds. When this condition is satisfied, the steady state population is undetermined.
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Since land and technology are fixed at steady state then the only possible balanced growth path is with
n = 1; which requires zero population growth.
Similar to the model with one period life, the model with two periods’ life also suggests the dynastic
altruistic model with a fixed land has the Malthusian property: steady state consumption does not respond
to technological progress but population does.
Corollary In the frictionless model, steady state consumption cyss is independent of technological progress
z: A bigger z leads to more population N:
Proposition 5 shows that in the long run complete market with two periods’ life delivers the efficient
allocations, the ones solved the social planner’s problem with individuals living for two periods.
Proposition 5 In the two periods’ problem, the complete market delivers the steady state efficient alloca-
tions, the ones solved from the social planner’s problem:
max
Nyt+1;c
y
t ;c
o
t+1
1X
t=0
t (Nyt )
1 
u
 
cyt ; c
o
t+1

where
u
 
cyt ; c
o
t+1

= A+
 
cyt c
o
t+1

subject to
Nyt c
y
t +N
o
t c
o
t = F
 
K;Lt

2.3.3 Incomplete Market Model
In this section, I study incomplete markets. I consider a friction similar with credit friction, an important
driving force of market incompleteness in macroeconomics. The friction comes from an exogenous restric-
tion on transfer from parents to children, bt+1 b
¯
. More specifically, parents are not allowed to transfer an
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amount lower than b
¯
to every child. I characterize the steady state allocation with different credit limits b
¯
and compare the efficient population to the level of population in incomplete markets. A notion of over- and
under-population is formalized through this comparison.
Steady State When the credit constraint binds, bt+1 =b
¯
. The following proposition characterizes the
steady state allocations of the system.
Proposition 6 The dynamics of the system with binding credit constraint is described by the following
equations:
nt (b
¯
  nt+1b
¯
=Rt+2)+Rt+1 [(1  ) zkt (1  nt) + b
¯
  ntb
¯
=Rt+1] = (1  nt+1) zkt+1nt (1 + )
(14)
2kt+1 =
1
qt
((1  ) zkt (1  nt) + b
¯
+ ntb
¯
=Rt+1)
1
nt
1
1  nt+1 (15)

ut
cyt
(wt+ b
¯
=Rt+1) = 

n (nt)
(nt)
nt
ut+1

1 +
nt+1
n

1
cyt+1
(wt+1+ b
¯
=Rt+2) +
A
ut+1

(16)
Rt+1 =
qt+1 + zk
 1
t+1
qt
(17)
The nondegenerate steady state allocations (n; k;N; cy) and prices (r; w;R; q) of the economy with
binding credit constraint, bt+1 = b
¯
, are given by:
n = 1
1  
1   
1
cy
(w+ b
¯
=R) = 

1 +
A
u

k =
1
2q

w + b
¯
(1 + 1=R)
1
1  

N =
K
k
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R = 1 +
r
q
u = (cy)2 R ; cy =
1
2
(w (1  ) + b
¯
  b
¯
=R)
and
w = z (1  ) k; r = zk 1:
The Model with Non-negative Credit Constraint A particularly realistic case of the bequest constrained
model is the one with non-negative constraint on transfer or credit limit, bt+1  0. Non-negative bequests
imply that parents cannot legally impose debt obligations on their children. When the constraint is binding,
bt+1 = 0:
Proposition 7 Assume 1 

1 
2
1  > 1: Under the condition 2 < (1  )

1 + 1

; the nonnegative
credit constraint binds, and the steady state utility is given by
u =
A
1 


1 
2
1    1
The restriction 1 

1 
2
1  > 1 guarantees that the utility u is positive. Since
2
1  > 1 then this requires
time cost  to be not too low. Both conditions require  to be small. The more severe an individual discounts
the future, the less he will save through children and the more likely the constraint on transfer binds.
Individual’s steady state welfare depends negatively on ; time cost of raising children. This is because a
higher cost of raising children reduces earnings and consumption. Marginal utility of consumption increases
as a partial equilibrium effect. Parents care more about the foregone time cost of raising children so fertility
tends to go down. On the other hand, the marginal benefit of having a child is lower because at higher cost
of raising children the current generation anticipates lower future generations’ consumption and welfare.
Altruistic parents care about children’s welfare. Lower welfare motivates lower fertility. If prices do not
26
adjust steady state fertility when time cost is high tends to be smaller than the one when time cost is low.
However the fixed land assumption implies the steady state fertility is 1 as population do not grow at steady
state. Hence when the time cost of raising children is higher wage needs to be lower so that parents have
stronger incentive to have more children. Higher cost of raising children and lower wage make people worse
off.
The credit (borrowing) constraint binds if and only if
ut
cyt
> Rt+1
(nt)
nt
ut+1
cyt+1
:
The parameter restriction to guarantee a binding constraint at steady state is
1 > 
1 + 
1  
where 1+1  is the value of the gross interest rate at steady state and (1) = .
Using the resource constraint, equation (11),
cyt =
(1  ) (1  )
2
f(kt)
Under the gross interest rate 1+1  , the consumption that clears the market is exactly the level that is solved
from equilibrium.
The model with nonnegative constraint has a property consistent with the Malthus model as well, that
is, the technological progress leads to more population but not consumption in the long run.
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2.3.4 Simulations of Deterministic Models
Parameters The general equilibrium model with dynastic altruistic fertility choices does not have closed
form solutions. I perform quantitative simulation in this section to investigate the steady state property of the
deterministic model, and study the effect of market frictions on long-term population by comparing steady
state population under and without the friction. For most parameters, I choose the ones calibrated to the
stochastic model in the following section. Since people live for two periods in the deterministic model while
they live for one period in the stochastic model, the parameters of preference is different. For example, the
 in the deterministic model corresponds to 2 in the stochastic model because the lifetime utility function
in deterministic model can be expressed as u = A + R (cy)2 at optimal. Parameters are summarized in
Table 2.1.
Results Steady state consumption when young cy, per capita land k, price of land q, and interest rate R in
the unconstrained model and the model with binding non-negative credit constraint are summarized in the
following table.
Table 2.1 Unconstrained and Constrained Deterministic Models
Variables Unconstrained Nonnegative credit constraint
cy 0.0086 0.0374
k 0.0002 0.0017
q 26.19 31.08
R 5.56 1.84
The quantitative exercise suggests the steady state per capita capital in unconstrained model is lower
than the steady state capital in the model with nonnegative constraint on transfer when the constraint binds.
Given the environment with a fixed amount of land, it turns out that the model when the constraint binds has
more capital per capita and hence fewer population at steady state compared with the model in absence of
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the credit constraint. Schoonbroodt and Tertilt (2014) show that model when the bequest constraint binds
produces fewer fertility than the unconstrained model. The reasoning in ST for why fertility is lower in
constrained model is that parents are prevented from extracting resource from children through a negative
bequest and children is a normal good. Their model compares fertility rates (the growth rate of population)
between complete and incomplete market models while I compare the level of population. However, if I
look only at incomplete market models with credit frictions, a surprising result arises: a tighter constraint
increases the population at steady state. Figure 2.1 plots how capital and population move as the constraint
is relaxed (meaning that the lower bound of transfer from parents to children decreases from 0 to bun).
The left panel plots steady state per capita land k versus bequest lower bound b
¯
and the right panel plots
steady state population N versus b
¯
. In both panels there is a discontinuity at the unconstrained optimal
bequest level bun. Other than that point, steady state population increases as the constraint becomes tighter
(meaning b
¯
increases to 0). The mechanism is the following. When the economy originally stays at the
steady state, tightening the credit constraint prevents parents from extracting as much resource from children
as before, and as a result fertility tends to go down below 1, which pushes the economy away from the
original steady state. People have fewer children and spend more time working. The partial equilibrium
effect leads to a higher total labor supply of the economy. The wage rate falls as a general equilibrium
effects, which makes it cheaper to have children and hence induces people to have more children. Fertility
falls as the partial equilibrium effect after the tightening of the constraint and then increases to 1 so that the
economy arrives at a new steady state. Under the new steady state wage is lower than that of the original
steady state and hence population is higher when total land is fixed. An application of this result is a
prediction of lower population after introducing the pay as you go (PAYG) system. PAYG requires current
young to pay money for the current old, which is parallel with a more relaxed credit friction. From the
perspective of the model, I anticipate the population to go down.
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The jump of capital and population at the unconstrained optimal bequest is because the mapping from
the degree of friction, described by b
¯
, to steady state interest rate is discontinuous as shown in Figure 2.2.
The horizontal axis is bequest lower bound and the vertical axis is interest rate R: When the constraint is
very tight, equilibrium interest rate is low. The more relaxed the constraint, the lower the equilibrium interest
rate. However, when the constraint is relaxed to the first best level, there are two equilibrium interest rates.
One of them is low and the other one is high. The one with high magnitude is exactly the frictionless interest
rate. I denote it by point A in the figure.
Stability Analysis of the Steady State In the previous sections, I focus on characterizing the steady state
and the comparative static analysis. In this section, I quantitatively investigate the stability of the steady
state. For the simplicity of notation, denote the system of equations, (14), (15), (16), and (17) by the
following four equations:
F 1 (nt+1; nt; Rt+2; Rt+1; kt+1; kt) = 0
F 2 (kt+1; kt; nt; Rt+1; nt+1; qt) = 0
F 3 (kt; kt+1; nt; nt+1; Rt+1; Rt+2) = 0
F 4 (Rt+1; qt+1; qt; kt+1) = 0
Log linearization around the steady state is done in the appendix. I express the system as Xt+1 =
A 1BXt. Four eigenvalues of the matrix A 1B determine the stability of the four dimensional first order
dynamic system. According to the simulated result, all the steady state except for point A; the steady state
of the unconstrained model, is saddle point stable. Among the four eigenvalues of the model with credit
limit b
¯
2 (bun; 0]; one real eigenvalue is close to 0, another real eigenvalue has absolute value bigger than
1, and the norm of two conjugate complex eigenvalues is bigger than 1. Hence, steady states of credit
constraint models are saddle path stable. The four eigenvalues of the complete market model are 0, 0.8123,
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4:2959  0:3458 i. The absolute values of two real roots are smaller than 1 and the norm of the two are
bigger than 1. The steady state of the complete market model, point A, is stable.
2.4 Stochastic Model
2.4.1 Environment
In this section, I extend the deterministic model to a stochastic model in which abilities are random and
correlated between parents and children. This model is essentially a Bewley model with a fixed amount
of land and endogenous population. In this model every individual lives one period. I am able to use
a stochastic model with one period life, not necessarily two periods’ life, to study the impact of friction
on population because with heterogenous agents a binding nonnegative transfer (bequest) constraint can
be equilibrium because it does not imply every individual’s bequest constraint is tight. In this sense, two
periods’ life is not as crucial as that in the deterministic case.
In the stochastic model, lifetime earning ability, denoted by !, is determined at birth and a child’s ability
!0 is correlated with parent’s ability. Assume earning ability follows an AR(1) process
ln!0 = ln! + "; where "  N(0; !): (18)
The lifetime utility of an individual is of the Barro-Becker type:
V (a; !) = max
c;n;a0
u (c) +  (n)E

V
 
a0; !0
 j!
where u (c) = c1 1  + A: c is consumption and n is the number of children. Let a denotes transfer, or
bequest, received from parents. V (a; !) is the utility of every individual who inherits an amount of asset
a from parents and is endowed with earning ability !: I call them a type (a; !) individual in the following.
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E is the mathematical expectation operator conditional on parental ability !. The altruism function is the
same with the form in the deterministic model  (n) = n1 , where 0   < 1:
The resources of an individual endowed with ability ! are labor income and transfers from their parents.
Labor income is the multiplication of time devoted to working, (1  n), and wage adjusted by ability, !w.
Resources are used to consume and to bequeath to children. The budget constraint of an individual with
ability ! is:
c+ na0  (1 + r) a+ ! (1  n)w
I assume there is a credit constraint, under which parents are restricted from leaving an amount of transfer
(bequest) lower than a
¯
,
a0  a
¯
.
A special case is the nonnegative credit constraint when a
¯
= 0.5
The interior optimal fertility condition is
u0 (c)
 
!w + a0

= 0 (n)E

V
 
a0; !0
 j!
Assume  2 (0; 1) . The curvature of the utility function captures the intergenerational elasticity of sub-
stitution, not the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. A low  implies high elasticity of intergenerational
substitution. Typically in macroeconomics this parameter is bigger than 1.
2.4.2 Law of Motion of Population and Distribution
Let N (a; !) be their population of individuals of type (a; !), n (; !) be their fertility, and g (a; !) be
their bequest policy. Children takes parents time, so the effective labor supply of an individual with ability
5By setting the per capita land k  a
q
and rents ~r  r
q
; one can easily show that the model with transferring only asset to
children is equivalent with a model in which a parent with type (k; !) transfer only an amount of land k0 (k; !) to every child. We
show in the appendix that a model in which parents transfer both land and assets to children is equivalent with a Bewley model
when parents only transfer land to children.
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! is ! (1  n (; !)) : The total labor L in the economy is the summation of all individuals’ labor supply,
weighted by population and ability.
L =
X
(a;!)
N (a; !)! (1  n (; !))
The law of motion of population is
N
 
a0; !0

=
X
(a;!)
N (a; !)n (a; !)M
 
!; !0

I
 
a0; a; !

where I (a0; a; !) is an indicator function
I
 
a0; a; !

=
8>><>>:
1 if a0 = g (a; !)
0 otherwise
I (a0; a; !) identifies parents with states (a; !) who transfer an amount a0 to children. Let the unconditional
distribution of (a; !) be  (a; !)  N(a;!)N . Dividing both sides of the law of motion of population by total
population of the economy N;
N 0
N
=
X
(a0;!0)
X
(a;!)
N (a; !)
N
n (a; !)M
 
!; !0

I
 
a0; a; !

=
X
(a;!)
 (a; !)n (a; !)
which derives the law of motion of distribution,  (a; !):

 
a0; !0

=
P
(a;!)  (a; !)n (a; !)M (!; !
0) I (a0; a; !)P
(a;!)  (a; !)n (a; !)
(19)
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2.4.3 Equilibrium
Land Market Total supply of asset is the value of land, q K; which is the price of land q times the stock of
land K. In equilibrium, it must equalize the demand of asset
P
g (a; !)N (a; !) : So asset market clearing
condition is
q K =
X
g (a; !)N (a; !)
It induces the equilibrium condition of land market
K =
N
q
X
g (a; !) (a; !) (20)
Labor Market Population does not change with time at steady state. N = N 0 if and only if
X
(a;!)
 (a; !)n (a; !) = 1 (21)
holds.
Total labor demand equals the total labor supply, which derives the labor market clearing condition
L
N
=
X
(a;!)
 (a; !)! (1  n (a; !)) (22)
Following the notation in deterministic model, wage w and rent r are the marginal product of labor and
land, respectively.
w = FL
 
K;L

; r = F K
 
K;L
 (23)
Definition of Equilibrium at steady state A competitive equilibrium at steady state are price fq; w; rg,
allocations fc (a; !) ; n (a; !) ; a0 (a; !)g(a;!) ; the distribution f (; !)g(;!), a population level N , and
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a level of labor supply L such that: (i) allocations solve the individual problem given prices; (ii) w and r
satisfy (23), and q clears the land market as defined by (20); and (iii) population and labor satisfy equations
(21) and (22).
This general equilibrium model with heterogenous agents does not have a closed form solution, so the
quantitatively solution is solved in the following section.
2.4.4 Simulations of the Stochastic Model
Parameters The following parameters are needed to simulate the model: the Markov process of abilities
M , preference parameter ; nonhomothetic partA of the utility, altruistic parameters  and , cost of raising
children ; the capital share  in the production function, and the stock of land K:
I use the Tauchen’s Method to discretize the AR(1) process (18) by a three state Markov chain M .
Denote by M (!; !0) the probability that a child to be endowed with ability !0 given ! as the parental
ability. Setting the intergenerational persistence of log ability  to be 0.5 and the variance w to be 0.85.
 and " are chosen to be 0.72 and 0.57 respectively according to Cordoba, Liu and Ripoll (2014) (CLR
henceforth) who calibrate the dynastic altruistic model to match key features of U.S. inequality. The parame-
ter , the curvature of the utility function, is smaller than 1. In the context of dynastic models, it controls the
intergenerational elasticity of substitution (EGS) that measures the willingness to substitute consumption
across generations (between parents and children). By contrast, typically in macroeconomics  is bigger
than 1 because it controls the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (EIS) that measures the willingness
to substitute consumption between different periods of one’s life. As Cordoba and Ripoll (2014b) (CR
henceforth) investigate, a low EGS is one of the key factors that generate a negative relationship between
fertility and income. Time cost of raising children  is picked to be 0.308, the one calibrated in Cordoba and
Ripoll (2014b). Their calibration is based on Folbre (2008) who uses data from the 1997 Child Development
Supplement of the PSID and the family income data of USDA (2012).
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Other parameters that needs to be calibrated are capital share ; total factor productivity z; intergen-
erational discount rate ; and the nonhomotheticity A. I calibrate  to match net interest rate which is 2
calibrated in Cordoba, Liu and Ripoll (2014), z to match arable land per person in the United Kingdom,
and A to match the income elasticity of fertility. The income elasticity of fertility, estimated in Jones and
Tertilt (2006) using U.S. census data from 1826 to 1960, is -0.38. Broadberry, Campbell, Klein, Overton,
and Leeuwen (2010) provide data on the population of the United Kingdom in 1700s, which is 5.2 million,
and the total arable land during the same period, which is 9.7 millions of acres. Hence the arable land per
person is 1.865 acres. I do not match the parameter  to a specific target because the equilibrium of dynastic
altruistic model with fixed land is very hard to obtain. Given other parameters, the interest rate that clears
the land market tends to be too high to maintain an average fertility rate at 1. The transfer lower limit a
¯
is set
to be 0 and parents face a nonnegative constraint on transfer. There is typically no equilibrium unless the pa-
rameter  is low enough to reduce fertility rates of different types. These set of parameters are summarized
in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2 Parameters
Parameters Concept Values Targets
 discount rate 0.15 avg(n) = 1
 altruistic parameter 0.57 CLR (2014)
 elasticity of substitution 0.72 CLR (2014)
 per child time cost 0.308 CR (2014b)
 capital share 0.295 interest rate in CLR (2014)
z TFP 1 per capita land (UK 1700)
A constant term in utility 0.28 income-fertility elasticity
b
¯
bequest lower bound 0 exogenous
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Results The simulated model shows that high ability individuals choose to have more consumption and
fewer children, and bequeath more to every child than low ability individuals. These properties are consistent
with the data and are shown from the first three panels of Figure 2.3 in which red dashed line denotes
allocations of high ability individuals and blue solid line denotes those of low ability. The upper left panel
shows that the amount that high ability individuals’ bequeath to every child does not vary a lot as they receive
more bequest from parents. The extra resource from parents translates into more demand for children but not
more transfer to every child. Notice that in the numerical simulation, I consider a discrete set of number of
children. For example, the set can be

0; 1; 2;    ; 1
	
: As the number of children approaches a continuous
variable, the bequest policy tends to be flat. This feature is consistent with Alvarez (1999) that considers
children and total bequests to all children as two assets in the dynamic portfolio problem. This result
crucially depends on the following elements: BB form of homothetic altruism function, linear time cost
function and the CES from of the homothetic part of utility function. In Cordoba, Liu and Ripoll (2014),
we show that this feature does not necessarily hold for those whose credit constraint are binding, the low
type individuals in this chapter. If the transfer received from parents is high enough, low type individuals’
optimal fertility could hit the maximum number and is not able to increase as the transfer received from
parents rises.
The inverse relationship between ability and fertility is not easy to obtain in altruistic fertility models.
I replicate this result as shown in the lower left panel of Figure 2.3. The reason why an inverse link is
reproduced is due to the following four factors: abilities are persistent but not perfectly persistent across
generations, the high elasticity of substitution ( < 1), the presence of time cost of raising children, and
the market friction. As the earning ability increases, the marginal cost of having a child, u0 (c) (!w + a0),
increases because on one hand children are more costly for high ability parents in terms of time cost. On
the other hand, high ability people care less about the time cost because they enjoy lower marginal utility
of consumption. When  < 1, the time cost dominates and high ability people have higher marginal cost
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of raising a child. The marginal benefit 0 (n)E [V (a0; !0) j!] increases with earning ability due to the
persistence of ability. If the intergenerational persistence of ability is not perfect, the effect of ability on the
marginal cost dominates its effect on the marginal benefit. Regression to the mean in abilities means that
low ability parents expect their children to be of higher ability on average while high ability parents expect
their children to be of lower ability. This explains why poor people have more children and rich ones have
fewer children in a fully rational and altruistic environment.
The lower right panel of Figure 2.3 plots the distribution of population of two ability groups. As I can
see from the figure, a majority of people are under credit constraint. More specifically 43% of low ability
people and 29% of high ability people bequeath nothing to every child. They would like to impose a debt
upon children but are prevented from doing so by the nonnegative credit constraint. The huge amount of
people under constraint indicates the importance of the credit friction, which is the main driving force of the
incomplete market model in this chapter.
Policy Experiments I perform a policy experiment of relaxing the credit constraint to investigate whether
steady state population becomes higher or lower. When A is 1 as I use above; the steady state population
with different bequest lower bounds are close to 0 and it is hard to capture the trend of population as I relax
the credit constraint. As a result, I decreaseA to 0.3 to obtain higher population levels. As Figure 2.4 shows,
the steady state population drops dramatically from 325 to 1.39 as the bequest lower bound a
¯
decreases from
0 to -0.11. The result implies that the tighter the credit constraint, the more the steady state population at
steady state. Put it differently, the model with the nonnegative credit constraint produce too much population
in the long run compared with the one one with loser constraint. Based on this result, I wonder whether a
policy aiming at restricting people’s fertility choices, such as one child policy, is able to reduce the level of
steady state population in the model with nonnegative credit constraint.
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I study a demographic policy, n children policy that restricts people’s fertility choices. n is the maximal
fertility allowed. I study how population behaves by gradually reducing n from 1 to 1.1. Recall that
1
 is the
maximum number of children one could possibly have since every child needs  percentage of time from
parents and the total amount of time is normalized to 1. When n is 1 ; the policy does not restrict people’s
fertility choices. n has to be no lower than the replacement rate, one. If n were below one, the fertility rate
of every type of individuals would be below one and the population diminishes over time, in which case
equilibrium does not exist with a fixed amount of land.
The result is surprising to some extent. The demographic policies such as one child policy aim at
reducing people’s fertility, but end up with increasing steady state population. The reason is the following.
Assume I impose a policy that further restricts people’s fertility choices, e.g. a one child policy, on an
economy initially staying at steady state with more children allowed. In the short run when prices are given
the policy decreases the utility of everyone living in all generations and decreases the marginal benefit of
having a child. Marginal cost of having one more child at every given fertility level is not affected when
prices are given. As a result, the policy reduces fertility of every individual. People spend less time raising
children and more time working, which increases an economy’s labor supply and decrease the wage rage.
The reason why one child policy lowers the utility of every individual is the following. Those who wants
to have more than one child is negatively affected because the policy restricts people’s fertility choices.
Fertility restrictions that only affect a particular group result in lower welfare for all individuals because,
regardless of current ability, there is a positive probability that a descendant of the dynasty will fall into the
group directly affected in finite time. So those whose fertility choices are not directly affected are also hurt
by the policy.
Before the price adjusts, the one child policy shrinks the fertility choice set and lowers every individual’s
marginal benefit of having a child. People choose to have fewer children than before. Hence population
growth become less than 1 and the economy leaves the steady state. For the economy to retrieve a steady
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state, prices have to adjust to induce fertility rates going up until population growth rate becomes one again.
The equilibrium wage rate falls, which decreases the marginal cost of raising a child. It also decreases the
marginal benefit. When the decrease of marginal cost is more than that of the marginal benefit, people are
induced to have more children. Fertilities of different types of individuals go down immediately after a
tighter restriction is imposed and go up later. In the new steady state, average fertility must come back to 1
and the steady state wage is lower than that in the initial steady state. With a fixed amount of land, a lower
wage rate implies a higher total labor supply. Total labor supply is the multiplication of population and the
weighted average of individuals’ labor supply. Average fertility rate is one at steady state, which prevents
the average labor supply to move a lot. Hence an increase of total labor supply translate into an increase of
total population.
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I study the issues of population of an economy with finite resource, land. I find maximum
sustainable population can be efficient even in the presence of fixed resources. The long run population is
lower in incomplete market economy than the efficient level.
I also study demographic policies in a Bewley model with endogenous fertility and fixed resource. I find
that policies that restrict fertility choices increase population in the long run. An empirical regularity, the
inverse relationship between fertility and earning ability, is replicated in equilibrium.
This model abstracts a number of factors that potentially interact with population in the long run. For
example, I abstract technological progress and the physical capital. Other related factors, such as education,
interacts with transfer and affects one’s fertility decision and the economy’s long run population. Incorpo-
rating these factors into the model is left to the future work.
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CHAPTER 3. FERTILITY, SOCIAL MOBILITY, AND LONG RUN
INEQUALITY
3.1 Introduction
During the last two decades the study on inequality has significantly advanced thanks to the development
a fairly unified and tractable framework of analysis known as Bewley models.6 As explained in Aiyagari
(1994), these models build upon the standard growth model of Brock and Mirman (1972) by incorporating
precautionary saving motives and liquidity constraints. The connection with the standard growth model
is very appealing because a single unified framework can be used to study issues of long term growth,
business cycles –as in Kydland and Prescott (1982),– and issues of distribution, or inequality. Implicit in
this framework is the idea of dynastic altruism: either individuals are infinitely lived or, more realistically,
lives are finite but individuals care about the welfare of their descendants. Dynastic altruism is an important
conceptual benchmark because it brings certain level of efficiency, if not full efficiency, to the resulting
allocations.
This fairly unified framework, however, seems to fall apart when serious consideration is given to fer-
tility decisions. In particular, Becker and Barro (1988) and Barro and Becker (1989) introduce optimal
fertility choices within the optimal growth model and find that some of the most appealing conclusions ob-
tained under the exogenous fertility assumption are seriously altered.7 On the specific issue of inequality,
the optimal fertility choice tends to eliminate any inequality and any persistence of inequality, a result high-
lighted by Bosi et al. (2011) in the context of a deterministic Barro-Becker model. In contrast, the version
of the model with exogenous fertility predicts that any initial inequality is highly persistent, as shown by
6Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012, chapter 18) offers a pedagogical exposition. Some of the contributions in this literature include,
among many, Loury (1981), Laitner (1992), Aiyagari (1994), Huggett (1996), Krusell and Smith (1998), Castañeda et al. (2003),
and Restuccia and Urrutia (2004). See Cagetti and De Nardi (2008) for a comprehensive survey.
7Cordoba and Ripoll (2012) discuss some of the counterfactual predictions of the Barro-Becker model. For instance, this model
predicts a negative association between individual consumption and individual income. This prediction runs counter to standard
consumption theory and a variety of evidence suggesting a positive association between lifetime income and lifetime consumption.
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Chatterjee (1994). An analogous result is obtained using Bewley style models. While Bewley models with
infinitely lived agents, as in Aiyagari (1994), or with exogenous fertility, as in Castañeda et al. (2003),
predict significant and persistent inequality, the analogous version with endogenous fertility predicts lack of
persistence (Alvarez, 1999). Section 3.2 derives and discusses in more detail these results.
The key possibility introduced into the growth model when allowing endogenous fertility is that richer
individuals can use family size as a way to obtain welfare, an extensive margin, instead of providing more
consumption to each descendant, the intensive margin. This turns out to be the optimal solution and, as
a result, there is no inequality after the original generation. Although inequality can be recovered when
markets are incomplete and shocks are idiosyncratic, Alvarez finds an implausible lack of persistence result,
or lack of memory, in this case: there is no persistence in economic status after controlling for innate ability.
In other words, social mobility is perfect. Jones et al. (2013) find an analogous result, which they call the
"resetting" property, in the context of an optimal contract with private information. We derive a version of
these results in section 3.2 below.
Due to some arguably unrealistic predictions of existing altruistic models with endogenous fertility –
namely lack of inequality, lack of persistence and/or a positive response of fertility to income– most of the
existing literature on inequality either: (i) abstracts from endogenous fertility decisions; or (ii) departs from
the assumption that parents are purely altruistic and exhibit instead certain type of warm glow altruism (e.g.,
De la Croix and Doepke, 2003; Sholz and Seshadri, 2009). Both approaches are convenient for multiple
purposes but unsatisfactory for others. For example, by ignoring issues of fertility the recent literature on
inequality is silent about the documented strong association between fertility, inequality and poverty, an
association that has been used to support family planning programs around the world (e.g., Chu and Koo,
1990). Furthermore, warm glow altruism is unsatisfactory when addressing issues of policy evaluation and
optimal policy design because it introduces, by assumption, inefficiencies at the household level (Kaplow
and Shavell, 2001).
42
Another determinant of inequality is fertility. An older literature on the topic, one that mostly abstracts
from savings, inter vivos transfers and bequests, shows that systematic differences in fertility rates among
income groups affect the observed distribution of incomes. This literature include authors such as Lam
(1986, 1997), and Chu and Koo (1990).
This chapter revisits the relationship between fertility, savings and long run inequality in economies
populated by altruistic individuals. Since pure altruism is at the core of modern macroeconomics, a field
that builds extensively on the dynastic model, it is natural to wonder if pure altruism is ultimate inconsistent
with key stylized facts regarding social mobility, the distribution of earnings, income, wealth, as well as
evidence of fertility declining with income (Jones and Tertilt, 2008).8 We consider various ways to recover
inequality and persistence as well as conditions to replicate a negative fertility-income relationship. We are
able to show that, under very natural conditions, pure altruism can generate the degree of inequality and
persistence as well as the negative fertility income relationship suggested by the data. To the extent of our
knowledge, our model is the first altruistic model to get these predictions right.9 Our analysis implies that
altruism is ultimately consistent with empirical evidence of fertility and inequality, and it provides tools for
researchers and policy makers to fully incorporate considerations of fertility and family size into the analysis
of inequality.
The model we analyze features individuals who live for two periods: as a child and as an adult. While we
do not model the childhood period, individuals start adulthood with a level of ability and a level of transfers
they receive from their parents. We refer to these transfers as "bequests" although they reflect the present
value of all the resources the individual receives from the parent at the beginning of adulthood. We also refer
to these bequests as "wealth" as they represent a measure of dynastic wealth. Adults in the model consume
and decide on the number of children. Raising children involves a time cost, which endogenously affect
the lifetime labor supply of the adult. It also involves a "goods cost" as given by the bequests. While the
8Cordoba and Ripoll (2014) address other issues of altruistic models of endogenous fertility besides inequality.
9Alvarez (1999) consider some of these possibilities in theory. Our main contribution is quantitative.
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level of earnings ability will be drawn from an exogenous distribution, labor supply will be endogenous and
will constitute an important channel in explaining the intergenerational persistence of earnings. Similarly,
bequests constitute the main channel of intergenerational persistence of wealth.
In addition to deriving some theoretical results regarding intergenerational persistence, we calibrate the
model in order to provide a quantitative evaluation of the importance of different modeling assumptions in
explaining persistence. Even though the model we analyze is stylized, our calibration follows a heuristic
approach in order to better understand the mechanisms at work. We rely on the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics in order to compute a number of calibration targets. We also use information provided in other
sources, particularly in the Census, the Child Development Survey, and the United States Department of
Agriculture to set additional targets. These sources are particularly important to determine the income
elasticity of fertility, as well as the costs of raising children.
The analysis yields a number of interesting results regarding intergenerational links and inequality. First,
the exogenous persistence of (earnings) ability is not enough to generate persistence of wealth in the model
with endogenous fertility. Although the theoretical analysis of Alvarez (1999) suggests this lack of persis-
tence, it is not clear whether this is the case quantitatively. Our calibration exercise confirms the quantitative
lack of persistence for the standard fertility model. In particular, the standard modeling assumptions in the
literature include a hyperbolic altruistic function, a constant marginal cost of raising children, and a contin-
uous number of children. These assumptions together eliminate the endogenous persistence of inequality
because the transfers or "bequests" parents give to their children are only a function of ability, and not of the
transfers the parent himself received. Relaxing the assumption that the altruistic function is hyperbolic is
enough to recover persistence. In particular, when we replace this function for an exponential one, the model
generates significantly more persistence. The reason is that while under hyperbolic altruism the elasticity
with respect to the number of children is constant, with exponential altruism this elasticity decreases with
the number of children. As we discuss below, in this case wealthier parents have more children, but they
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also transfer more resources to each of them, increasing persistence. In addition, making the number of
children discrete limits the extent to which individuals may freely use children as a margin of adjustment of
their wealth portfolios.
Second, in models with endogenous fertility, the exogenous persistence of ability is not enough to gen-
erate persistence of earnings. Earnings are computed as the multiplication between ability (exogenous) and
labor supply (endogenous). In this respect, the behavior of labor supply, which is directly linked to the
cost of raising children, becomes essential in understanding persistence. It turns out that in models with
endogenous fertility, labor supply is negatively correlated across generations, which tends to lower persis-
tence. Specifically, low ability individuals would have more children, lower labor supply, lower earnings,
and would give lower bequests to their children. In turn, these asset-poor children will have less children
and higher labor supply. Breaking the extent of this negative correlation of labor supply across generations
is key to recover persistence.
Third, our calibration strongly suggests that the rate at which parents substitute their own consumption
with their children’s consumption is larger than the rate of substitution of consumption across the individ-
ual’s life cycle in standard quantitative macro models. In other words, the "elasticity of intergenerational
substitution" is larger than the more commonly known elasticity of intertemporal substitution. We calibrate
this parameter to match the Gini coefficient of wealth, as intergenerational substitution plays a key role in
determining whether or not parents hit the zero-bequest constraint imposed in the model. It turns out that this
parameter is also important in guaranteeing a negative relationship between ability (earnings) and fertility.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the model and derives some
analytical results regarding persistence, as well as the relationship between fertility, ability and bequests.
Section 3.3 discusses the calibration targets and explains the data used in computing these targets. Section
3.4 presents the results for a number of variations of our benchmark model. In particular, this section high-
lights how different modeling assumptions on the altruistic function and the cost of raising children affect
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the quantitative performance of the model. Special attention is given to the comparison of the exogenous
and the endogenous fertility models. A policy simulation of an increase in estate taxation in discussed in
section 3.5, while section 3.6 briefly concludes the analysis.
3.2 The basic model of dynastic altruism
3.2.1 Preliminaries
The following is a version of the model studied by Alvarez (1999). Individuals live for two periods, one
as a child and one as an adult. Children do not consume. Adults have earning ability ! and receive parental
transfers b: We also refer to b as bequest or wealth. Lifetime resources are given by (1 + r) b+! where r is
a risk free interest rate. Resources can be used to consume, c, or to pay for the cost of raising children. The
cost of children includes a time cost, (n); and a good cost, nb0. Normalizing total parental time to one,
there is maximum feasible number of children, n, satisfying  (n) = 1: Earning abilities are random and
drawn from the distribution F (!j! 1), where ! 1 is the ability of the parent. Individuals know their own
earning ability but not the ability of their children.
Preferences are of the form V = U(c) +
R n
0 E [V
0
i j!]idi where U(c) is the utility flow derived from
consumption, E [V 0i j!] is expected lifetime utility of child i; i  0 is the weight that the parent places on
the welfare of child i, and n is the mass of children. These preferences are appealing because they describe
parents as social planners at the house level. Since weights are non-negative, children are goods to parents
only if V 0i  0: This requires the restriction U(c)  0. We focus on the CRRA case, U(c) = c
1 
1  + A;
where 1= is the elasticity of intergenerational substitution (EGS), a parameter that controls the willingness
to substitute consumption between parents and children. As discussed in Cordoba and Ripoll (2014), the
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EGS is conceptually and quantitatively different from the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS).10 A
positive constant A ensures a positive utility flow in the low curvature case,  > 1.
We will focus on the symmetric case, V 0i = V .11 In this case,
R n
0 E [V
0
i j!]idi = (n)E [V 0i j!] where
(n) =
R n
0 idi is the weight parents place on their n children. Notice that 
0(n) = n > 0: In order to
keep utility bounded, it is necessary to assume that parents put more weight on themselves than on all their
potential children, 1 > (n): Assuming further that i decreases with i implies that (n) is concave. Let
(n) = 0(n) n(n) be elasticity of (n) with respect to n, an elasticity that plays a central role in fertility
choices.
Two functional forms for (n) are explored below: hyperbolic and exponential child discounting. Hy-
perbolic discounting is the most common in the literature (e.g., Becker and Barro, 1988). It takes the form
i =  (1  ) i , 0 <  < 1, which implies (n) = n1  and a constant elasticity (n) = 1   : The
restriction 0 <  < 1 is required for marginal weights to be positive and decreasing. Alvarez (1999) also
considers the case  > 1 combined with a negative utility function so that parental utility increases with
the number of children. For completeness, we consider this case below but notice that it implies negative
marginal weights, i < 0; so that parents are not altruistic toward all their children.
Exponential child discounting takes the form i = e i,  > 0; which implies (n) =  (1  e n)
and a decreasing elasticity (n) = nen 1 which goes from 1 when n = 0 to 0 when n = 1: This type
of discounting is the natural counterpart of exponential time discounting but applied to individuals. It has
the convenient property that (1) =  so that  < 1 ensures the boundedness of parental utility for any
positive fertility. This property does not hold in the hyperbolic case.
10To see this, one can interpret consumption as a composite good made of consumption flows at various ages:
c =
Z T
0
e tc1 a da
 1
1 
:
In this interpreation the EIS is 1= while EGS = 1=:
11Symmetric treatment is not optimal given that weights are different. However, it may be optimal for strategic reasons as in
Bernheim and Severinov (2003).
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3.2.2 Recursive formulation
The following is a recursive formulation of the individual’s problem:
V (b;!) = Max
nn0; bb00

U
 
(1 + r) b+ !   nb0    (n)!+ (n)E V (b0;!0)j!	 :
This problem is not a standard discounted dynamic programming problem due to the endogeneity of the
discount factor, (n); and the non-convexity introduced by the term nb0: As a result standard properties,
such as strict concavity of the value function, need to be established. Some properties of the problem are
well-known for specific functional forms U(c) and (n) (Alvarez 1999, Qi and Kanaya 2010). We assume
the problem is well-behaved and check numerically that this is in fact the case.
Let n = N(b; !) and b0 = B(b; !) be the optimal solution rules. The optimality conditions for n and b0;
and the Envelope condition for b are, respectively,
b0 + !0(n) = 0(n)
E [V (b0;!0)j!]
U 0 (c)
; (24)
U 0 (c)  (n)
n
E

Vb(b
0;!0)j! ; with equality if b0  0; and (25)
Vb(b;!) = (1 + r)U
0(c): (26)
The conditions above assume an interior solution for fertility but allow a general solution for transfers.
Corner solutions for fertility are discussed below. The left hand side of equation (24) is the marginal cost
of a child, including goods and time costs, while the right hand side is the marginal benefit of the n child to
a parent. Term E[V (b
0;!0)j!]
U 0(c) is the expected welfare of the child measured in units of parental consumption,
while 0(n) = n > 0 is the marginal weight of the n child.
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The optimal condition for bequests can be written, using the last two equations, as
U 0 (c)  (n)
n
(1 + r)E

U 0
 
c0

: (27)
This version of the Euler Equation describes optimal intergenerational consumption smoothing. An impor-
tant difference with the traditional Euler Equation is that the average degree of altruism, b(n)  (n)n ; takes
the place of the discount factor. As a result, family size plays a key role in determining intergenerational
savings, and in particular, larger families have less incentives to save since b0(n) < 0:
Given the policy functions, the wealth-ability distribution can be computed recursively as:
pt+1(b
0; !0) =
1
nt
X
!
X
fb:b0=b(b;!)g
pt(b; !)n(b; !)F (!
0j!)
where nt =
P
!;b pt(b; !)n(b; !) is average population growth.
Finally, define (lifetime) labor earnings and income as e = ! (1  (n)) and i = ! + rb: The model
does not offer a measure of wealth easily comparable with observed measures of wealth in the data. Variable
b0 are transfers from parents to children during adulthood and is a measure of dynastic wealth, excluding
any life cycle component. Nonetheless, the quantitative exercise we present here will provide insights into
the ability of endogenous fertility models to recover certain level of persistence of b. We now discuss two
properties of the model regarding persistence and the relationship between fertility, ability and bequests.
3.2.3 Persistence
The most common functional forms of the dynastic altruism model assumes a constant marginal cost
of raising children and hyperbolic child discounting. Proposition 1 states that under those assumption the
optimal bequest policy is independent of b and therefore there is no endogenous persistence of inequality.
Proposition 1. Suppose 0(n) =  and  (n) = : Then b0 = B(b; !) = B(!):
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Proof. Combining (24) and (47) yields:
b0 + !0(n)   (n) E [V (b
0;!0)j!]
E [Vb(b0;!0)j!] with equality if b
0 > 0: (28)
Under the stated assumptions, condition (28) is independent of n; and therefore the condition fully
describes the solution of b0: b0 is either 0 or the one that solves equation (28) with equality. Since (28)
does not depend on b; the optimal solution takes the form b0 = B(!):
Proposition 1 states that if the marginal cost of children is constant and the parental weight is an isoelastic
function of the number of children, then the optimal bequest policy is independent of b. This result was first
obtained by Barro and Becker (1989) for a determinist environment, and later extended by Alvarez (1999)
to an stochastic one. Our derivation is novel and more direct.12 We call this result the lack of (endogenous)
persistence property. Proposition 1 is particularly important because it remains the most popular formulation
of the Barro-Becker model.
Figure 3.1 illustrates some implications of the lack of persistence property for the deterministic case.
Figure 3.1.a. shows, for given !, the policy function b0 = B(b) for the case of exogenous fertility. The
figure assumes n = 1 and, for simplicity, (1 + r) = 1. In that case, b0 = b is the optimal policy. Thus, if
the initial distribution of wealth is described by a vector
 !
b 0 then financial inequality is perfectly persistent
as
 !
b t =
 !
b 0 for all t. Figure 3.1.b. shows the policy function for the case of endogenous fertility. In that
case, b0 = b regardless of b. As a result, any initial inequality disappears after one generation, a point made
transparent in Bosi et al. (2011). The deterministic altruistic model predicts no persistence of economic
status.
Figure 3.2 illustrates analogous results for the stochastic case. Figure 3.2a shows the case of exogenous
fertility with (1 + r) < 1 and n = 1. The figure follows Aiyagari (1994). In this case, there is inequality
12Our derivation uses the household problem, while Alvarez derive the result by aggregating at the dynasty level. His derivation
requires to assume that all children have the same ability !0, while our derivation does not impose this assumption.
50
even in the long run and endogenous persistence of wealth: conditional on ability, richer parents provide
more assets to their children except in the region where b0 = B(b; !) = 0: Figure 3.2b illustrates the endoge-
nous fertility case: conditional on ability, asset rich parents do not have asset rich children. Economic status
is not persistent beyond any persistence that comes from the exogenous persistence of abilities. Whether
this channel of pure exogenous persistence is enough to account for the empirical evidence on persistence is
a quantitative question. We explore this possibility in the next section.
Persistence weakens when fertility is endogenous because richer parents can use family size as a way
to obtain welfare, the extensive margin, instead of providing more consumption to each descendant, the
intensive margin. For the functional forms originally used by Barro and Becker (1989) all (endogenous)
persistence disappears.
Proposition 1 suggests that the lack of persistence is an special result obtained for specific but stylized
functional forms commonly used in the literature. Equation (28) suggests two ways to recover persistence:
an increasing marginal cost of raising children or a decreasing elasticity of altruism.13 Both alternatives
either make more costly or less attractive the use of the family size margin. The second alternative is more
plausible since the evidence suggests that the marginal cost of raising children decreases with the number of
children due to parental learning by doing. A third channel is to allow a discrete number of children which
limits the extent to which parents can use the family size margin.
3.2.4 The fertility-ability-bequest relationship
Consider now the ability of the model to generate a negative relationship between fertility and earnings
consistent with the empirical evidence. In the context of a deterministic model, Cordoba and Ripoll (2015)
have shown that such pattern can only be obtained if the EGS is larger than one, and Cordoba and Liu (2014)
find the same result in the context of an stochastic model with no savings. It turns out that EGS > 1 is also
13Alvarez (1999) discuss these possibilities.
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required in the current model. To see this, it is convenient to rewrite (24) as:
 
b0 + !0(n)

U 0 (c) =
b0 + !0(n)
c
= 0(n)E

V (b0;!0)j! :
Notice first that the marginal benefit of having a child, the right hand side of the expression, typically
increases with the ability of the parent for two reasons: first, since abilities are intergenerational persistent,
the ability of the child also increases; second, since abilities are typically mean reverting, the ability of the
child does not increase as much as the ability of the parent inducing parental transfers to increase.
For fertility to decrease with parental ability, !, the marginal cost must increase more than the marginal
benefit. The marginal cost tend to increase both because the time cost increases, !0(n); and also because
transfers are expected to increase. However, parental consumption also increases with ability which reduces
the marginal utility of consumption and lowers the cost of raising children. In other words, the diminishing
marginal utility of parental consumption makes children more valuable. If  is sufficiently large this effect
would dominate and fertility will increase with ability. Therefore, a negative fertility-earnings relationship
requires a low , or high EGS. How high? For this purpose, consider the case of poor individuals, those
who are constrained and do not leave any transfers. Their marginal cost of raising children is:
!0(n)
c
=
!1 0(n)
(1   (n)) :
For the marginal cost to increase with ability for poor individuals the condition  < 1 is needed.
3.3 Data and calibration
We now discuss the data and the calibration exercise. Bringing the model to the data is difficult due to
its simplicity and data limitations. In particular, while bequests in the model include total intergenerational
transfers, what we can measure in the data is net assets over the life cycle, or wealth. We follow an heuristic
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approach by assuming that key moments of the distribution of wealth, namely Lorenz curves and degree
of persistence, also characterize the distribution of bequests. For our purposes of recovering persistence,
this approach turns out to be sufficiently informative as many key results are robust to alternative plausible
assumptions. In fact, as we discuss next section, we are able to isolate the role different features (e.g., the
type of altruistic discounting, the EGS, the cost function of raising children) play in recovering persistence.
3.3.1 Data
We use a number of data sources to compute the calibration targets, as well as other moments in the data
to evaluate the performance of the models.
Panel Study of Income Dynamics The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) is one of our main data
sources. Using data from 1968 to 2011, we are able to obtain and link detailed life cycle observations for
two generations of parents and their children who have already grown into adults. As it is well known, this
is the only available longitudinal data set in which this can be achieved. We use the PSID to compute the
persistence, Gini coefficients, and coefficients of variation of wage earnings, income and wealth, as well as
the correlation among these variables.
Although, as discussed in the literature, one of the disadvantages of the PSID is that it does not represent
well the very rich, it is the best data set for our purpose for three reasons. First, it is the only data set
that allows for linking parents and children, as discussed above. Second, because in our model adults live
for only one period, measuring earnings, income and wealth requires that we capture the whole lifetime,
not just one observation of a specific year. Alternative data sets such as the Survey of Consumer Finances
(SCF) provide a better sampling of the very rich, but its cross-sectional nature would not allow us to measure
lifetime statistics for individuals. Last, since our purpose is to compare the extent to which different versions
of our model can recover intergenerational persistence, we can still provide a ranking of how these models
compare for a given set of targets. Intergenerational persistence can only be computed using PSID data,
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so even if our Gini coefficients were different from those measured using the SCF, our exercise is still
informative of our main purpose.
We follow the methodology in Lee and Solon (2009) in order to exploit all available observations for
parents and children over the lifecycle. As in Lee and Solon (2009) we: (i) exclude any children born before
1952 to avoid over-representing children who left home at a late age; (ii) use income observations no earlier
than age 25 to more meaningfully capture long-run income; (iii) measure children’s adult income in the
household in which they have become head of head’s spouse; (iv) use only the Survey Research Center
component of PSID and exclude the sample of the Survey of Economic Opportunities, or "poverty sample"
due to representation concerns; and (v) exclude income observations imputed by major assignments. The
result is an unbalanced panel that uses all available years for each individual.
We use the same econometric specification as in Lee and Solon (2009), except that we update the obser-
vations until 2011, while their final year was 2000. Their estimation equation is given by:
yict = 
0Dt + tXic + 1Aic + 2A
2
ic + 3A
3
ic + 4A
4
ic + 1(t  c  40) + 2(t  c  40)2
+ 3(t  c  40)3 + 4(t  c  40)4 + 1Xic(t  c  40) + 2Xic(t  c  40)2
+ 3Xic(t  c  40)3 + 4Xic(t  c  40)4 + "ict
where yict is the log of family income for individual i in cohort c and time t; Dt is a vector or year dummies;
Xic is parental log income measured as the average of log family income over the three years the child was
15 to 17 years old; t is a time-varying intergenerational elasticity; Aic is the parental age at the time in
which parental income is observed; and (t c 40) is the child’s age at the time in which the child’s income
is observed. The latter implies a normalization such that  is the intergenerational income elasticity at age
40.
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For calibration purposes, we only need a single  value, so we eliminate the time variation of this
coefficient. However, controlling for age for both parents and children, as well as for time effects, allows
our estimation of intergenerational persistence  to include the whole lifetime profile of income of each
child who has grown to form his / her own household.
We use the methodology above to compute the intergenerational persistence of both income and wage
earnings. Income is measured as PSID variable "total family money", which includes wage earnings of all
family members, as well as any other money received by all members of the household. Measuring wage
earnings using the PSID is more complicated, as there is not a single variable including wage earning for all
family members. Earnings are constructed summing the labor earnings of the head and head’s wife, taking
into account that after 1994 labor earnings coming from own businesses are reported separately from those
coming from employment.
We estimate the specification above separately for sons and daughters, and also for all children including
a dummy for daughters. For the case of income, we obtain income = 0:532 (standard deviation of 0:013)
for the later regression, and the equivalent for labor earnings is earnings = 0:267 (s.d. of 0:010).
The PSID provides data on family wealth starting only in 1984. As discussed above, we compute
statistics of wealth in the data in order to compare them with their counterparts of bequests in the model.
Although the methodology of Lee and Solon (2009) described above could in principle be used to compute
the persistence of wealth, we instead follow the methodology in Mulligan (1997) for two reasons. First,
if parental wealth is measured when the child is between ages 15 and 17, the oldest cohort that could
be included is the one from 1969. This means that even for the oldest possible cohort, wealth data after
age 25 would only be available until these individuals turned 42 in 2011, relatively earlier in their life
cycle. Regressions following Lee and Solon (2009) would then be heavily biased towards the early part
of individual’s life cycle, partially defeating the purpose of exploiting the whole life cycle information of
parents and children. Second, in contrast with income and earnings, wealth is a stock, so the methodology
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used in Mulligan (1997) should be good enough to estimate intergenerational persistence of wealth. He
measures the average wealth over a five-year period for the parent (head of household) and the child, as well
as their average age during that interval. He then regresses the log of the average wealth of the child onto
the log of the average wealth of the parent and second-degree polynomials on the average ages of the parent
and the child. Given the information available in the PSID we used this methodology for year intervals
1984-1989, 1994-1999 and 2004-2009. Regressions were run separately for sons, daughters, and for all
with a dummy for daughter. The intergenerational elasticity of wealth varies slightly across specifications
and interval years. For calibration purposes we used the regression including all children for the latest year,
which estimates an intergenerational elasticity of wealth wealth = 0:40 (s.d. of 0.017).
In addition to intergenerational persistence, we use PSID data to compute Gini coefficients of earnings,
wealth and income. In order to exploit the panel structure of the data, we control for time and age effects
before computing Gini coefficients. In particular, they are computed over the residuals of the following
regression:
yict = 
0Dt + 1(t  c  40) + 2(t  c  40)2 + 3(t  c  40)3 + 4(t  c  40)4 + "ict
where yict is the income, earnings or wealth of individual i in cohort c and time t: Although we computed
year-specific Gini coefficients for each variable, in our calibration we only use the Gini computed over the
whole sample of years. We obtained a Gini for income and for earnings of around 0.4, and a Gini for wealth
of 0:76.
We also computed the income - earnings correlation over the residuals of the regression above for each
of these two variables. We obtained a correlation of about 0.88. The coefficients of variation for income,
earnings, and wealth are given by 1:08, 1:19, and 4:02 respectively. Last, the average wealth to average
income ratio is 4:02, and the income - wealth correlation is estimated to be 0:338.
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Child Development Survey and USDA Time costs or raising children are central for the endogenous fer-
tility models. Given that adults in our model live for one period, the relevant cost is the time costs of raising
a child as a fraction of lifetime parental income. Using the 1997 Child Development Supplement of the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics, Folbre (2008) estimates the time costs of raising a child by incorporating
both primary and secondary time parents spend with children. She concludes that the average amount of
both "active" and "passive" parental-care hours per child (not including sleep) is 41.3 per week for a two-
parent household with two children ages 0 to 11. Passive care corresponds to the time the child is awake but
not engaged in activity with an adult, while active parental care measures the time the child is engaged in
activity with at least a parent. In addition to reporting hours spent in child care, Folbre (2008) discusses two
alternative ways of computing the monetary value of these hours: one uses a child-care worker’s wage and
the other the median wage. Folbre (2008) combines this information with the estimates of the goods costs
of raising children by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA, 2012). The latter include direct
parental expenses made on children through age 17 such as housing, food, transportation, health care, cloth-
ing, child care, and private expenses in education. Folbre concludes that when child-care worker’s wages are
used to value the hours spend in raising children, then the time cost of raising children is on average around
60% of the total costs (see Table 7.3, p. 135). In addition, since the median wage is around the double of a
child-care worker’s wage, then using the former time valuation the time cost of raising children increases to
75% of the total costs.
The USDA (2012) computes the present value of the goods costs of raising children ages 0 to 17 for
families with low, medium and high income. Using these estimates together with Folbre’s scenarios, we can
compute the time costs of raising a child as a fraction of lifetime parental income for the average family in
each of these income brackets. Since most families in the United States are in the low and middle income
brackets, we use the average of these two to compute our target. Specifically, the average family in the
USDA (2012) income bracket has an annual income of $43,625 in 2011, which corresponds to a lifetime
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income $1,217,250.14 Using the most conservative estimate in Folbre (2008) the present value of the time
costs of raising a child for this low-income family is $214,576, about 17.6% of lifetime household income.
In the case of the middle-income bracket, the average annual household income is $81,140, lifetime income
is $2,264,016, and the time cost of raising a child $297,656, or 13.1% or lifetime income.
Last, Folbre (2008, Table 6.4) suggests strong increasing returns in raising children. Their figures im-
plies that the relative cost of two and three children relative to one child is 1:33 and 1:70, instead of 2 and
3 if there are no increasing returns. This information is used to calibrate the cost function with decreasing
costs of raising children.
Census The last set of calibration targets in our model include average fertility and the elasticity of fertility
with respect to lifetime income. Although the Childbirth and Adoption History module of the PSID includes
a measure of total children born that can be used to approximate completed fertility when measured around
age 45, this variable is only available starting in 1985. Unfortunately once this information is merged with
the income and wealth panel observations, the sample of individuals for which completed fertility is known
is too small, under 3,000 observations, to be a representative sample.
Rather than using the PSID to compute average fertility and the income elasticity of fertility, we rely
on estimates already available from Jones and Tertilt (2008). They use US Census data as far back as the
1826 cohort to estimate an income elasticity of fertility of about  0:38. Their analysis is distinct in that
they construct a more refined measure of lifetime income by using occupational income and education.
Lifetime income and fertility are measured for several cross-sections of five-year birth cohorts from 1826-
1830 to 1956-1960. They conclude that most of the observed fertility decline in the US can be explained
by the negative fertility-income relationship estimated for each cross-section, together with the outward
shift of the income distribution over time. The estimated income elasticity is robust to the inclusion of
additional controls such as child mortality and the education of husband and wife, suggesting a strong
14This computation uses an interest rate of 2% per year and assumes a 40-year working lifespan.
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negative correlation between income and fertility. For the latest cohorts in their data, 1956-1960, the income
elasticity of fertility is estimated to be 0:22, and the average fertility is 1:8 children per household. Finally,
the coefficient of variation of fertility for the latest cohorts is about 0:6.
3.3.2 Calibration
We now explore the quantitative predictions of various calibrated versions of the dynastic altruistic
model. For this purpose we run a horse race between six different versions of the model that differ in: (i)
whether fertility is endogenous or exogenous; (ii) the type of child discounting assumed, either hyperbolic or
exponential; (iii) the curvature of the utility function, either EGS > 1 or EGS < 1; and (iv) the marginal
cost of raising children, either constant or decreasing. We document weaknesses and strengths of each
model, and conclude that overall a model with exponential child discounting, EGS > 1, and diminishing
cost of raising children is the most promising.
3.3.3 Calibration targets
Our calibration strategy is analogous to the one used by Castañeda et al. (2003). Key parameters
are chosen to match specific aspects of Lorenz curves for earnings and wealth. The performance of each
model is then assessed along various dimensions, in particular regarding their ability to generate realistic
persistence as well as to match other features of the Lorenz curves beyond the matching targets.
When comparing to the existent literature, it is important to keep in mind three aspects of the problem
that make the calibration non-standard. First, the earning process is not annual but life time. Second, the
curvature of the utility function does not reflect the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. In fact, typical
calibrations set  > 1 but, as discussed in the previous section, a negative fertility-earnings relationship
requires  < 1: Third, discount factors are family specific and depend on fertility rates. The following are
the models considered:
59
1. Model 1. Exogenous fertility with EGS = 2=3 < 1.
2. Model 2. Exogenous fertility with calibrated EGS.
3. Model 3. Alvarez’s (1999) model with continuous number of children.
4. Model 4. Alvarez’s (1999) model with discrete number of children.
5. Model 5. Exponential child discounting with constant costs of raising children.
6. Model 6. Exponential child discounting with decreasing costs of raising children.
Computing the models require the Markov process F (!j! 1); the function  (n) ; and parameters r; ;
;  and : Models 1 to 4 assume hyperbolic child discounting while Models 5 and 6 consider exponential
child discounting. A common interest rate, r = 2, is assumed for all models.15 For the labor endowments
shocks we approximate the first-order autoregressive process,
ln!0 =  ln! + e; e  N(0; 2!);
by a 15 states Markov chain using the Tauchen Method. The coefficient  is the intergenerational persistence
of abilities. A natural calibration procedure would be to calibrate  for each model so to match a target for the
persistence of earnings, as in Restuccia and Urrutia (2004). However, as we show below, generating enough
persistence of earnings when fertility is endogenous is a challenge. Instead, we assume  is common across
models and report results for  = 0:25 and discuss, without reporting, results for  = 0:5: The lower value
is consistent with the findings of Urrutia and Restuccia (2004) while the upper value is the intergenerational
persistence of (log) hourly wages reported by Mulligan (1997).
The calibration of the remaining parameters is specific to each model. The variance 2! is calibrated to
match the Gini coefficient of labor earnings. Models 1 and 2, the exogenous fertility models, require only
15A net return of 2 is obtained if annual returns are 4:5% for 25 years, or 3:73% for 30 years. 25 or 30 years could be considered
the midpoint of adult life.
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the extra parameters  and  since n = 1 is assumed.  is identified by targeting the earnings-income
correlation. The justification for this target is that  determines the amount of savings, and therefore the
earnings-income correlation. For example, the correlation is 100% when there are no savings at all or close
to zero if savings are infinite. Model 1 sets  = 1:5 as in Castañeda et al. (2003), and Restuccia and Urrutia
(2004), a standard value in the literature. Model 2 calibrates  to match the Gini coefficient of wealth. This
is because  controls the degree of precautionary savings and therefore affects the concentration of wealth.
The identification of  and  in all models, except Model 1, is simultaneous because both parameters affect
savings, and therefore the correlation of earnings with income and the concentration of wealth.
Models 3 to 6 require to specify a technology for raising children. We use the function  (n) =

h
(n+ )   
i
; 0 <   1: Notice that  (n) = 0 and 0 (n) =  (n+ ) 1 : A constant mar-
ginal cost is obtained when  = 1, and decreasing when  < 1: Parameter  allows to bound the marginal
cost of the first (dn) children. We assume a constant marginal cost, , for models 3 to 5. To calibrate ,
existent evidence on the time costs of raising children can be used. However, as discussed in Cordoba and
Ripoll (2014), the evidence suggests a wide range of possible values for . We decided to calibrate  within
each model and then discuss whether the estimates are plausible or not. The target used to identify  is the
average fertility. , turns out, have a strong effect on savings too, because it affects the demand for chil-
dren, and therefore the calibration of (; ; ) is simultaneous. Model 6 assumes a relative small degree of
increasing returns to child rearing of around 15%. It assumes that the relative cost of raising two and three
children relative to one is 1:84 and 2:59 respectively. The degree of increasing returns suggested by Folbre
are much higher but, in order to match an average fertility of 1, they would require an unrealistically high
cost for the first child. To avoid this issue, we opted for more moderated degree of increasing returns.
Finally, the curvature parameters of the altruistic functions (n);  and ; are calibrated by targeting an
income elasticity of fertility of  0:20. Parameters were chosen to minimize the sum of square errors of the
model predictions relative to the targets.
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3.4 Results
Table 3.1 reports the targets and their model counterparts, Table 3.2 reports the calibrated parameters,
and Tables 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 reports additional moments besides the matching targets. A general issue, made
apparent in Table 3.1, is the difficulty to match the targets with precision for various models. The reason
is that the models in some cases are too stylized and/or the functional forms are not flexible enough to
match all targets. In particular, endogenous fertility models tend to produce too much concentration and
too low correlation of earnings and income. A tension in calibrating parameters arises because reducing
concentration requires more incentives to save but higher savings would further reduce the earnings-income
correlation. The criteria of choosing parameters to minimize a set of equally weighted moments allow us to
identify a set of parameters. We tried various other weights and the results discussed below are generally
robust to various weights.
Exogenous Fertility Models
Model 1 is our version of a traditional Bewley with a standard curvature for the utility function,  = 1:5;
or EGS = 0:66: This value, used by Castañeda et. al. (2003), is typically estimated using quarterly or
annual data. The model assumes n = 1; it is analogous to a infinitely lived individual model and serves as
baseline for comparison. Model 1 is able to generate significant higher concentration of wealth, Gini(b) =
0:65, than of earnings, Gini(e) = 0:4; but significantly less than in the data, a finding that is consistent with
other results in the literature, e.g. Aiyagari (1994). The model also generates significant persistence, similar
to the data, for all variables.16;17 Significant persistence of earnings is important for the model to generate
large savings and wealth concentration.
Model 2 delivers, by construction, more wealth concentration than Model 1. This is achieved by, one
the one hand, reducing the need to save for precautionary motives, by reducing ; which leads more indi-
16Persistence is calculated as the coefficient in a regression between the log of the outcome of the children againts the log of the
outcome of the parent.
17The persistence of wealth would still be high, of 0:47, even if ! = 0: The focus is to show how persistence is loss and then
recovered when fertility is endogenous. Higher persistence of abilities, of 0:5, would result in too much persistence of all variables.
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viduals to hit the zero bequest constraint, but on the other hand increasing savings for non-precautionary
motives, by increasing ; so that the correlation between earnings and incomes is preserved. The calibrated
EGS = 1= in Model 2 is 2:17 which describes parents as much more willing to substitute consumption
intergenerationally than what is traditionally assumed. Notice that the calibrated values of the EGS in all
models, except Model 1, are significantly larger than the typical value of 0:66; and likely around 1:4:18
Moreover, the estimated value of  in Model 2 is significantly higher than what would be required by a
more traditional calibration. Model 2 performs similarly to Model 1 but generates slightly higher degree of
social mobility that is still consistent with the data.
Alvarez’s Endogenous Fertility Model
Model 3 is Alvarez’s (1999) model, an intergenerational Bewley-Barro-Becker model.19 Matching all
targets is particularly difficult when fertility is endogenous. The high calibrated time cost of a child,  = 0:5,
is concerning but required in order to avoid even more concentration of wealth, which is already high, as
more individuals, particularly low ability ones, would increase their fertility if the cost is lowered at the
expense of reducing bequests per child. Figure 3.3 shows the policy functions and the predicted relationship
between average fertility and both bequests and abilities. The model predicts a strong wealth effect, as the
elasticity of fertility to bequest is 0:21.
The most striking difference between the exogenous fertility models and Alvarez’s endogenous fertility
model is in the degree of persistence of all variables, but particularly of bequests and earnings, which now
exhibit practically zero persistence. The lack of persistence of earnings, in spite of the 25% persistence
of abilities, is surprising and novel. Figure 3.4 illustrates the mechanism at work. The problem is the
endogenous determination of labor supply, which lacks intergenerational persistence and exhibits significant
dispersion so that it dominates the persistence of earnings. The mechanism explaining the lack of persistence
18Expected utility models do not distinguish between risk aversion and aversion to deterministic fluctuations. Our interpreation
of a low  relative to the typical  means that parents are less risk averse to gambles on their children’s earnings than to gambles
on their own earnings. Cordoba and Ripoll (2014) calibrate the EGS and the EIS in a model with no risk and also obtain
EGS = 1= > 1.
19A continuous number of children is approximated by setting the change in the number of children to 1/30.
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in labor supply is one in which a high ability individual would have few children, due their high time costs,
high labor supply and high labor earnings. The parent endows each child with relatively high bequests.
The child, on the other hand, is expected to have significantly more children and lower labor supply than
the parent for two reasons: her ability is expected to be lower than her parent’s, because abilities are mean
reverting, and her initial wealth is higher.
Model 4 restricts the number of children to be discrete, which prevents parents from fully utilizing
children as a saving device. The calibrated parameters are similar to the continuous case but the model is
able to reduce the cost of raising children. Otherwise, Model 4 performs slightly better than Model 3 but the
fundamental issue of lack of persistence remains.
The remaining models also assume a discrete number of children. In this case, n is restricted to lie in
the set f0; 0:5; 1:5; ::; ng so that 0:5 child per parent mean 1 child per couple, etc.
Extended Endogenous Fertility Models
Models 5 uses exponential child discounting and maintains the assumption of a constant marginal cost
of children. This model is relevant because it uses the channel that Alvarez regarded as the most promising
to recover persistence. The model in fact predicts significant amount of persistence for all variables but
not enough for earnings. It also reduces significantly a strong wealth present in the previous models as the
elasticity of fertility to wealth drops from around 0:2 to 0:1. The mechanism to recover persistence is a
strong diminishing marginal benefit of having children due to the assumed exponential child discounting.
Two key issues remain: a high time cost of raising children and the low persistence of earnings.
Finally, Model 6 assumes exponential child discounting and increasing returns to raising children. Figure
3.5 shows the policy functions and the predicted relationship between average fertility and both bequests
and abilities. Jumps in the policy functions occur at the levels where fertility changes. Similar to the other
models, targets cannot be exactly matched, with the main issue being the low predicted value for fertility-
income correlations. Model 6 outperforms other endogenous and exogenous fertility models in various key
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aspects. First, the calibrated time cost function for children implies that on average are less costly. For
example, average labor supply is 0:62 rather than 0:5 in Alvarez’s model. The calibrated time costs are still
high compared with the estimates of time cost reported in the previous section. Second, it predicts similar
levels of persistence of bequest as exogenous fertility models, or around 58%, and significantly increases
the persistence of earnings. Third, it predicts a relative weak elasticity of fertility to wealth.
Why increasing returns help increase persistence of bequest, if Alvarez expected the opposite, and earn-
ings? The explanation is the following. Model 6 has a much stronger degree of child discounting which
itself would raise persistence too much. Increasing returns help reducing persistence from that high level.
The gain of increasing returns is that it reduces the dispersion of labor supply because, although additional
children are less expensive, parents don’t want them. Lower dispersion of labor supply makes the persis-
tence of earnings replicate more closely the persistence of abilities, as illustrated in Figure 3.6. The problem
with Alvarez model regarding the lack of persistence of earnings is really the tremendous variation in labor
supply due to the linear and high cost needed. The persistence of bequest increases, from Model 5 to Model
6, for the same reason: a combination of a stronger child discounting partly compensated by increasing
returns, which overall make the use of the extensive margin less attractive.
3.5 Policy experiments
To illustrate the importance of taking fertility decisions into account we conduct two policy experiments:
an increase in estate taxes and a family planning policy limit fertility in the spirit of the one child policy.
For this purpose, we compute the steady implications of these policies according to Model 2, our preferred
exogenous fertility model, and Model 6, our preferred model of endogenous fertility.
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3.5.1 Estate taxes
Consider first the long term effect of introducing a 20% estate tax used to finance an exogenous stream
of government expenditures. We don’t consider changes in the interest rate so that the results correspond
either to partial equilibrium or to a small open economy. Results are reported in Table 3.6. Consider first
the effects of the policy in the economy with exogenous fertility. The policy significantly reduces steady
state bequests, incomes and consumption, but do not affect earnings.20 The policy reduces inequality, as
measured by standard deviations, but increases according to Gini coefficients and coefficient of variations.
Both results are possible because, as intergenerational savings fall, more individuals become constrained
which reduces standard deviations but also increase the concentration of bequests.21 For an utilitarian social
planner, means and standard deviations are the two most important moments determining social welfare. We
also find significant reductions in the levels of persistence meaning that higher estate taxes increase social
mobility. The intuition for this result seems clear from the Euler Equation as estate taxes increase the cost
of smoothing consumption. The results on means are consistent with the ones reported by Castañeda et. al.
(2003) but they do not find significant changes in Gini coefficients or persistence.
The predictions of the endogenous fertility model differ significantly mostly regarding quantitative pre-
diction and some qualitative predictions. This is because an increase in estate taxes reduces the welfare of
children and therefore the incentives to have children. As a result, fertility rates fall around 3%, and labor
supply as well as labor earnings increase, instead of being constant. The standard deviation of fertility falls
significantly, 42%, mostly due to falling fertility of the very asset rich who disappear from the ergodic set.
Average bequest, income and consumption as well as the standard deviation of bequest fall but significantly
less, up to 42% less, than in the exogenous fertility case. The results show that endogenizing fertility sig-
nificantly affect the predicted quantitative effects of policies, mostly dampening the effects. On qualitative
20Earnings will fall in a closed economy due to the fall in capital stock.
21If distributions were log-normal, for example, standard deviations and Gini’s would move together.
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differences, while the exogenous fertility model predicts rising inequality of income and consumption, as
measured by Gini coefficients, the endogenous fertility model predict lower inequality.
3.5.2 Family Planning Policies
Consider next a family planning policy seeking to reduce fertility rates such as the one child policy.
It turns out that such a policy, of 0:5 children per-parent, leads to perpetual growth and eliminates the
stationary of the model. This is because, as is well-known, Bewley models with exogenous fertility require
the restriction (n)n (1 + r) < 1 in order to have an ergodic set. Otherwise, the incentives to save are too
strong and consumption eventually diverges to infinite. This is in fact the case for the calibrated parameters
as one obtains (n)n (1 + r)  (0:5)0:5 (1 + r) > 1: For this purpose, we consider a less stringent family
planning policy.
Table 3.7 shows the results of a two children policy using Model 6. The effect of the policy is a 5% drop
in average fertility and, perhaps more significantly, a 52% drop in the standard deviation of fertility explained
by the reduction of fertility of very asset rich individuals. Qualitative, the effects of a family planning policy
is similar to a reduction in estate taxes because the policy increases the incentives to save as parents average
degree of altruism rises. The policy increases mean earnings, income, bequest and consumption, increase
inequality as measured by standard deviations but reduce inequality when measured by Ginis or coefficient
of variations. Social mobility, particularly of bequests, significantly decreases.
3.6 Concluding comments
We have shown that models of endogenous fertility by dynastic altruistic parents can replicate similar
persistence as analogous models with exogenous fertility. Introducing endogenous fertility considerations
is important for policy evaluation because the decision to have or not children, and how many, affect most
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long term economic variables like consumption, savings, income and labor supply. We show, for example,
that the long run effects of estate taxes are substantially different when fertility is endogenous.
We recover realistic levels of persistence by combining three novel elements into an otherwise standard
Bewley model. An intergenerational elasticity of substitution larger than one, as opposed to the typical
intergenerational elasticity of substitution less than one; exponential child discounting instead of hyperbolic
discounting; and increasing returns in child rearing.
Target Data Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Interest rate 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
Gini bequest 0.76 0.65 0.72 0.80 0.86 0.83 0.81
Gini earnings 0.40 0.40 0.41 0.45 0.44 0.43 0.40
Persistence of abilities 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
correlation earnings‐income  0.88 0.88 0.89 0.87 0.86 0.88 0.83
average fertility 1.00 ‐‐‐‐‐‐ ‐‐‐‐‐‐ 1.01 1.06 1.07 1.03
Income elasticity of fertility ‐0.20 ‐‐‐‐‐‐ ‐‐‐‐‐‐ ‐0.25 ‐0.22 ‐0.18 ‐0.14
cost two children/cost one child 1.33 ‐‐‐‐‐‐ ‐‐‐‐‐‐ ‐‐‐‐‐‐ ‐‐‐‐‐‐ ‐‐‐‐‐‐ 1.85
cost three children/cost one child 1.70 ‐‐‐‐‐‐ ‐‐‐‐‐‐ ‐‐‐‐‐‐ ‐‐‐‐‐‐ ‐‐‐‐‐‐ 2.59
Model 1: Exogenous fertility (EGS=2/3); Model 2: Exogenous fertility (EGS calibrated);  Model 3: Alvarez continuous;  Model 4: Alvarez discrete;
Model 5: CLR exponential with constant cost;  Model 6: CLR exponential with decreasing cost.
Table 3.1: Targets (ρω=0.25)
Exog. Fertility Alvarez CLR
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Parameter Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
r = Interest rate 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
σ = curvature utility function 1.50 0.46 0.79 0.82 0.68 0.73
β =   discount factor 0.23 0.30 0.24 0.24 0.43 0.32
ε=curvature hyperbolic discounting ‐‐‐ ‐‐‐ 0.44 0.57 ‐‐‐ ‐‐‐
μ = curvature exponential discounting ‐‐‐ ‐‐‐ ‐‐‐ ‐‐‐ 1.01 1.93
ρω = persistence log ability 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
σω = dispersion log ability 0.72 0.73 0.59 0.61 0.67 0.66
λ = parameter cost of children ‐‐‐ ‐‐‐ 0.50 0.45 0.41 3.05
κ = parameter cost of children ‐‐‐ ‐‐‐ ‐‐‐ ‐‐‐ ‐‐‐ 1.84
θ = elasticity cost of children ‐‐‐ ‐‐‐ ‐‐‐ ‐‐‐ ‐‐‐ 0.23
Λ'(1) = marginal time cost of one child ‐‐‐ ‐‐‐ 0.50 0.45 0.41 0.31
Φ(1) = altruism toward first child 0.23 0.30 0.24 0.24 0.27 0.28
EGS 0.67 2.17 1.26 1.22 1.47 1.37
Table 3.2: Parameter Values  (ρω=0.25)
Model 1: Exogenous fertility (EGS=2/3); Model 2: Exogenous fertility (EGS calibrated);  Model 3: Alvarez continuous;  Model 4: Alvarez
discrete;   Model 5: CLR exponential with constant cost;  Model 6: CLR exponential with decreasing cost.
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Data Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
mean abilities 1.32 1.33 1.21 1.22 1.27 1.27
mean labor supply 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.53 0.56 0.62
mean labor earnings 1.32 1.33 0.64 0.68 0.75 0.80
mean income 1.81 1.70 0.78 0.81 0.90 1.01
mean bequest 0.24 0.18 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.13
mean consumption 1.81 1.70 0.78 0.81 0.89 1.01
mean fertility 1.0 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.06 1.07 1.03
stdev abilities 1.12 1.15 0.81 0.85 0.99 0.97
stdev labor supply 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.15 0.11 0.06
stdev earnings 1.12 1.15 0.59 0.65 0.73 0.71
stdev income 1.38 1.38 0.63 0.71 0.84 0.90
stdev bequest 0.33 0.31 0.18 0.24 0.25 0.30
stdev consumption 1.27 1.28 0.57 0.66 0.78 0.86
stdev fertility 0.6 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.36 0.24 0.19
Table 3.3: Means and Standard Deviations  (ρω=0.25)
Model 1: Exogenous fertility (EGS=2/3); Model 2: Exogenous fertility (EGS calibrated);  Model 3: Alvarez continuous;  Model 4:
Alvarez discrete;   Model 5: CLR exponential with constant cost;  Model 6: CLR exponential with decreasing cost.
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Data Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Coefficient variation abilities 0.85 0.86 0.67 0.70 0.78 0.76
Coefficient variation labor supply 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.28 0.20 0.10
Coefficient variation earnings 1.19 0.85 0.86 0.92 0.96 0.97 0.89
Coefficient variation income 1.08 0.76 0.81 0.81 0.88 0.93 0.89
Coefficient variation bequest 4.02 1.38 1.72 2.00 2.40 2.50 2.31
Coefficient variation consumption 0.70 0.75 0.73 0.81 0.88 0.85
Coefficient variation fertility 0.6 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.34 0.22 0.18
Gini abilities 0.40 0.41 0.34 0.34 0.38 0.37
Gini labor supply 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.12 0.07 0.03
Gini earnings 0.40 0.40 0.41 0.45 0.44 0.43 0.40
Gini income 0.40 0.38 0.40 0.39 0.41 0.42 0.42
Gini bequest 0.76 0.63 0.72 0.80 0.86 0.83 0.81
Gini consumption 0.36 0.38 0.37 0.39 0.41 0.40
Gini fertility ‐‐‐ ‐‐‐ 0.18 0.14 0.10 0.13
Table 3.4: Coefficients of Variation (ρω=0.25)
Model 1: Exogenous fertility (EGS=2/3); Model 2: Exogenous fertility (EGS calibrated);  Model 3: Alvarez continuous;  Model 4:
Alvarez discrete;   Model 5: CLR exponential with constant cost;  Model 6: CLR exponential with decreasing cost.
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Data Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Persistence abilities 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
Persistence labor supply 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.10 0.03 0.01
Persistence earnings 0.27 0.25 0.25 ‐0.05 0.03 0.12 0.20
Persistence income 0.53 0.60 0.55 0.36 0.40 0.45 0.54
Persistence bequest 0.40 0.65 0.59 0.14 0.33 0.38 0.58
Persistence consumption 0.70 0.67 0.61 0.43 0.44 0.49 0.59
Persistence fertility ‐‐‐ ‐‐‐ ‐0.12 ‐0.04 ‐0.02 ‐0.01
Correlation earnings‐income (e,i) 0.88 0.88 0.89 0.87 0.86 0.88 0.83
Correlation earnings‐bequest (e,b) 0.74 0.74 0.89 0.90 0.89 0.81
Correlation income‐bequest (i,b) 0.34 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.92 0.94 0.93
labor earnings/income 0.73 0.78 0.82 0.84 0.83 0.79
Fertility elasticity of b'/b (top 2%) ‐1.00 ‐‐‐ ‐‐‐ ‐2.11 ‐2.11 ‐1.97 ‐1.85
Fertility elasticity of b'/b (top 10%) ‐‐‐ ‐‐‐ ‐2.40 ‐2.48 ‐2.97 ‐3.47
Income elasticity of fertility ‐0.20 ‐‐‐ ‐‐‐ ‐0.25 ‐0.22 ‐0.18 ‐0.14
wealth elasticity of fertility ‐‐‐ ‐‐‐ 0.21 0.18 0.10 0.05
Model 1: Exogenous fertility (EGS=2/3); Model 2: Exogenous fertility (EGS calibrated);  Model 3: Alvarez continuous;  Model 4:
Alvarez discrete;   Model 5: CLR exponential with constant cost;  Model 6: CLR exponential with decreasing cost.
Table 3.5: Persistence and Other Statistics  (ρω=0.25)
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Benchmark After Tax % change Benchmark After Tax % change diff
Mean earnings 1.33 1.33 0.0% 0.80 0.81 1.3% 1.3%
Mean income 1.70 1.38 ‐18.8% 1.01 0.87 ‐13.9% 5.0%
Mean bequest 0.18 0.03 ‐83.3% 0.13 0.05 ‐61.5% 21.8%
Mean consumption 1.70 1.37 ‐19.4% 1.01 0.86 ‐14.9% 4.6%
Mean fertility 1.00 1.00 0.0% 1.03 1.00 ‐2.9% ‐2.9%
Std earnings 1.15 1.15 0.0% 0.71 0.70 ‐1.4% ‐1.4%
Std income 1.38 1.18 ‐14.5% 0.90 0.76 ‐15.6% ‐1.1%
Std bequest 0.31 0.10 ‐67.7% 0.30 0.20 ‐33.3% 34.4%
Std consumption 1.28 1.12 ‐12.5% 0.86 0.71 ‐17.4% ‐4.9%
Std fertility 0.00 0.00 0.0% 0.19 0.11 ‐42.1% ‐42.1%
Persistence of earnings 0.25 0.25 1.0% 0.20 0.23 11.9% 10.9%
Persistence income 0.55 0.32 ‐42.4% 0.54 0.37 ‐31.7% 10.7%
Persistence bequest 0.59 0.07 ‐88.6% 0.58 0.31 ‐46.6% 42.0%
Persistence consumption 0.61 0.34 ‐44.2% 0.59 0.40 ‐32.4% 11.7%
Persistence fertility ‐‐‐ ‐‐‐ ‐‐‐ 0.00 ‐0.04 ‐‐‐
Gini earnings 0.41 0.41 0.0% 0.40 0.39 ‐2.5% ‐2.5%
Gini income 0.40 0.41 2.5% 0.42 0.40 ‐4.8% ‐7.3%
Gini bequest 0.72 0.92 27.8% 0.81 0.93 14.8% ‐13.0%
Gini consumption 0.38 0.40 5.3% 0.40 0.39 ‐2.5% ‐7.8%
Gini fertility 0.00 0.00 0.0% 0.06 0.02 ‐66.7% ‐66.7%
Coefficient variation earnings 0.86 0.86 0.0% 0.88 0.86 ‐2.3% ‐2.3%
Coefficient variation income 0.81 0.86 6.2% 0.89 0.88 ‐1.1% ‐7.3%
Coefficient variation bequest 1.69 3.76 122.5% 2.39 4.12 72.4% ‐50.1%
Correlation earnings‐bequest (e,b) 0.74 0.83 11.9% 0.81 0.82 0.4% ‐11.5%
Correlation income‐bequest (i,b) 0.95 0.85 ‐10.7% 0.93 0.85 ‐8.5% 2.2%
Average(b)/average(e) 0.14 0.02 ‐83.3% 0.16 0.06 ‐62.0% 21.3%
Income elasticity of fertility ‐‐‐ ‐‐‐ ‐‐‐ ‐0.13 ‐0.05 ‐59.2%
Bequest elasticity of fertility ‐‐‐ ‐‐‐ ‐‐‐ 0.05 0.04 ‐11.6%
Exogenous Fertility (M2) Endogenous Fertility (M6)
Table 3.6: Estate Taxation (+20% tax)
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Benchmark Two Children Policy % change
Mean earnings 0.80 0.82 2.5%
Mean income 1.01 1.08 6.9%
Mean bequest 0.13 0.15 15.4%
Mean consumption 1.01 1.08 6.9%
Mean fertility 1.03 0.98 ‐4.9%
Std earnings 0.71 0.71 0.0%
Std income 0.90 0.93 3.3%
Std bequest 0.30 0.32 6.7%
Std consumption 0.86 0.90 4.7%
Std fertility 0.19 0.09 ‐52.6%
Persistence of earnings 0.20 0.24 19.3%
Persistence income 0.54 0.59 8.7%
Persistence bequest 0.58 0.70 21.4%
Persistence consumption 0.59 0.64 9.0%
Persistence fertility 0.00 ‐0.03 ‐‐‐
Gini earnings 0.40 0.39 ‐2.5%
Gini income 0.42 0.41 ‐2.4%
Gini bequest 0.81 0.79 ‐2.5%
Gini consumption 0.40 0.40 0.0%
Gini fertility 0.06 0.02 ‐66.7%
Coefficient variation earnings 0.88 0.87 ‐1.1%
Coefficient variation income 0.89 0.87 ‐2.2%
Coefficient variation bequest 2.39 2.15 ‐10.0%
Correlation earnings‐bequest (e,b) 0.81 0.76 ‐6.1%
Correlation income‐bequest (i,b) 0.93 0.94 0.8%
Average(b)/average(e) 0.16 0.18 12.6%
Income elasticity of fertility ‐0.13 ‐0.04 ‐68.3%
Bequest elasticity of fertility 0.05 0.00 ‐91.9%
Table 3.7: Two Children Policy
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CHAPTER 4. ACCOUNTING FOR THE INTERNATIONAL
QUANTITY-QUALITY TRADE-OFF
4.1 Introduction
Fertility rates and schooling attainments differ greatly across countries and exhibit a clear inverse asso-
ciation as illustrated in Figure 4.1. It plots fertility rates against expected years of schooling for a group of
74 countries using UNESCO data for 2005. For example, Niger has the highest fertility rate, 7.2, and the
lowest expected schooling, 9.7 years, while Greece has the lowest fertility rate, 1.2, and an average length of
education of 22.7 years, one of the highest among 74 countries in the data. What explains the international
quality-quantity trade-off illustrated in Figure 4.1?
There is an extensive related literature on the demographic transition but few attempts to quantitatively
explain the overall international evidence through the lenses of a unified model. An exception is Manuelli
and Seshadri (2009) who argue that most of the international differences in schooling and fertility can be
explained by differences in total factor productivity (TFP) and taxes. In their theory, there is a Barro-Becker-
Ben Porath model and there are no market imperfections and no role for public policies, such as public
education, student loans or child labor regulations. Individuals’ human capital and fertility decisions are
socially optimal, and there is no quality-quantity trade-off at the family level as schooling and educational
investments in each child are not constrained by family income or family size. Their explanation is based on
introducing a non-homothetic element to a general equilibrium model so that the equilibrium interest rate
decreases with income. A lower interest rate rises the optimal amount of human capital and, by arbitrate,
reduces the demand for children (see their equation 5). Their proposed explanation suggests that economic
growth policies and lower taxes would naturally lead to an efficient demographic transition.
Cordoba and Ripoll (2015) cast doubts on the ability of frictionless Barro-Becker models to account
for consumption and fertility data. For optimal fertility to be an interior solution children need to be a net
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financial costs to parents, as recognized by Barro and Becker. If not, it would be optimal for parents to raise
the maximum possible number of children in order to maximize rents. Cordoba and Ripoll document for
the U.S. that children are on average a net financial benefit to society as the present value of their earnings
substantially surpasses the present value cost of their upbringing. They also show that introducing limits to
intergenerational transfers can fix the predictions of the Barro-Becker model. But the efficiency of market
allocations, in particular fertility and education, is no longer guaranteed, the demographic transition is not
necessarily efficient, and a role for public policies potentially arises. In particular, the model could poten-
tially rationalize the educational revolution of the last century based on the expansion of public education
around the world. This chapter uses a calibrated version of the Barro-Becker-Ben Porath model with credit
constraints to assess the underlying determinants of fertility and schooling different across countries. We
focus on situation of perfect capital mobility across countries so that interest rates differentials play no role
in our theory, consistent with the findings of Caselli and Feyrer (2007). In our theory, a quality-quantity
trade-off arises at the household level due to binding credit constraints, educational outcomes are deter-
mined by parental resources and family size dilutes those resources. We model in some detail the life cycle
of individuals, life expectancy, aspects of public education, and wage differential across countries.
Our calibrated model is able to explain 68.3% of the fertility dispersion and 85.1% of the schooling
dispersion in the data. We find wage has the most power in explaining the differences in fertility and years
of schooling across countries. Regarding the effect of wages on fertility, the channel is a direct effect
on the marginal cost of raising children as children take parental time. Higher wages also increase the
marginal benefit of having children since they increase the welfare of the child, which parents value, but the
presence of non-economic goods weaken this second channel so that the effects of wages on the marginal
cost dominates, as discussed in Cordoba and Ripoll (2015). Following wage, adult survival probability
ranks the second among all exogenous factors in generating fertility difference across countries. Among two
margins of schooling, the intensive margin, the duration of public education, the extensive margin, generates
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more differences of years of schooling while the annual public educational subsidies, the intensive margin,
is influential in explaining part of fertility differentials.
There is a large literature studying fertility and schooling decisions, as well as their interaction. Barro
and Becker (1988) is a seminal work of a standard neoclassical growth model with micro-foundation of
fertility choices. A main strand of later works in explaining the demographic transition over time and the
relationship between fertility with income rely on the time cost of rearing children, e.g. Galor and Weil (GW,
1996), Greenwood and Seshadri (GS, 2002), Cordoba and Ripoll (2013) and many others. Some of them,
such as GW (1996) and GS (2002) assumes warm glow altruism and bounded rationality. Doepke (2004)
develops a growth model in which children might become skilled or unskilled. His model explains the
decline of fertility in the economic transition from stagnation to growth. He argues that the main influencing
policy is child labor regulation rather than educational subsidies.
Among all the literature the one closely connected with this chapter is Cordoba and Ripoll (2013), CR
(2013) henceforth. They provide a theory explaining the cross-country distribution of average years of
schooling, as well as the so called human capital premium puzzle in a Ben Porath model with credit friction.
They find fertility plays the most important role in producing schooling difference among all exogenous
factor. This chapter goes beyond CR (2013) since we endogenize altruistic fertility choice, instead of taking
it as given. Moreover, we quantitatively calibrate parameters relating to the time cost of raising children and
parental altruism, which are not so relevant in exogenous fertility models. A difference from the exogenous
fertility model is that wage plays key role in generating difference in years of schooling. For example,
equating wages of all countries to the U.S. level reduces years of schooling by 63%. The channel through
fertility explains this huge response. Higher wage induces people to have fewer children, then parents
transfer more to every child not only because of the quantity-quality trade-off but also because of the higher
parental altruism on every child.
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Concerning the relationship between fertility and years of schooling, there is an early literature on the
quantity-quality trade-off by Becker and Lewis (1973) and Becker and Tomes (1976). Becker, Cinnirella,
and Woessmann (2009) provide an evidence of the existence of such a trade-off before the demographic
transition using census-based dataset.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 sets up the benchmark model and character-
izes steady state consumption, bequest, fertility and educational choices, including the length of schooling
and private expenditures. Section 4.3 describes the calibration of the model. Section 4.4 assesses the perfor-
mance of the model and performs counterfactual exercises. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 The Benchmark Model
4.2.1 The Model
This section describes the problem faced by a representative individual. The individual maximizes his
or her lifetime utility, V; which includes a life cycle utility over the life span of T years and the utility of n
children, V 0 who are born at age F .
V (b) =
C1 
1   +  (F ) e
 F(n; F )V
 
b0

where
C =


1  T
Z T
0
e t (t)
1 
1  c (t)1  dt
 1
1 
+ u
where V (b) is the value function of an individual with bequest b received from parents when born, C is a
composite consumption, c (t) is the consumption of time t; u is utility from non-economic goods,  (t) is
the survival probability from being born to age t, and (n; F ) is the weight parents attach to their n children.
 is a time discount rate. 1= is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EGS) characterizing the intra-
personal willingness to substitute consumptions across periods. 1= is the elasticity of intergenerational
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substitution (EIS) characterizing the inter-personal willingness to substitute consumption across generations.
Disentangling EIS from EGS is necessary in models with intergenerational transfers to match imputed values
of children and the negative fertility-income relationship well documented in the literature.
Assume
(n; F ) = e F
 
1  e n
And assume the survival probability  (a) takes the following form following Cordoba and Ripoll
(2013),
 (t) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
e pct for t  ac
 (ac) e
 ps(t ac) for ac  t  as
 (as)
e p(t as) 
  for as  t  T
Individuals are subject to a sequence of budget constraints that could be reduced to a single life-time
budget constraint in the absence of credit frictions. However, we assume that only working individuals
can borrow and therefore students need to rely on parental resources to finance consumption and education
during their schooling years. Working individuals, in particular parents, have full access to credit markets.
Parents act as banks for their children but, as we show below, they are imperfect substitutes for financial
institutions.
Due to the assumed credit frictions, agents’ life span can be divided into two clear phases: student’s
phase from age 0 to years of schooling s and post-student’s phase from age s to T . In the first phase,
individuals rely solely on parental transfers, b, to finance expenditures as described by the following budget
constraint:
Z s
0
(c (t) + es (t)) q (t) dt+ q (s)Q (s)  b (29)
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Private expenditure on education, E = fes (t)gs0  0; complement public education expenses available,
ep every year from age s
¯
to s. q(t) is the price of consumption at age t relative to age 0 consumption.
With annuity q (t) = e rt (t) and Q (s) are net savings at the end of schooling. The credit constraint is
summarized by the condition:
Q (s)  0
At the end of the education phase, the agent starts working with an amount of human capital given by
h(s;E): The budget constraint for the second phase is described by:
Z T
s
c (t) q (t) dt+ q (F )nb0  q (s)Q (s) +W (s; n) (30)
b0  0
where W (s; n) be the present value of life time earnings. The first inequality states that consumption
expenditures and transfers to children could not exceed life time income plus savings at the end of student
life. The second inequality prevents parents from leaving debts to children. The two life-time budget
constraints could be combined into a single one when savings, Q(s), are positive.
Lifetime income W (s; n) is given by
W (s; n) =
Z R
s
wh (s) e(a s)q(a)l(n)da
where r is the risk-free interest rate, F is the age of having children, R is the retirement age,  is the return
to experience, w is the wage rate, h (s; E) is the human capital accumulated after s years of education with
an amount E of private education in addition to the public education available. l (n) is the parental effective
labor supply.
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Assume
h (s;E) =
Z s
0
((ep + es (t)) =pE)
 dt
=
and l (n) takes the form
l(n) = 1  
h
(n+ )   
i
 > 0;  > 0; 0 <  < 1
Parameter  allows to bound the marginal cost of the first (dn) children. The condition that  < 1
guarantees the convexity of the labor supply function which implies that the marginal time cost of children
decreases with the number of children. A simple form of the above labor cost function is the one with linear
time cost per child.
l (n) = 1  n
Lifetime income W (s; n) is thus a decreasing function of n and an increasing function of  and w. Absent
credit frictions, optimal schooling maximizes lifetime income and therefore Ws(s; n) would be 0. As we
show below, Ws(s; n) > 0 in the presence of credit frictions.
A full characterization of the solution is provided in Appendix. We focus on some key results in what
follows.
The optimality choice of schooling must satisfy
ers (s) 1 cW (s) Ws (s; n)| {z }
net marginal benefit of s
= u(s) + cS (s)  es (s)| {z }
marginal cost of s
(31)
where
Ws (s; n) = w

 h (s) q(s) + (hs (s)  h (s)) e vs
Z F
s
eaq(a)da+ l(n)
Z R
F
eaq(a)da

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The net marginal benefit of one more year of schooling is measured by the percentage increase of the
human capital due to an extra year of education. The net marginal cost of an extra year of schooling is
comprised of the loss of one year of experience and salary, one year of private educational cost, and one
more year of being constrained as a student to consume at a low level compared with the consumption in the
second phase.
The relationship between the net marginal benefit and marginal cost of fertility is
 Wn(s; n)
W (s; n)
=  12  (F )1e
 F n(n; F )
W (s; n)
V
 
b0
  q(F )b0
W (s; n)
(32)
The right hand side of (32) is the normalized marginal benefit of having one more child net of the bequest
to the child. All terms are normalized by dividing the lifetime income W (s; n): The left hand side of (32)
characterizes the marginal time cost of having one more child as a percentage of the total labor he supplies.
Since we’ve already subtracted the bequest to every child on the right hand side, the only cost that needs to
be taking into account in the LHS is the relative time cost of raising children.
4.2.2 Consumption and Bequest
The agent’s consumption at any time can be written as his consumption at age s: There is a jump of
consumption at age s because of the credit friction, that is people are not able to borrow as much as they
want during student periods by assumption. Let cS (s) and cW (s) denote the consumption as a student and
a worker, respectively.
c (a) =
8>><>>:
e
(r )(a s)


(a)
(s)
 1

 
1 
cS(s) for a  s
e
(r )(a s)


(a)
(s)
 1

 
1 
cW (s) for s < a < T
(33)
Depending on parameter values, the bequest constraint may bind or not. We need to consider both cases.
Denote by 1 and 2 the Lagrange multipliers of the two constraints associated with (74) and (75). Then
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the first order condition to consumptions become

cS(s)
cW (s)
 
=
1
2
=
q(F )n
 (F ) e F(n; F )
(34)
where cS(s) and cW (s) are the consumptions at age s in student phase and post-student phase, respectively.
A sufficient and necessary condition for cS(s) < cW (s); and therefore for the bequest constraint to bind,
would be
q(F )n
 (F ) e F(n; F )
> 1
Frictional Case
In the frictional case, we have cS(s) < cW (s): The agent would like to borrow but he couldn’t get any
loan, so the optimal savings at age s, Q(s), would be 0. Define
G  1
2
(35)
At steady state, G can be solved through (34) and (35). It measures the tightness of the constraint during the
first phase of life. The consumption at age s as a worker can be expressed in terms of the consumption at
age s as a student by
cW (s) = cS (s)G
1
 (36)
Let E be the total private expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP during student phase.
E 
Z s
0
es(t)q(t)da
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Steady state bequest b can be solved by (74), (75) and (33) as
b =
W (s; n)G 
1
 + E
(s)

(s) + q (F )nG 
1

(37)
where

(s)
=
 (ac)
1 


1  e
psac
1 


1  I

 + ps
1 


1  ; s; 25

+ (as)
1 


1 
R T
25 e
 a
h
e p(a as) 
1 
i 1 


1 
da
I

 + pc
1 


1  ; 0; ac

+  (ac)
1 


1  e
psac
1 


1  I

 + ps
1 


1  ; ac; s

 = r   r   

and
I(; c; d) =
Z d
c
e ada
Frictionless Case
In the frictionless case, the bequest the agent gets in the early life is very high relative to his future
income, so consumption at age s as a student and the one as a worker be the same. By (34) and (35), G = 1
and the optimal choice of number of children depends solely on exogenous parameters.
e (r )F
n
(n; F )
= 1
In the frictionless case, cS(s) = cW (s). When Q(s) = 0, steady state bequest b0 can be solved though
(74) and (33).
b =
W (s; n) + 
(s)E

(s) + q (F )n
(38)
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4.2.3 Human Capital Accumulation
With s years of schooling and e(a) as the total amount of investment on education percentage of GDP
at age a, both public and private, the agent accumulates human capital h(s; E) according to the function
h(s;E) =
Z s
0

e(t)
pe

dt


(39)
where pe is the relative price of education. When the overall annually educational investment, e(a), is
a constant, human capital is proportional to the product of an exponential form of s and an exponent of
annually total educational investment. In terms of human capital accumulation, a sufficiently long period of
education together with a low amount of total educational investment can be the same with a short period of
education and a huge amount of total educational investment every year. Ben Porath(1967)’s law of motion
of human capital at age a is
_h(t) = z[n(t)h(t)]1i(t)2   hh(t) (40)
CR (2013) prove that when n(a) = 1; z = 1; h = 1;  = 2; and  = 11 1 holds, (39) is a solution to
(40).
4.2.4 Educational Expenditure
Public educational subsidies in the amount ep per period are available from age s
¯
to s. Individuals can
make private investments on education, es(t), to supplement public education. Let e^ (t) be the optimal
amount of total expenditure on education, then
e^ (t) =
8>><>>:
ep + es(t) if s  t  s
es(t) else
(41)
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Optimal total educational expenditure e(t) is given by
e(t) =
8>><>>:
max fe^ (t) ; epg if s  a  s
e^ (t) else
During the range when public education is available, if public educational subsidy is higher than what the
individual desires for the total amount of educational investment, the agent chooses pure public education,
otherwise, he invests privately to complement the available public education.
As derived in CR (2013), if an agent decides to get s years of schooling, the optimal total educational
expenditure at age t is given by:
e (t) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
be (t) for t  min(s; s)
ep for min(s; s)  t  sp
be (t) for sp  t  s
(42)
where
sp  min fs; s;max [s;ba]g : (43)
ba is defined by
ba = sup ft : be (t) = epg
When private investment on education is nonzero, the optimal total amount of educational expenditure,
e^ (t) ; is
e^ (t) = e^ (0) q(t) 
1
1  (44)
and the total amount of investment (both public and private) on education at age 0 is
e^ (0) =

h (s) 

 p E W (s; n)=G
 1
1  (45)
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ba is the supremum age of periods when the total educational investment is pure public. It can be solved
using (44) and e (ba) = ep.
a^ =
1
ps + r

(1  ) ln

ep
e^(0)

+ ln (ac) + psac

Using (121), (41), and (44), we get the present value of optimal private expenditures in education, E, as:
E 
Z s
0
es(a)q(a)da
= e^ (0)
"Z min(s;s)
0
q(a)
  
1  da+
Z s
sp
q(a)
  
1  da
#
  ep
Z min(s;s)
sp
q(a)da
Total value of the expenditure on education is the summation of private educational expenditure before and
after the availability of public education and the total investment on education given total investment exceeds
the public educational subsidies, minus the public educational subsidies during the period [s; s]. Similarly,
we can also write h(s) as:
h(s; E) =

e(0)
pe
 Z s
0
q (a)
  
1  da


h(s) =

e (0)
pE
 " Z min(s;s)
0
q(a)
  
1  da+
Z s
sp
q(a)
  
1  da
!
+

ep
e(0)

(sp  min(s; s))
#=
(46)
22
22Notice that min(s; s)  sp:The proof is trivial.
If s
¯
 a^;
sp = min fs; s; a^g  min fs; s; s
¯
g = min fs; s
¯
g
Otherwise,
sp = min fs; s; s
¯
g = min fs; s
¯
g :
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4.2.5 Steady State Wage
Labor earns the marginal product. Since after tax per capita production y is
y = h (t)1 1 k1
so the wage per unit of labor income is
w = (1  ) (1  1) y
h (t)
4.3 Calibration
4.3.1 Parameters common across countries
Among all parameters assumed to be common across countries, Table 4.1 shows parameters that are set
exogenously from micro evidence and related study, they include interest rate r; returns to experience ; age
parameters regarding survival probability ac and as, age of giving birth to children, F; and age of retirement
R. Other than these parameters, we calibrated parameters, including non-consumption goods, u; altruism
parameter,  and ; intergenerational elasticity of substitution, ; intertemporal elasticity of substitution ;
time preference ; labor supply parameters ; ; and ; human capital accumulation  and ; risk aversion
to mortality ;survival probability pc, ps, p, and ; life expectancy T; price of education pe; public education
expense ep, age lower and upper bound of public education, s
¯
, s, tax rate  ; experience parameter Exp, and
per capita GDP y.
Calibration Targets Table 4.2 summarizes the calibrated parameters. We calibrate the model to match
key statistics on fertility, education, and bequest in OECD countries and the United States. There are seven
parameters that need to be calibrated. Due to the difficulty of exactly matching all of them, we minimize
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mean square errors between the model’s statistics and the targets. The inverse of intergenerational elasticity
of substitution  is calibrated to match the mean fertility of OECD countries from the UNESCO data.
The calibrated parameter on intergenerational elasticity of substitution  is 0.68. It quantitatively identi-
fies EGS to be larger than 1, which is different from EIS, smaller than 1. Since EGS captures the easiness of
consumption smoothing across generations while EIS captures the extent of consumption smoothing across
periods within one’s own life, the calibrated parameter indicates that people tolerate the cross-generational
consumption fluctuation more than the cross-periods’ fluctuation within one’s life.
The target to identify the nonhomothetic part of the utility function u is the income elasticity of fertility,
-0.22, estimated in Jones, Schoonbroodt and Tertilt (2011) (JST (2011) henceforth) using more recent U.S.
census data in which cohorts were born between 1956 to 1960. OECD includes relatively richer countries
in the sample so we match the income elasticity of fertility across OECD countries to the U.S. level. Higher
u increases fertility by raising the marginal benefit of having children but it affects more on the poor than
the rich as the rich has more consumption and cares less on the utility from nonconsumption goods.
The discount rate on children’s consumption  and altruistic parameter  jointly match the the mean
years of schooling across OECD countries and the parental transfer to every child from year 0 to 17 as
a percentage of parents’ lifetime income in the U.S. calculated in Cordoba and Ripoll (2014). Altruistic
parameter  is chosen to be 2:8 implying for an individual who only have one child, at the age of giving
birth to children F , the altruistic level toward the child is 75.3% of what they value themselves. Two children
in a household get a total weight around 93.9% from parents, with 47% each one. And each child in a three
children household is given a weight around 33% from his/her parent. A decreasing altruistic level can be
seen as number of children increases. Up to any arbitrary large number of children, the total weight that
every parent puts on all his or her children is less than 1 but close to 1, which means that parents value all
their children less than what they value themselves.
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The average private expense on education as a percentage of GDP in OECD countries 0.65% and the
return to schooling in U.S. 8.28% are used to pin down parameters  and  in the human capital accumula-
tion function. We choose OECD countries for the fraction of private educational expense instead of the U.S.
level 2.1% because US education statistics tend to be somehow atypical among rich countries.
Time cost on every child is an important parameter that governs fertility and time cost, hence we calibrate
 to match time cost as a percentage of lifetime income.
From the calibrated model, mean fertility of the OECD countries is 0.85, mean years of schooling is 21.9,
very close to the targets. Transfer from parents to children and time cost of raising children are 15.6% and
19.5%, several percentage points higher than the data. However, since the targets’ underestimate goods cost
and time cost, in particular, goods transfer does not take into account the transfer from parents to children
when children are older than 17. our calibrated parameters deliver statistics in a reasonable range. The
fraction of private educational expense is 0.44% and the return of schooling is 9.9%. Our model delivers an
income elasticity of fertility in OECD countries, -26.5% which is in between JST (2009)’s estimation using
census data in 1960s, -22% and their estimation across the whole sample period -30%.
Table 4.1 Exogenous Parameters Common Across Countries
Parameters Concept Value Target
 return to experience 2% Bils and Klenow (2000a)
s
¯
starting schooling age 6 UNESCO
F parenthood age 25 Cordoba and Ripoll (2013)
R retirement age 65 Cordoba and Ripoll (2013)
k capital share 0.33 Gollin (2002)
 inverse EIS 1.5 Cordoba and Ripoll (2014)
r riskless interest rate 2% Cordoba and Ripoll(2014)
 time discount 2% Flat consumption
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Table 4.2 Calibrated Parameters
Parameters Concept Value Targets
 inverse of EGS 0.68 OECD Mean fertility: 0.86
u utility nonconsumption goods 0.14 OECD 4Fertility4Income : -22%(JST 2011)
 discount on children 0.2 OECD Mean years of schooling: 22.0
 altruism 2.8 US Transfer/Lifetime Income 10.3%
 human capital 0.4 OECD Private Edu Expense/GDP: 0.65%
 human capital 0.16 U.S. Return to schooling at s: 8.28%
 time cost per child 0.24 US Time cost/Lifetime Income 15.4%
4.3.2 Parameters specific for different countries
Country-specific parameters are chosen following CR (2013). They includes ep, the public educational
expenditure as a percentage of GDP, price of education Pe, life expectancy T , wage w; the upper bound s
and the lower bound s of the set of age range when public education is available.
4.4 Results
In this section, we report the quantitative predictions of the calibrated model on the steady state levels
of fertility and schooling of all the 74 countries in 2005 from statistics of UNESCO.
4.4.1 Model’s fit
Figure 4.2 and 4.3 plot the fertility and years of schooling simulated from the model versus that in the
data. Our model is able to explain around 68.3% of the fertility dispersion and 85.1% of the schooling
dispersion in the data. Model’s prediction on fertility rates ranges from 0.63 to 2.64 and fertility rates in
data range from 0.58 to 3.87. Model’s prediction on years of schooling ranges from 13 to 25 and schooling
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data ranges from 9.71 to 26.35. The average fertility rate of all the 74 countries predicted by the model is
1.29 with standard deviation 0.53, while the average fertility rate in the data is 1.42 with 0.77 as its standard
deviation. The mean value of years of schooling in the model and in the data are 20.04 and 18.96, with the
corresponding standard deviations 2.85 and 3.35, respectively. The model slightly underestimates average
fertility by 0.13 and overestimates average years of schooling by 0.24. A significant part of the mismatch
occurs in poor countries where the predicted fertility is lower and years of schooling is higher than the data.
As Figure 4.4 shows, the model does a good job in generating a negative relationship between fertility
and years of schooling. Countries with more education have lower fertility rate. Are these countries richer
than others? Figure 4.5 and 4.6 plot fertility and schooling as a function of wage per unit of labor income,
respectively. These two figures indicate that people in countries earning higher wage choose to have few
children and go to school longer. Why do rich countries have lower fertility rates? There is a tension
between the effects of wage on fertility. On one hand higher wage implies higher income, consumption
and bequest to children, which leads to a higher utility of every child, which induces parents to have more
children as the marginal benefit of having children increases. On the other hand higher wage also increases
the cost of having children as children take parental time. When the utility function is nonhomothetic due
to the presence of nonconsumption goods, the effect of wage on marginal cost dominates that on marginal
benefit so fertility decreases with wage. The model predicts an income elasticity of fertility -0.28 of all the
74 countries in the data. Table 4.3 indicates model’s performance.
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Table 4.3 Model’s Performance for All Countries
Model Data
Mean Fertility 1.29 1.42
Std Fertility 0.53 0.77
Mean Years of Schooling 20.04 18.96
Std Years of Schooling 2.85 3.35
Income Elasticity of Fertility -0.28 -0.20 to -0.38
4.4.2 Counterfactual Exercises
In this section, we identify key factors in the model that are driving the dispersion of fertility rate and
length of education across countries. Table 4.4 shows the effects of experiments on the mean, standard
deviation of years of schooling, fertility, and parental transfers across countries. In every counterfactual
exercise, we equalize one parameter to the U.S. level and leave others unchanged.
Table 4.4 Counterfactuals (% Change)
stds means stdn meann stdb meanb
pc -6.0 1.2 -10.7 -3.5 -0.1 1.4
ps -1.6 0.3 -3.0 -1.0 -0.6 0.0
p -5.6 1.7 -26.3 -8.3 -7.5 0.0
pc; ps; p -14.4 4.1 -39.2 -13.4 -8.2 5.7
ep 7.9 -4.8 -21.2 -10.8 4.6 17.5
s -35.2 1.1 -14.5 -2.6 -5.1 -7.9
pe 6.9 -5.5 12.8 10.7 -14.2 -23.0
w -65.7 22.2 -61.3 -41.5 94.0 411.8
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Wage per unit of labor is the most important factor in explaining both the dispersion of fertility and years
of schooling across countries. Equating wage to the US level decreases the standard deviation of fertility by
61.3% and decreases cross country years of schooling by 65.7% . Fertility rates of many countries, especially
those poor countries, become as low as the U.S. fertility and their schooling hits the maximum level after
equating wage to the U.S. level. A higher wage increases the marginal cost of having children since the
opportunity cost of raising children is higher. Higher wage rate also increases the marginal benefit at steady
state since children’s welfare is higher and parents are altruistic toward children. The nonconsumption goods
weakens the impact of wage on the marginal benefit. Hence the increase of the marginal cost dominates that
of the marginal benefit and raising wage reduces fertility.
Contrary to Cordoba and Ripoll (2013) in which fertility is exogenous and wage is a trivial factor in
affecting mean as well as the dispersion of schooling, wage in our model is quantitatively important. Equat-
ing wage to the US level decreases the standard deviation of schooling by 61.3% and increases average
schooling by 22.2%. There is a channel at work in our model but can not be captured in exogenous fertility
models. Higher wage reduces optimal fertility, and it increases the transfer from parent to children by the
quantity-quality trade-off and by the higher degree of parental altruism. Table 4.4 shows that the mean of
bequest is four hundred times bigger than that without equating wage to the U.S. level. In the model with
credit friction, bigger transfer from parents allows young people to invest more resource in education.
In addition to wage, the maximum length of public education s also has substantial effect on the disper-
sion of schooling. Equating the wage of all the 74 countries to that of the U.S. level, the predicted average
schooling is raised by 1.1% and the dispersion is shrinked by 35.2%.
Although the the extensive margin of education, s, has a greater effect on differences in fertility across
countries, the intensive margin, the public educational subsidy per pupil ep, does not play a role in producing
the divergence of years of schooling. The reason is that equating ep to the U.S. level allows people to accu-
mulate high level of human capital, which leads to high earnings per unit of labor and higher consumption
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when working. This increases the gap between consumption as a student and as a worker and hence in-
creases the marginal cost of schooling and discourages the optimal years of schooling. In short, individuals
are less willing to be constrained as students and tend to escape from the constrained student phase with low
consumption and eager to enter into the working life earlier. This explains why mean years of schooling is
lower by 4.8%.
Regarding the impact on fertility dispersion, adult survival probability is the second important factor
after wage. It lowers the fertility dispersion by 26.3% by equating all countries’ adult survival probability to
the U.S. level. The mechanism at work is that the experiment raises the expected earning by increasing the
adult probability. Higher expected earnings per unit of labor increases the marginal cost of having children
and this impact dominates the impact on marginal benefit.
Shutting down differences in ep to the U.S. level lowers the predicted average fertility rate by 10.8%
and reduce the predicted standard deviation of fertility by 21.2%. Assigning all countries’ ep to the US level
endows a higher human capital accumulation for most countries, which enhances the annual income. A
higher time cost of raising children discourages the optimal decision of fertility.
Infant survival probability explains 10.7% of the fertility dispersion. The survival probability of all
stages has minor impact on the dispersion of schooling. The standard deviation of years of schooling is
merely cut by 3.7% if we shut down the difference of all stages’ survival probability by equating all coun-
tries’ level to that of U.S. But it does play an active role in the dispersion of fertility.
Infant survival probability explains 10.7% of the fertility dispersion. The survival probability of all
stages has significant impact on the dispersion of fertility. The standard deviation of years of schooling is
cut by 14.4% if we shut down the difference of all stages’ survival probability by equating all countries’
level to that of U.S.
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If we equate the price of public education, pe; to the U.S. level while keeping other factors unchanged,
the dispersion of both fertility and schooling will be even higher than the prediction of the model without
counterfactual analysis. It seems that pe does not produce any diversion, rather, it reduces these dispersions.
4.5 Conclusion
We quantitatively study optimal fertility and years of schooling choices in a dynamic altruistic Barro-
Becker context with credit frictions. The model predicts a plausibly negative relationship between steady
state fertility and duration of education, consistent with UNESCO data in 2005. Our model performs well
in predicting average and dispersion of fertility rate and that of educational length.
Within the altruistic life-cycle model with credit friction, we identify several key forces that drive the
diverse steady state fertility and schooling across countries. Our model suggests that wage differentials are
the most essential factor in generating differences in fertility and years of schooling. The duration of public
education, has substantial effect on the divergence of years of schooling while the intensive margin, the
annual public educational subsidy, works better in producing the dispersion of fertility.
In this chapter, we abstract the heterogeneity of individuals in the economy and do not examine the
dynastic transition of the economy. Heterogeneity is not considered in this model. In one of the companion
chapter of my dissertation, CLR (2015) we quantitatively study U.S. inequality using a heterogeneous model
in which people differ in lifetime earning abilities.
97
CHAPTER 5. ALTRUISM, FERTILITY AND RISK
5.1 Introduction
At least since Malthus it has been recognized that high fertility rates are associated to poverty. Such
association motivates many family planning programs around the world that seek to reduce fertility as a way
to alleviate poverty.23 Understanding the link between poverty and fertility, and more generally, between
inequality and fertility is an important part of the theory of distribution.
This chapter studies fertility choices and fertility policies in economies where the underlying force
driving inequality, poverty, social mobility and fertility differentials is uninsurable idiosyncratic risk. Our
model integrates two leading streams of the literature on inequality and fertility. One the one hand, inequality
and social mobility is driven by idiosyncratic shocks, as in Huggett (1993) or Aiyagari (1994). On the
other hand, fertility is purely motivated by altruistic reasons, as in Barro and Becker (1989) and Becker
and Barro (1988). Individuals in our models are fully rational, altruistic toward their descendants, and
heterogeneous in their abilities. Earning abilities are randomly determined at birth and potentially correlated
with parental abilities. Insurance markets are available but parents cannot leave negative bequests to their
children. Altruistic models with idiosyncratic risk are central to modern macroeconomics, particularly when
studying issues of inequality and redistribution, but with the important exception of Alvarez (1999), these
models assume exogenous fertility. This chapter is the first to provide a characterization of the endowment
version of a Bewley economy extended to include endogenous fertility.24
The first main contribution of the chapter is to characterize complete markets allocations in the presence
of idiosyncratic shocks and endogenous fertility. Surprisingly, while perfect risk sharing and flat consump-
tion are optimal when fertility is exogenous, they are not optimal when fertility is endogenous. Instead
23For example, a United Nations Population Fund pamphlet asserts that "effective family planning programmes targeted
to meet the needs of poor populations can reduce the fertility gap between rich and poor people, and make a power-
ful contribution to poverty reduction and the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals." Reported by UNPF at
http://www.unfpa.org/rh/planning/mediakit/docs/sheet4.pdf. Retrieved April 2 2014.
24See Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012, chapter 18) for a presentation of Bewley models.
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consumption and fertility remain stochastic in the complete markets economy. The reason is that when a
life is costly to create, optimal consumption is an utilization rate and the higher the net cost of creating a
new life the higher its utilization rate, as shown by Barro and Becker (1989). Since the net cost of a child
is not constant in our environment, as it is tied to both the parent’s and the child’s abilities, then neither
flat consumption nor flat fertility is optimal. We also show that the complete markets model predicts a neg-
ative relationship between fertility and parental ability, inequality and social mobility. However, we also
document some key counterfactual implications. For example, the model predicts that all children of the
same parent have the same consumption, that the actual ability of an individual does not affects his/her own
consumption, or that maximum fertility is often optimal for plausible calibrations of the income process.
We then proceed to characterize the incomplete markets economy, one that arises when the non-negative
bequest constraint binds. The model can replicate a number of stylized facts: inequality, persistence as
well as social mobility, and fertility decreasing with ability. The equilibrium is characterized by a Markov
branching process satisfying the Conditional Stochastic Monotonicity property. This means that if a kid
from a poor family and a kid from a rich family both fall into one of the poorest classes, it is more likely
that the poor kid will be poorer than the rich kid. But the model also requires a significant degree of social
mobility in order to rationalize why the poor have more children. Absent social mobility, fertility rates
would be equal among the poor and the rich. Furthermore, significant social mobility is a distinguishing
feature of the data.
A negative relationship between fertility and ability is not simple to obtain within dynastic altruistic
models, as discussed by Jones, Schoonbroodt and Tertilt (2011). Our explanation for the negative relation-
ship is novel and the second main contribution of the chapter. It arises from the interplay of two opposites
forces. On the one hand, higher ability individuals face a larger opportunity cost of having children as
children take valuable parental time. On the other hand, higher ability individuals enjoy a larger benefit of
having children when abilities are intergenerationally persistent because the utility of a child is positively
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related to parental ability. We find that the effect of ability on the marginal cost dominates its effect on the
marginal benefit if the intergenerational persistence of abilities is not perfect. Regression to the mean in
abilities means that low ability parents expect their children to be, on average, of higher ability while high
ability parents expect their children to be of lower ability. This explains why fertility decreases with ability,
and income, in a fully rational, homothetic and altruistic environment.
Golosov, Jones and Tertilt (2007) have shown that allocations are efficient in frictionless Barro-Becker
models. Of particular interest is whether fertility is higher or lower when markets are incomplete than when
markets are complete. We show analytically that steady state fertility can be higher when markets are in-
complete if children are a net financial cost to parents. In that case, binding bequest constrains prevent early
generations from extracting resources from later generations making future generations effectively richer.
Since fertility is a normal good, the fertility of early generations falls while fertility of later generations, and
in particular steady state fertility, increases. Providing conditions under which fertility is higher in incom-
plete markets economies than in complete market is the third main contribution of the chapter. This chapter
complements Schoonbroodt and Tertilt (2014) who have shown that fertility is inefficiently low for early
generations when markets are incomplete.
Finally, we study the consequences and optimality of fertility policies, such as family planning programs
aiming at reducing fertilities rates. We show that policies restricting the fertility of the poor result in a
sequence of income distributions that dominates the original distribution in all periods in the first order
stochastic sense. In particular, average income and consumption increase in all periods. This result arises
from two forces. First, average ability of (born) individuals increases because the poor has proportionally
more low ability children as a result of the assumed conditional stochastic monotonicity property. Second,
consumption and income of the poor strictly increases because they spend less time and resources raising
children. These results seemingly provide the theoretical support to family planning programs seeking to
reduce the fertility of the poor (Chu and Koo 1990).
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In spite of these positive implications, the fourth main result of the chapter is to show that fertility
restrictions of any type, not only for the poor, unequivocally reduce individual and social welfare in our
model, even when fertility is higher than its complete market counterpart. As we show, a policy that restricts
fertility reduces the set of feasible choices and invariably reduces welfare of all individuals in all generations,
even those whose fertility is not directly affected. This is because altruistic parents care not only about their
own consumption and fertility but also care about the consumption and fertility of all their descendants.
Regardless of current ability there is a positive probability that a descendant of the dynasty will fall into
the group directly affected in finite time. Furthermore, the welfare of those individuals who are not born
under the new policy also falls, or at least does not increase. Social welfare falls because the welfare of
all individuals, born and unborn, either falls or remain the same. This is the case, for example, if social
welfare is defined as classical (Bentham) utilitarianism, a weighted sum of the welfare of all present and
future individuals. The result also holds for versions of classical utilitarianism that are consistent with the
Barro-Becker concept of diminishing altruism. An interpretation of our results is that the positive effect on
welfare of fertility restrictions, namely higher average consumption, is dominated by the negative effect of
a smaller dynasty size.
If social welfare is defined as average (Mills) utilitarianism rather than classical utilitarianism, social
welfare could increase even if the welfare of all individuals falls if population falls even more. In this case,
the net effect of fertility restrictions on social welfare depends on the relative strength of two opposite forces.
On the one hand, distributions of abilities and income improve for all periods. On the other hand, welfare
of all individuals fall. We present two analytical cases in which the later force dominates and hence social
welfare defined as average welfare falls not only in present value but also for all periods. Our quantitative
exercises also show that these results hold more generally.
The negative impact of fertility policies on individuals’ welfare applies not only to policies aiming at
reducing fertilities, but also to policies compelling individuals to increase their fertilities. An example of
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such policy is the seemingly official Chinese policy of stigmatizing unwed women older than 27 as “leftover
women".25
We also study the effects on steady state social welfare of taxes or subsidies seeking to increase or
reduce the cost of raising children using a calibrated version of the model. The government is required to
run a balanced budget. The results suggest steady state average social welfare could be increased but only
by a very small tax, say one less than 2% the time cost of raising every child. Out of this range, neither
tax nor subsidy would improve social welfare. The consequence on individual welfare varies across ability
types and is determined by the magnitude of the tax/subsidy.
In addition to the papers already mentioned, our chapter is related to Alvarez (1999). He studies an
economy with idiosyncratic shocks, incomplete markets and endogenous fertility choices by altruistic par-
ents but does not study the high fertility of the poor nor the consequences of fertility policies. Our incomplete
markets economy is a version of his model, one with non-negative bequest constraints. In equilibrium no
individual leaves positive bequests. This is a stronger degree of market incompleteness than that in Alvarez.
Similar degree of market incompleteness is exploited by Krusell et al. (2011) to obtain closed form solution
for asset prices in a Huggett (1993) model. Similarly, we are able to derive various closed form solutions
and provide analytical proofs of the welfare effects of various fertility policies. Our chapter is also related to
Hosseini et al. (2013) who study a related problem using an optimal contracting approach, and to Sommer
(2013) who studies fertility in the presence of idiosyncratic shocks but parents are not dynastically altruistic
as in Barro and Becker.
There is a related literature that studies fertility policies in general equilibrium. A recent example is
Liao (2013) who studies the One Child Policy using a calibrated deterministic dynastic altruism model with
two types of individuals, skilled and unskilled, in the spirit of Doepke (2004). Although Liao’s model can
generate fertility differentials, Doepke (2004) documents that this channel alone is relatively weak. Part of
25Fincher, Leta Hong (12 October 2012). "OP-ED CONTRIBUTOR; China’s ’Leftover’ Women". The New York Times.
Retrieved 29 March 2014.
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the issue is that the model only generates upward mobility in equilibrium. Our model, in contrast, generates
significant upward and downward mobility that can lead to significant fertility differentials. The mechanisms
are different and therefore complementary. We are also able to derive sharp analytical results. For example,
we prove that fertility reducing policies, like the one child policy, decrease every individual’s welfare for
sure while Liao’s calibrated result suggests it’s true for almost all generations but not all.26
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 analyzes a simple deterministic model of
fertility. We show that steady state fertility is higher in incomplete markets economies than in complete
markets economy when children are a net financial cost to parents. Section 5.3 introduces idiosyncratic
shocks into the model. We characterize the optimal fertility as well as its relationship with earning abilities.
Section 5.4 studies the effect of fertility restriction policies on individual and social welfare. Numerical
simulations, policy experiments and robustness checks are performed in section 5.5. Section 5.6 concludes.
Proofs are in the Appendix.
5.2 A deterministic model
It is convenient to consider first a deterministic version of the model. We use the model to show an-
alytically under what conditions fertility may be higher when markets are incomplete. A similar result is
obtained for the full model but using numerical simulations. Schoonbroodt and Tertilt (2014) have shown
that, under certain assumptions, incomplete markets models can result in inefficiently low fertility. In those
cases, policies directed to promote higher fertility may be welfare enhancing. We show that, under different
assumptions, incomplete markets models can result in high, not low, fertility relative to the complete mar-
kets counterpart. If that is the case then policies limiting fertility could, in principle, be welfare improving.
As we later show, this is not the case. Restricting fertility in incomplete markets models, even if fertility is
inefficiently high, is generally welfare detrimental.
26Another related paper is Moav (2005). In his model, individuals exhibit warm-glow altruism, and comparative advantage in
the education of children explains differential fertility rates among rich and poor individuals as well as the persistence of poverty.
He does not study fertility policies and social mobility does not occur in equilibrium.
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The key assumption explaining why fertility could be lower or higher when markets are incomplete is
whether children are a net financial cost or a net financial gain to parents. When children are a net financial
gain, as in Schoonbroodt and Tertilt (2014) or Cordoba and Ripoll (2014), then market incompleteness
reduces fertility. But when children are a net cost, as in Barro and Becker (1989) and Becker and Barro
(1988), then market incompleteness generates increases steady state fertility. Short term fertility, on the
other hand, in particular the fertility of the first generation, is lower under market incompleteness regardless
of whether children are a net financial cost or benefit.
The deterministic models of this section do not generate a negative relationship between fertility and
income. Therefore, they do not help to rationalize the negative fertility-income relationship nor the high
fertility of the poor. The model in the next section, with idiosyncratic shocks, can generate a negative
relationship between fertility and income as well as inefficiently high fertility rates.
5.2.1 Complete markets
Individuals live for two periods, one as a child and one as an adult. Children do not consume. The
lifetime utility of an adult individual, or just an individual, at time t is of the Barro-Becker type
u (ct) +  (nt)Ut+1; t = 0; 1; 2;    ;
where u (c) = c1 1  ;  2 (0; 1) ; is the utility from consumption, n is the number of children and  (n) =
n1 "; satisfying  2 (0; ),  (n) < 1, and n  n:  (n) is the weight that parents attach to the welfare
of their n children and Ut+1 is the welfare of an individual at t + 1. The upper limit on  is needed for an
interior solution of fertility, as discussed in Barro and Becker (1988). The upper limit on  (n) is required
to guarantee bounded utility.
Individuals are endowed with one unit of time that is used either to work or to raise children. An adult’s
labor supply is lt = 1   nt; where  is the time cost of raising a child. In additional to labor income,
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individuals receive transfers, or bequest, from their parents in the amount bt. Let w be the wage rate per unit
of labor supply and r be the interest rate at time. An individual’s budget constraint is given by
w (1  nt) + (1 + r) bt  ct + ntbt+1:
The maximum number of children, n; needs to satisfy two restrictions. First, n  1= is required so
that parents labor supply, 1  nt; is nonnegative. Second,  (n) < 1 implies n < 
1
" 1 : These restrictions
are satisfied if 1 " > : A final assumption is required so that maximum fertility is not always optimal:

1
" (1 + r)
1
" < n:
Barro and Becker (1989) characterized optimal consumption and fertility allocations, given prices and
b0, of the sequence version of the problem above under the assumption (1 + r)w > w. This assumption
requires children to be a net financial burden to parents. The following proposition characterizes optimal
allocations.
Proposition 1 If (1 + r)w > w then the optimal solutions for t  1 are given by
cCt =
1  
   " [(1 + r)w   w]
and
nCt = 
1
" (1 + r)
1
" :
If (1 + r)w < w the optimal solutions for t  1 satisfy nt = n and ct+1ct = (n "(1 + r))
1=
.
The first part of the Proposition was proven by Barro and Becker (1989) while the second part is proven
in the Appendix. According to the proposition, if (1 + r)w > w then there is no transitional dynamics
after the first period, consumption is proportional to the net cost of raising a child, and fertility is proportional
to the interest rate but independent of wage income. However, if w > (1 + r)w then maximum fertility
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is optimal and the economy is always in transition, except if parameters are such that n "(1 + r) = 1.
Maximum fertility is optimal because children earn enough income to compensate their parents for the costs
of raising them and such compensation scheme is possible when markets are complete.
5.2.2 Incomplete markets
Consider now an incomplete markets case. Specifically, suppose bequests are constrained to be larger
than certain amount, b. This is a natural restriction because parents are legally unable to leave debts to their
children. The first order condition for optimal bequests can be written as a standard Euler equation but
across generations:
ntu
0 (ct)   (nt)u0 (ct+1) (1 + r) with equality if bt+1 > b: (47)
The left hand side of this equation is the cost of endowing n children with additional db bequests per-child
while the right hand side is the benefit. Denote nI the steady state fertility in the incomplete markets model.
The following proposition states that fertility is higher in the incomplete markets model when children are a
net cost to parents.
Proposition 2 Suppose (1 + r)w > w. Then nI  nC .
P roof. In steady state, equation (47) simplifies to 1   (1 + r)  nI " or
nI   1" (1 + r) 1" = nC :
The intuition for this key result is the following. When bequest constraints bind, early generations can-
not extract as much resources from later generations. Since children are normal goods, this redistribution
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of resources from early to later generations reduces fertility at early times but makes future generations ef-
fectively richer and therefore increases fertility at later times. The assumption (1 + r)w > w is important
because in that case nC is the relevant fertility when markets are complete. Otherwise, maximum fertility is
optimal in the complete markets case and therefore larger or equal than the incomplete markets case.
The results above show that steady fertility may be larger when markets are incomplete than when they
are complete. In those instances policies seeking to reduce fertility may be welfare enhancing. The findings
also put in context of the results of Schoonbroodt and Tertilt (2014). Their study is related with cases where
children are a financial gain to parents and therefore market incompleteness generates too little fertility.
It is also the case that even when children are a net financial cost, fertility by early generations may be
inefficiently low. But over the longer term, high fertility arises when markets are incomplete and children
are a net financial cost.
Whether children are a financial benefit or cost is an open question. Cordoba and Ripoll (2014) find that
children in the U.S. are likely a net financial benefit. Lee (2000) estimates intergenerational transfers for
different societies and finds that lifetime transfers run from children to parents in relative rich societies, and
from parents to children in relative poor societies.
The results of this section take prices as given. In that sense, they correspond to either partial equilib-
rium or to a small open economy. The Appendix shows that these results can also be obtained in general
equilibrium. A limitation of the models so far is that they are silent about why fertility rates are larger
among poorer individuals, a key motivating for many family planning policies. The next section shows that
an extension of the model that allows for idiosyncratic shocks can explain this regularity.
5.3 Idiosyncratic shocks
This section introduces idiosyncratic shocks into the model of the previous section. We consider com-
plete markets and incomplete markets arrangements. Models with idiosyncratic risk are central in modern
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macroeconomics, particularly when studying issues of inequality and redistribution but, with the exception
of Alvarez (1999), there exists no dynastic altruistic models with endogenous fertility. Given the focus of
family planning policies on poverty and inequality reduction, it is natural to study those issues within a
standard model where inequality is ultimately the result of idiosyncratic risk.
The remaining of the chapter derives a series of novel results for what can be called Bewley models with
endogenous fertility. A key contribution is to show that a negative relationship between fertility and income
arises naturally both in the complete and incomplete markets versions of the models. We also show that
the complete markets model has some counterfactual predictions, and focus the rest of the discussion in the
incomplete markets version.
5.3.1 Environment
Assume there is not aggregate uncertainty, goods are perishable, all information is public, and markets
open every period.
Evolution of abilities Consider an endowment economy populated by a large number of dynastic altru-
istic individuals who live for two periods, one as a child and one as an adult. Children do not consume.
Individuals differ in their labor endowments, or earning abilities. Let 
  f!1; !2; :::; !Kg be the set of
possible earning abilities, where 0 < !1 < ::: < !K : Earning abilities are drawn at the beginning of the
adult life from the Markov chain M(!0; !) = Pr(!t+1 = !0j!t = !) where !t is the ability of the par-
ent and !t+1 is the ability of the child. We use the following assumption, due to Chu and Koo (1990), to
guarantee intergenerational persistence of abilities in the first order stochastic sense.
Assumption 1 Conditional Stochastic Monotonicity (CSM):
PI
i=1Mi1PJ
j=1Mj1

PI
i=1Mi2PJ
j=1Mj2
 ::: 
PI
i=1MiKPJ
j=1MjK
; 1  I  J  K:
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Assumption 1 means that if a low ability kid and a high ability kid both fall into one of the lowest ability
classes, it is more likely that the kid born by a low ability parent be endowed with a lower ability than the
kid born by a high ability parent. CSM implies first order stochastic dominance. To see this notice that when
J = K, the condition becomes:
IX
i=1
Mi1 
IX
i=1
Mi2  ::: 
IX
i=1
MiK , 1  I  K:
Two examples of Markov chains satisfying Assumption 1 are an i.i.d. process and quasi-diagonal matrices
of the form:
M =
266666666666666666664
a+ b c 0 0 :: 0 0
a b c 0 :: 0 0
0 a b c :: 0 0
:: :: :: :: :: 0 0
0 0 0 0 a b c
0 0 0 0 0 a b+ c
377777777777777777775
:
where (a; b; c) 0; a+ b+ c = 1 and b > 0:5:
Assume further that M has a unique invariant distribution, , satisfying:
 (!j) =
X
!i2

 (!i)M(!j ; !i) for all !j 2 
: (48)
Let !t = [!0; !1; :::; !t] 2 
t+1 denote a particular history of ability realizations up to time t. We call !t a
family history or a family branch. With some abuse of notation, let !t =
 
!t 1; !t

for t > 1 and !0 = !0.
Individual resources The technology of production is linear in ability: one unit of labor produces one unit
of perishable output. The total resources available to an individual of ability !t at time t are labor income
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!t (1  nt) and transfers from their parents. Let ct
 
!t

and nt
 
!t

denote consumption and fertility of
an individual whose family history is !t: Let bt
 
!t

denote transfers, or bequests, received from parents.27
Resources are used to consume and to leave transfers to children. Insurance market exists as parents can
leave bequests contingent on the ability of their children. Let qt(!t; !i) be the time t price of a contingent
asset bt+1
 
!t; !i

that delivers one unit of consumption at t + 1 contingent on !t+1 = !i given family
history !t. The budget constraint of an individual at time t with history !t is:
ct
 
!t

+ nt
 
!t
 KX
i=1
qt(!
t; !i)bt+1
 
!t; !i
  !t  1  nt  !t+ bt  !t : (49)
Aggregate resources Let N0
 
!0
  1: Nt  !t = Nt 1  !t 1nt 1  !t 1M (!t; !t 1) is the popu-
lation size at time t of a particular branch of the family tree, the one described by !t: Assume goods are
perishable, total consumption cannot exceed the total endowment of the economy at any point in time:
X
!t2
t+1
Nt
 
!t
 
!t
 
1  nt
 
!t
  ct  !t  0 for all t.
Preferences The lifetime utility of an individual born at time t is of the Barro-Becker expected-utility
type:
u
 
ct
 
!t

+ 
 
nt
 
!t

Et

Ut+1
 
!t+1
 j!t , t = 0; 1; 2;    (50)
where u (c) and  (n) satisfy the same properties of the previous section,Et is the mathematical expectation
operator conditional on the information up to time t and EtUt+1 is the expected utility of individuals in the
next generation.
Market arrangements All markets are competitive and insurance prices are actuarially fair. Let pt =P
i qt(!
t; !i) be the price of a riskless bond. Under the assumption of no aggregate uncertainty, pt = p:
27We denote bt bequest for short. This bequest includes all net transfers from a parent to each of his/her adult child. In particular,
it includes inter vivos transfers.
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The riskless interest rate is then given by 1 + r = 1=p. Furthermore, actuarially fair prices must satisfy the
arbitrage condition
qt(!
t; !i) = pM (!i; !t) : (51)
so that qt(!t; !i) = q(!t; !i):
We study two different market arrangements. We first consider a complete markets economy in which
families are only subject to natural debt limits, limits that prevent Ponzi schemes but that do not bind
in equilibrium. In particular, parents can leave negative bequests to their children in a complete markets
economy. We also consider an incomplete markets economy in which parents cannot leave negative bequests
to their children. In particular, in this case we assume:
bt+1
 
!t; !t+1
  0 for all !t 2 
t+1; !t+1 2 
 and all t  0: (52)
5.3.2 Complete markets
Optimal consumption and fertility Consider first the complete markets economy. We find convenient to
write the problem recursively. Let Vt
 
bt; !
t

be the maximum lifetime utility of a time t adult with family
history !t. Then
Vt
 
bt; !
t

= max
nt2[0;n];bt+1(!t;!i)
u (ct) + n
1 "
t Et

Vt+1
 
bt+1
 
!t+1

; !t+1
 j!t
subject to
ct + nt
KX
i=1
q(!t; !i)bt+1(!
t; !i)  !t (1  nt) + bt for all t and
 
!t; !i

: (53)
The following Proposition generalizes Proposition 1 for the case of stochastic earning abilities and children
being a net financial costs to parents. Proofs are in the Appendix.
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Proposition 3 Suppose (1 + r)!t > E (!t+1j!t) for all !t: Then the optimal interior solutions for con-
sumption and fertility are given by:
ct+1 = c (!t) =
1  
   " [(1 + r)!t   E (!t+1j!t)] for all t  0 (54)
and
nt = n (!t 1; !t) = 
1
" (1 + r)
1
"

(1 + r)!t 1   E (!tj!t 1)
(1 + r)!t   E (!t+1j!t)

" for all t  1: (55)
If (1 + r)!t > E (!t+1j!t) for some t; then the optimal fertility at time t is n:
According to the proposition, consumption of all generations, except the first one, is proportional to
the net expected financial cost of raising a child, (1 + rt)!t   E (!t+1j!t) : Equation (54) implies that
individual consumption is a random variable, one that increases with the ability of the parent and falls with
the expected ability of the individual. The randomness of consumption is perhaps surprising because with
exogenous fertility consumption it is not random but constant. In that case, individuals are able to insure all
idiosyncratic risk, and consumption obeys the permanent income hypothesis.
But consumption in the endogenous fertility case obeys a completely different logic. In contrast to the
exogenous fertility case, the existence of a next period consumer, the child, is not guaranteed nor costless.
When a life is costly to create, optimal consumption becomes an utilization rate and the higher the net cost
of creating a new variety, a new child, the higher the utilization rate. Furthermore, if costs and/or benefits
of raising a child is random so is consumption. The randomness of consumption also implies that there
exists social mobility in the endogenous-fertility complete-markets model. Equation (54) also implies that
all children of the same parent has the same consumption, and that the actual ability of an individual does not
affects his/her own consumption. These two predictions are particularly problematic. Evidence shows that
there exists significant consumption inequality among siblings and that consumption increases with earnings
(e.g., Mulligan 1997 and Gaviria 2002).
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The solution for optimal fertility described by equation (55) is a restatement of the intergenerational
Euler equation, u0(ct) = n "t (1 + rt+1)Etu0(ct+1), where n
 "
t is the average degree of altruism: Fertil-
ity, rather than consumption, now plays the key role of smoothing family welfare. If parental consumption
is high while children consumption is low, then high fertility is required to smooth family utility intertempo-
rally. More precisely, equation (55) shows that fertility depends negatively on the ability of the parent, and
positively on the ability of the grandparent. The model thus provides a novel explanation for the negative
fertility income relationship, an explanation that relies purely on the random nature of abilities. Conditional
on grandparents’ abilities, the model predicts that high ability parents have fewer children because children
are more costly to those parents.
Notice that optimal fertility is the lowest for high ability parents with low ability grandparents. This is
due to the fact that, with complete markets, unlucky grandparents can borrow against the income of their
high ability children which reduces the wealth of those children, and therefore their fertility. As we show
below, when markets are incomplete unlucky grandparents cannot borrow against their children’s income
and therefore the fertility of high ability parents with low ability grandparents is higher under incomplete
markets.
Corner solutions are not only possible but likely in complete markets models with idiosyncratic shocks.
First, if children are a net financial benefit to parents, then maximum fertility is optimal, nt = n. Second,
equation (55) can easily imply nt > n for parents whose ability is far below that of their grandparents. As
we document below, using a calibrated version of the model, this feature of the complete markets model is
problematic because it leads to unrealistic high fertility rates for many families.
General equilibrium Given optimal fertility rules n (!t 1; !t) ; let Nt+1 (!t; !t+1) be the population at
time t + 1 with own type !t+1 and parental type !t: Assuming a law of large number holds, aggregate
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population evolves according to:
Nt+1 (!t; !t+1) =
X
!t 1
Nt (!t 1; !t)n (!t 1; !t)M (!t+1; !t) :
Let Nt 
P
!t 1
P
!t
Nt (!t 1; !t) be total population at time, t (!t 1; !t)  Nt(!t 1;!t)Nt be the fraction
of population of type !t and parental type !t 1;and 1 + gt  Nt+1Nt the gross growth rate of population.
Then, the previous expression can be written as:
t+1 (!t; !t+1) =
1
1 + gt
X
!t 1
t (!t 1; !t)n (!t 1; !t)M (!t+1; !t) (56)
Adding across (!t; !t+1) pairs, it can be seen that 1 + gt =
P
!t
P
!t 1 t (!t 1; !t)n (!t 1; !t) : The
stationary distribution  (!t 1; !t) is the invariant distribution that solves (56).
Given that production is perishable, the equilibrium interest rate has to equate aggregate consumption to
aggregate endowments. Using the stationary distribution, the equilibrium condition can be expressed as
X
!0
X
!
c (!)
 
!; !0

=
X
!0
X
!

1  n  !; !0!0  !; !0 :
This equation pins down the steady state interest rate r since both c (!) and n (!; !0) are functions of the
interest rate r.
5.3.3 Incomplete markets
Recursive formulation Consider next the case of bequests constraints of the type (52). Assume output
is perishable, aggregate consumption must equal aggregate production. Alternatively, aggregate savings are
zero. Moreover, savings are equal to the total amount of bequests left by parents. Since all bequests are non-
negative then aggregate savings are zero if and only if all bequests are zero. Therefore, in any equilibrium
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with bequest constraints the budget constraint (74) simplifies to:
ct
 
!t
  !t  1  nt  !t for all !t 2 
t+1 and all t  1. (57)
This is balanced budget constraint for every period and state. The lack of intergenerational transfers signifi-
cantly simplifies the problem. To study the incomplete markets problem, we first show that the principle of
optimality holds. Standard arguments cannot be used because the discount factor is endogenous. Alvarez
(1999) shows that the principle of optimality holds for a dynastic version of this problem, while we show
that it holds for the household version of the problem.28
Let N^0
 
! 1

= 1; N^t
 
!t 1

=
t 1Q
j=0
nj
 
!j

for t  1: The problem can be written in sequential form,
using (75) and (77) recursively, as follows:
V 0 (!0) = sup
fN^t+1(!t 1;!t)g1t=0
E0
1X
t=0
tN^t
 
!t 1
1 "
u
 
!t
 
1  N^t+1
 
!t 1; !t

N^t (!t 1)
!!
(58)
subject to
0  N^t+1
 
!t 1; !t
  N^t  !t 1 = for all !t 1 2 
t, !t 2 
 and t  0:
The recursive formulation of this problem is:
U (!) = max
n2[0;n]
u (! (1  n)) + n1 "E U  !0 j! : (59)
The next proposition states that the principle of optimality holds for this problem.
28The analogous dynastic problem is:
U (N;!) = max
N02[0;n]
u
 
!   N 0=NN1  + E U  N 0; !0 j! :
In this problem the number of family members is a state variable, N , all members have the same ability, !; and make the same
choices. The household problem does not impose these constraints. On problem is simpler than Alvarez’s because there are no
savings. But the problem is still dynamic.
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Proposition 4 The functional equation (79) has a unique solution, U (!). Moreover U (!) = V 0 (!) for
! 2 
:
Optimal fertility The optimality condition for fertility choices is
!u0 ((1  n)!) =  (1  ")n "E U  !0 j! : (60)
The left hand side of (80) is the marginal cost of an additional child while the right hand side is the marginal
benefit. The marginal cost is the product of the opportunity cost of raising a child, !, times the marginal
utility of consumption. The marginal benefit to the parent is the discounted expected welfare of a child,
E [U (!0) j!], times the parental weight associated to the last child, (1  ")n(!) ". Let n = n(!) be the
optimal fertility rule and c = c (!)  (1  n(!))! the optimal consumption rule.
In contrast to the complete markets case, corner solutions are not optimal in the incomplete markets
case under the assumed functional forms. Having no children is not optimal because the marginal benefit
of a child is infinite while the marginal cost is finite. In particular, E [U (!0) j!] > 0 for all ! while
limn!0 n  = 1: Having the maximum number of children is also sub-optimal because the marginal cost
is infinite when parental consumption is zero, while the marginal benefit is finite.
Consider now the relationship between fertility, n, and parental earning ability, !. According to (80),
both marginal benefits (MB) and marginal costs (MC) are affected by abilities. MB increase with !
because of the postulated intergenerational persistence of abilities: high ability parents are more likely to
have high ability children. Regarding MC, there are two effects. On one hand, MC tends to rise with !
because higher ability increases the opportunity cost of the parental time required to raise children. On the
other hand, MC tends to fall because the larger the ability the smaller the marginal utility of consumption.
Given that  2 (0; 1); the first effect dominates the second one so MC increases with !. The need for  2
(0; 1) suggests a tension between the theory and the empirics since estimates of the intertemporal elasticity of
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substitution are typically lower than 1. But the correct interpretation of 1= is an intergenerational elasticity
of substitution (IGES), one controlling inter-personal consumption smoothing rather than intra-personal
consumption smoothing (Cordoba and Ripoll 2011).
Since both MB and MC increase with !; it is not clear in principle whether fertility increases or
decreases with ability. The following proposition provides the answer in three cases: i.i.d. abilities across
generations, perfect intergenerational persistence of abilities without uncertainty and random walk (log)
abilities.29
In order to analyze the case of perfect persistence of ability, it is instructive to write the first order
condition in an alternative way. Using equation (80) to express (79) as:
Ut = u (c (!)) +
1
1  "n (!)!u
0 (c (!)) (61)
Then use (81) to rewrite (80) as:
u0 (c (!))n (!)" = E

u0
 
c
 
!0
 !0
!

1

+
   "
1  

1

  n  !0! (62)
This equation is useful because it only requires marginal utilities, rather than total utility as in equation (80),
and corresponds to the Euler equation of the problem describing the optimal consumption rule. Although
savings are zero in equilibrium, fertility allows individuals to smooth consumption across generations.30
29Although a random walk does not satisfy some of the assumptions above, it helps to develop some intuition.
30Equation (80) can also be written in the form of a more traditional Euler equation. Let 1 + r0 be the gross return of "investing"
in a child. It is given by 1 + r0  U(!0)=u0(c0)
!
. In this expression, U(!0)=u0(c0) is the value of a new life, in terms of goods, while
! is the cost of creating a new individual. Then (80) can be written as:
u0(c) =  (1  )n E u0(c0)  1 + r0 j! : (63)
This is an Euler equation with a discount factor  (1  )n : It suggests that optimal fertility choices are similar to saving
decisions and that children are like an asset, as pointed out by Alvarez (1999). However, two important differences with the
traditional Euler Equation are that the individual controls the discount factor and the gross return.
117
Proposition 5 Persistence and the fertility-ability relationship. (i) Fertility decreases with ability if abil-
ities are i.i.d. across generations. In this case n (!) satisfies the equation n(!)"
(1 n(!)) = A!
 1 where A
is a constant. Furthermore, fertility is independent of ability in one of the following two cases: (ii) M is
the identity matrix (abilities are perfectly persistent and deterministic); or (iii) ln!t = ln!t 1 + "t where
"t  N(0; 2").
According to Proposition 5, fertility decreases with ability when abilities are i.i.d. The intuition is
that without intergenerational persistence, a higher ability of the parent only affects her or his marginal
cost but not marginal benefit as E [U (!0) j!] = E [U (!0)] for all ! 2 
: On the other extreme, fertility
is independent of ability when abilities are perfectly persistent across generations (cases ii and iii). This
is because in those cases both the marginal cost and marginal benefit are proportional to !1 . Given
that fertility becomes independent of ability only in the extreme case of perfect persistent, it is natural to
conjecture that fertility decreases with ability when persistence is less than perfect. We were able to confirm
this conjecture numerically but analytical solutions were not obtained.
General equilibrium Denote Nt (!) the mass of population with ability !, Nt 
X
!2
Nt (!) to-
tal population, t (!) = Nt(!)Nt the fraction of population with ability ! 2 
 at time t; and 1 + gt =X
!2
 n (!)t (!) the gross growth rate of population. The initial population of different ability types
fN0 (!i)gKi=1 is given.
As in section 5.3.2.2., it can be shown that the law of motion for t (!i) satisfies
t+1 (!j) =
1
1 + gt
X
!i2

n (!i)t (!i)M(!j ; !i) for all !j 2 
 (64)
Let  (!)  lim
t!1t (!) represents the limit distribution of abilities where ! 2 
 = f!ig
N
i=1. Given the
Assumption 1 and that n (!1)  :::  n (K) > 0, a unique limit distribution exists (see Chu and Koo 1990).
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We now provide some analytical results characterizing the distribution t; the limit distribution  and
their relationship to fertility for some special cases. Calibrated results are provided in section 5.5. The
following proposition provides a simple but important benchmark. The first part states that when fertility
is identical across types then  =  : the endogenous limit distribution of abilities equals the exogenous
invariant distribution of abilities described by equation (48). In other words, the endogenous distribution of
abilities just reflects the genetic distribution of abilities, what can be termed nature rather than nurture. The
second part of the proposition shows that this results also holds when fertility rates are different across types
but there is not persistence of abilities.
Proposition 6 When  equals : Suppose one of the following two conditions holds: (i) n (!) = n for all
! 2 
; or (ii) M(!0; !) is independent of ! for all !0 2 
. Then  (!) =  (!) for all ! 2 
: Moreover,
if (ii) holds then t (!) = M (!; :) for all ! 2 
 and all t  1:
The following proposition uses propositions 5 and 6 to characterize fertility and the limiting ability
distribution in cases of either no persistence or perfect persistence of abilities.
Proposition 7 Persistence, fertility and ability distribution. (i) If M(!0; !) is independent of ! then n (!)
decreases with ! and t (!) =  (!) = M (!; :) for all ! 2 
 and t  1; (ii) if M is the identity matrix
then n (!) = n for all ! 2 
 and t (!) =  (!) = 0 (!) for all ! 2 
 and all t; (iii) if ln! follows a
Gaussian random walk then n (!) = n; and given !0 the variance of abilities diverges to1.
In words, if children’s abilities are independent of parental abilities, then fertility decreases with ability
but the observed distribution of abilities is independent of fertility choices and determined by the Markov
chainM from the second period on. Furthermore, with certainty and perfect intergenerational persistence of
abilities the observed distribution of abilities in any period is identical to the initial distribution of abilities.
Finally, if (log) abilities follow a random walk then there is not limit distribution of abilities since its variance
goes to infinite.
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As for intermediate case of some persistence, the following Proposition is an application of Chu and
Koo’s (CK, 1990) Theorem 2. It states that if the fertility of the poor, meaning the group with lowest
income, is higher than the fertility of the rest of the population then  is different from ; and moreover, 
dominates  in the first order stochastic sense.
Proposition 8 SupposeM satisfies Assumption 1 and n (!1) > n (!i) = n for all i > 1: Then
PI
i=1 
 (!i) >PI
i=1  (!i) for all 1  I  K:
P roof. See Chu and Koo (1990, pp.1136).
5.4 Welfare analysis of fertility policies
We now consider simple types of fertility policies that directly set constraints on fertility choices. In
particular, let n(!)  0 and n(!)  n be the lower and upper bounds on fertility set by the policy. Bounds
could potentially depend on individual abilities. The motivation for the upper bound is the one child policy.
Although fertility policies are significantly more complex than simple bounds, the bounds capture a key
essence of the intent of these policies which is to limit or, more recently, promote fertility.
5.4.1 Fertility policies and income
A key aspect of fertility policies such as family planning policies is their ability to increase the income of
the poor and also, the average income of the economy. Since income equals ! (1  n (!)) then restricting
fertility in fact increases individual income because it increases the effective labor supply. Furthermore,
average earning abilities and average income are defined as:
Et =
X
!2

!t (!) ; It =
X
!2

! (1  n (!))t (!) :
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These expressions shows that, in addition to increasing individual income, fertility policies also have the
potential to increase average income if those policies also result in better distributions of abilities, t (!) ; in
the first order stochastic sense. In fact, a corollary of Proposition 6 (i) and Proposition 8, is that reducing the
fertility of the poor to the same level as that of others results in a limit distribution that dominates the original
distribution. More generally, CK show that if fertility decreases with income, M satisfies Assumption 1,
and the initial distribution of incomes is at its steady state level, 0 (!i) ; then a reduction in the fertility of
the poor results in a sequence of income distributions that first order stochastically dominate 0 (!i), that
is,
PI
i=1 t (!i) <
PI
i=1 

0 (!i) for all 1  I  K and t > 0.
The positive effects of family planning policies on the income of the poor, average income and average
ability are often used to provide support for these policies. We next show that, in spite of its positive effects
on income, fertility policies are welfare detrimental in our incomplete markets economies.
5.4.2 Fertility policies and individual welfare
The indirect utility U r (!) of the problem with fertility constraints solves the Bellman equation:
U r (!) = max
n2[n(!);n(!)]
u ((1  n)!) + n1 "E U r  !0 j! : (65)
Let nr (!) denotes the corresponding optimal fertility rule. The following proposition states that binding
fertility restrictions in at least one state reduce the indirect utility, or welfare, of all individuals even those
whose fertility is not directly affected. The proposition also states that fertility restrictions of any type
(weakly) reduce the fertility of all individuals except perhaps those whose fertility rates are at or below the
lower bound.
Proposition 9 U r (!)  U(!) for all ! and it holds with strict inequality for all ! if n(!^) > n(!^) or
n(!^) < n(!^) for at least one !^ 2 
: Furthermore nr(!) = n(!) if n(!)  n(!) and nr(!)  n(!)
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otherwise. In particular, nr(!) < n(!) for all ! if n(!) > n(!) for all ! and n(!^) > n(!^) for at least one
!^ 2 
:
Proposition 9 implies that policies such as the One Child Policy, which limits fertility of all individuals,
or policies that compel individuals to increase their fertility such as the “leftover women” stigma in China,
are detrimental to all individuals’ welfare in our incomplete markets model.
Although fertility is possibly inefficiently high for some ability types and there might be potential room
for policies to improve individual welfare, the proposition shows that policies restricting fertility choices do
not help because it restricts individual’s choices without providing any compensation. Furthermore, fertility
restrictions that only affect a particular group result in lower welfare for all individuals because, regardless
of current ability, there is a positive probability that a descendant of the dynasty will fall into the group
directly affected in finite time. Given that welfare of every individual falls with fertility restrictions, the
marginal benefits of having children also falls while the marginal cost remains the same. Thus fertility must
fall for all types except perhaps for those who are constrained by the policy to increase their fertility.
5.4.3 Fertility policies and social welfare
Given that fertility policies reduce the welfare of all individuals, as shown in Proposition 9, it is natural
to infer that social welfare should also fall. The answer, however, depends on how social welfare is defined
and whether the policy reduces or increases population. In this section we focus on fertility policies that
impose upper limits on fertility rates such as limiting the fertility of the poor or the One Child Policy. Other
fertility policies like coercing the rich to have more children and fertility related taxes/subsidies involve
more competing factors and are postponed to the quantitative exercise.
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Total Utilitarian Social Welfare Classical (Bentham) utilitarianism defines social welfare as the total
discounted welfare of all (born) individuals:31
W =
1X
t=0
X
!2

p(t)U(!)Nt (!) : (66)
In this formulation p(t)  0 is the weight the social planner assigns to generation t, U (!) is the utility
of an individual with ability !, and Nt (!) is the size of population of generation t endowed with ability !:
Since individuals are altruistic toward their descendants, p(t) > 0 means that the planner gives additional
weight to generation t on top of what is implied by parental altruism. A particular case in which the planner
weights only the original generation and therefore adopts its altruistic weights is the one with p(0) = 1
and p(t) = 0 for t > 0 :
W0 =
X
!2

U(!)N0 (!) (67)
According to Proposition 9, upper limits affecting the fertility of at least one ability group reduce fertility
of all ability groups. Therefore, upper limits on fertility unequivocally reduce population of all ability groups
at all times after time 0. Given that both population and individual welfare fall for all ability types, we are
able to show that fertility limits unequivocally decrease social welfare if social welfare is of the classical or
Benthamite utilitarian form.
Proposition 10 Imposing upper limits on fertility choices reduces social welfare as defined by (66).
An identical result is obtained if the planner exhibits positive but diminishing returns to population, say
if Nt (!) in expression (66) is replaced by Nt (!)1 "p where "p 2 (0; 1) : This formulation seems a natural
extension of the Barro-Becker preferences for a planner. The result does not necessarily hold if we define
social welfare as the average, or Mills, utilitarian form as discussed next.
31The results in this section are similar if the welfare of the unborn is explicitly considered as long as the unborn enjoy lower
utility than the born.
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Average Utilitarian Social Welfare Define average, or Mills, utilitarian social welfare as
W =
1X
t=0
X
!2

p(t)U(!)t (!) (68)
This definition of welfare is analogous to (66) but uses population shares, t (!), rather than population,
Nt (!) as weights. A particular case is one where the planner cares only about steady state welfare so that
p(t) = 0 for all t and lim
t!1p(t) = 1, the steady state welfare function is given as
W

=
X
!2

U(!) (!) : (69)
This definition of social welfare is the one used by CK to argue in favor of family planning policies. It is
also a commonly used criteria in social choice theory because it avoids Parfit’s repugnant conclusion. Notice
that average social welfare could increase even if the welfare of all individuals fall when fertility limits are
enacted. The net effect depends on the relative strength of two potentially opposite forces: on the one hand
individual welfare falls but on the other hand the distribution of abilities, , may improve. CK assume that
U(!) is invariant to the policy in place and therefore the only consequence of the policy is to change : In
that case, Proposition 8 states that limiting the fertility of the poor improves the distribution of abilities, in
a stochastic dominance sense, and therefore increases average welfare, given U . The following corollary
summarizes CK main result.
Corollary 11 Suppose social welfare is defined by (68) where U(!) is a non-decreasing function of ability.
Furthermore, suppose M satisfies CSM and fertilities are exogenously given and satisfy n (!1) > n (!i) =
n for all 1 < i  N . Then (i) reducing the fertility of the lowest ability group increases social welfare; (ii)
fertility policies that do not change the distribution of abilities do not change social welfare.
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This result by CK assumes, however, that U is invariant to the policy in place which is not true in our
endogenous fertility model. As shown above, welfare of all individuals falls with the policy. Such reduc-
tion in individual welfare may be strong enough to offset the positive effects of the policy. The following
proposition shows that in fact this is possible.
Proposition 12 SupposeM(!0; !) is independent of ! for all !0 2 
. Then upper limits on fertility choices
reduce social welfare as defined by (68).
Proposition 12 relies on the earlier finding in Proposition 6 that, when abilities are i.i.d., the distribution
of abilities among the population is independent of fertility choices and thus fully determined by the Markov
matrix M . Therefore, in the i.i.d. case the effect of any fertility policy on social welfare, as defined by (68),
is only determined by its effect on individual welfare, U .
The following proposition for a deterministic case of perfect persistence of abilities states that average
utilitarian welfare unequivocally falls with “uniform” fertility restrictions such as the one child policy.
Proposition 13 Suppose M is the identity matrix. Then a uniform fertility restriction n (!) = n reduces
social welfare as defined by (68).
Proposition 13 provides another example in which fertility restriction do not affect : Since in the deter-
ministic case all ability groups have the same fertility choices and the fertility restriction affects all ability
groups equally, it follows that t = 0 for all t so that the effect of the policy on social welfare is only
determined by the effect on individual welfare U .
Proposition 12 and 13 formally provide analytical examples in which social welfare falls when fertility is
restricted even under the notion of average social welfare. We now turn to quantitative exercise to investigate
more general cases in which abilities are correlated but less than perfect persistent across generations. The
calibrated results suggest that fertility restricting policies decrease social welfare in general, even when
social welfare is defined as average welfare.
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5.5 Quantitative Exploration
We now explore some of the quantitative implications of the model. While the computation of the
incomplete markets model is relatively simple, the computation of the complete markets model is not. The
reason is that corner solutions easily arise for standard calibrations of the income process. In particular,
equation (55) would easily result in fertility larger than the maximum if !t 1 and !t are sufficiently different.
To avoid corner solutions we first consider an example that sets a relatively narrow range for the set of
abilities. Although the example produces only limited inequality, it allows us to illustrate that fertility in the
incomplete markets model may be inefficiently high relative to the complete markets version. The rest of the
section uses a more realistic calibration of the income process but provides only results for the incomplete
markets model.
5.5.1 Example
Suppose abilities follow a two-state Markov process characterized by [!H ; !L] = [0:85; 1:18] and
Pr (!H j!H) = Pr (!Lj!L) = 0:9; and Pr (!H j!L) = Pr (!Lj!H) = 0:1: Assume the following pa-
rameters values:  = 0:5,  = 0:2, " = 0:3, and  = 0:3. These values are similar to the ones calibrated
in the next section. The risk free interest rate that clears the asset market in the complete markets model is
3:44. Table 5.1 reports steady state fertilities for the complete and incomplete markets cases according to
formulas (55) and (80). Notice that fertility in the first environment is a function of both grandparents and
parental abilities while in the second environment is only a function of parental ability.
Table 5.1 Fertility in Complete and Incomplete Markets
nt = n(!t 1; !t) n(!H ; !H) n(!H ; !L) n(!L; !H) n(!L; !L)
Complete Markets 0.67 1.60 0.28 0.67
Incomplete Markets 0.58 0.69 0.58 0.69
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Table 5.1 illustrates the result that, in presence of idiosyncratic shocks, steady state fertility can be in-
efficiently high when markets are incomplete. For instance, the fertility rate of high ability parents with
low ability grandparents under complete markets is 0:28 while the fertility of the same individual under
incomplete markets is 0:58. As discussed above, when markets are complete unlucky grandparents can
borrow against the income of their high ability children which reduces the wealth of those children, and
therefore their fertility. However, when markets are incomplete unlucky grandparents cannot borrow against
their children’s income and therefore the fertility of high ability parents with low ability grandparents is
higher under incomplete markets. Thus, the result that policies restricting fertility rates are welfare detri-
mental is not due to fertility being always inefficiently low in incomplete markets models. Even if fertility
is inefficiently high, those policies still reduce welfare in our models.
5.5.2 Benchmark Calibration
In this section, we use Brazilian data to calibrate the model and evaluate the welfare effects of fertility
restriction policies. The use of Brazilian data takes advantage of data assembled by Lam (1986) on the
intergenerational income process, and it corresponds to a relevant case of a developing economy with high
fertility rates. We are also interested in evaluating the potential effects of the one child policy in China, but
given data limitations, Brazil in 1986 perhaps provides a reasonable approximation for China at the time of
the one child policy.
The following parameters are needed: the Markov chain of abilities M , ability vector ~!, curvature of
the utility function ; discount factor , parent’s degree of altruism ", and time cost of raising every child
: For social welfare calculations we also need a social planner’s weight on every generation p (t) :
Data on different income groups, fertility of each group, and the Markov chain are taken from Lam
(1986) who provides estimates for Brazil. Average incomes of each of five income groups are  !I =
[553; 968; 1640; 2945; 10991] : They describe income classes of Brazilian male household heads aged from
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40 to 45 in 1976. Average fertility of each income group are  !n = [6:189; 5:647; 5:065; 4:441; 3:449] =2.
We divide fertility by two to obtain fertility per-adult. Using income and fertility data, we calculate earning
abilities of different groups as !i = I(!i)1 n(!i) and normalize the lowest ability to be 1. The Markov chain
provided by Lam is:
M =
2666666666666664
0.50 0.25 0.15 0.10 0.05
0.25 0.40 0.20 0.20 0.10
0.15 0.20 0.35 0.20 0.20
0.05 0.10 0.20 0.35 0.25
0.05 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.40
3777777777777775
This chain does not satisfy the CSM property required by Assumption 1, but it implies certain level of
earning persistency across generations since its diagonal elements dominate their corresponding off-diagonal
elements. We also considered a Markov chain provided by Chu and Koo (1990) that satisfies CSM, and
obtain similar results.
Initial population is normalized to 1 and the initial distribution of abilities, 0; is approximated by the
stationary distribution implied by M and  !n .
Our discount factor  and altruistic parameter, ", are calibrated to match altruism function in Manuelli
and Seshadri (2009) (MS henceforth). Their altruistic function in a life cycle model takes the form
e Be 0+1 lnn
where 0; 1; and  are set to be 0.24, 0.65, 0.04, respectively. The child-bearing age B is 25. So the proper
mappings from our parameters to theirs are  = e Be 0 and 1  " = 1; which solve our  and " as 0:29
and 0:35, respectively.
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Other two key parameters are the curvature of the utility function  and the time cost of raising every
child : We originally set  to be 0:62; the one used by MS and calibrate  to match the mean of fertility
data because time costs are not provided by MS. But the simulated dispersion of fertility at steady state is
way below that of the Brazilian fertility data. To better fit the data, we calibrate  and  to jointly match the
mean and standard deviation of the fertility data. The calibrated values are  = 0:526 and  = 0:243. 
is below but not far away from the one used in MS. Under this values, the mean and standard deviation of
steady state fertility in the model are 2:653 and 0:433 respectively, which are close to the targets 2:648 and
0:416 in the data.
Our parameter of time cost of raising a child approximately prescribes a maximum number of 8 children
per couple, or that each parent spends around 12% of their time on every child. For the social planner’s
weights we assume p (t) = t with  = 0:1: Remember that  = 0:0 means that the planner values future
generations just as much as the original generation does. The set of parameters chosen for the benchmark
exercises are summarized in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2 Parameters
Parameters Concept Values
 individual discount factor 0.29
" altruistic parameter 0.35
 elasticity of substitution 0.526
 per child time cost 0.243
 weight of social planner 0.1
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5.5.3 Results
The simulated model replicates a negative relationship between fertility and ability similar to the Brazil-
ian data32. As shown in Figure 5.1, fertility per household falls from around 6 to 2.8 as earning abilities
increase from 1 to 8.5. This negative relationship arises from the interplay of two opposite forces. On the
one hand, individuals with higher abilities have a larger opportunity cost of raising children. On the other
hand, they enjoy a larger benefit of having children when abilities are intergenerationally persistent. The
effect of ability on the marginal cost dominates as long as the intergenerational persistence of ability is less
than perfect and the IGES is larger than 1.
We now use the model to perform policy experiments. First, we study policies that directly restrict or
encourage fertility. Second, we consider the effects of taxes and/or subsidies on family size.
5.5.4 Policy Experiments
Restricting Fertility Consider first the effects of policies limiting the fertility rate to be no more than
bn children, where bn < n. We have proved that these policies reduce total utilitarian social welfare in
Proposition 10 and reduce average social welfare in certain cases, in Propositions 12 and 13. We now
consider average social welfare in an empirically plausible case.
The first panel of Figure 5.2 shows the effect of limiting fertility on steady state average ability, !; and
average income, y. These two variables increase as the upper limit on fertility decreases. As predicted by
CK, tighter fertility limits, which affect lower income groups more severely, increase average income and
ability. These results seemingly provide support to family planning programs. However, they ignore the
negative welfare consequences of limiting family size. The second panel of Figure 5.2 shows that steady
state average social welfare, W , average social welfare of all generations, W , total social welfare of the
32By construction, our calibration targets the mean and dispersion of fertilities but not the sign of the relationship between fertility
and income.
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initial generation, W0, and total social welfare of all generations, W , consistently increase as the upper limit
on fertility is relaxed.
Knowing that policies limiting fertility reduce social welfare, we also simulate policies that impose
lower limits on fertility rates. An example of this policy is recent efforts by the Chinese government to
induce educated unwed women older than 27 to marry by stigmatizing them as "leftover women". The
objective of these efforts seems to be twofold. To reduce pressures due to sex imbalances brought about by
the One Child Policy, and to improve the quality of the workforce. These type of policies disproportionately
affect the rich, or high ability individuals, because their unconstrained fertility is typically lower. The
first panel of Figure 5.3 shows that this policy improves average ability since high ability individuals have
proportionally more high ability children. On the other hand, the policies reduce average income because
individuals, especially those with high abilities, spend more time raising children and this effect dominates
the effect of an improved ability distribution.
The second panel of Figure 5.3 illustrates the impact of setting lower limits on four social welfare
measures. In general all four welfare measures exhibit a decreasing trend as the lower bound increases
although there are certain ranges in which total welfare increase slightly. For example, total social welfare
has a tiny increase by 0.08 as the lower bound increases from 5 to 6. A further increase in the lower bound,
say above 6, results in all welfare measures eventually plunging.
These results confirm the main message of the chapter: in general fertility restrictions, on the poor or
other groups, do not have strong theoretical support for improving social welfare.
Taxes and Subsidies on Fertility We next study the effect on social welfare of taxes and/or subsidies
on fertility while preserving a government balanced budget. Specifically, consider a subsidy, s, that helps
parents offset the costs of raising children as is the spirit of recent policies in Europe. We also allow s to be
negative in order to consider policies deterring parents from having children. The subsidy (tax) is financed
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by a lump sum tax (transfer) T (s) imposed on every individual. Under this policy, individual’s budget
constraint becomes
c+ (  s)!n  !   T (s) :
The governments’ budget constraint is
T (s) = s
X
!
!n (!) (!) :
Figure 5.4 shows the effects of this policy on fertility and individual welfare. The horizontal axis of every
panel is the subsidy, s; ranging from -10% to 10%. The range of subsidies is such that they do not fully
compensate for the cost of raising children, s < : The first panel shows that fertility rates decrease as taxes
increase, say as s drops from 0 to -0.1, while the effect is ambiguous for subsidies.
The ambiguous impact of a subsidy on fertility is because of the income effects of the lump sum transfer.
In presence of taxes or subsidies the marginal cost of an additional child becomes
(  s)!1   1  (  s)n  T (s)! 1 
while the marginal benefit is  (1  ")n "E [U (!0) j!]. Marginal benefit also depends on s since U (!)
does although it is not clear from the expression how it moves with s: For marginal cost, when s > 0, an
increase in s decreases the marginal cost if T (s) is unchanged. But the lump sum tax T (s) imposed on
everyone increases with s, which causes marginal cost to go up. The effect of T (s) on marginal cost is
small for high ability types, so for them the effect of s on MC tends to dominate that of T (s) while the
inverse tends to be true for low ability individuals. This explains what happens in the first panel of Figure
5.4 where fertility increases for the two highest ability types and decreases for other types as s increases.
This is because MC of the two highest ability types decrease much faster than all other types’ MC as
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subsidy increases or possibly other types’ MC increase with the subsidy. Likewise, when s < 0; s becomes
more negative as taxes increase, MC of high ability types increase more than that of low ability types.
The numerical results show that everyone’s fertility falls as taxes increase. Panel 2 shows a mixed policy
consequences on individual welfare. A high subsidy benefits high ability individuals while harms other
types, especially low ability individuals.
Figure 5.5 shows the effects on social welfare, defined as steady state average social welfare. Social
welfare could be improved only when there is a very low tax, e.g. up to 2% of the time cost of raising every
child. Otherwise, it is neither improved by taxes nor by subsidies.
Robustness Checks We now report the results of various robustness checks. For this purpose we change
one parameter at a time while keeping all the other parameters at their benchmark values and study the
policy effects of reducing fertility on various welfare measures. We find that the qualitative results obtained
above are mostly robust for reasonable parameters although there exist parameters for which average steady
state welfare, W ; improves with fertility restrictions. The set of parameters studied is further restricted by
the need to have finite utility and concavity.
We find that the results are robust to setting  anywhere in the range 0:45 to 133. When  2 [0:35; 0:45] ;
fertility restrictions could moderately improves steady state average welfare W  but only when the limit is
at a very high level, as illustrated in the first panel of Figure 5.6 for  = 0:4: The intuition for the increase
in W  is the following. First, a small  implies a high IGES and therefore a small gain of smoothing con-
sumption through fertility choices. Thus fertility restrictions when  is small are less harmful to individual
welfare in which case people’s incentive to smooth consumption through fertility is relatively weak. Second,
W

could be slightly increased by a tighter fertility restriction only in the area near the unconstrained fertil-
ity choice of the low ability group. In that case, only fertility choices of low ability individuals are directly
affected. Due to their high fertility rate and low welfare, tighter restrictions could significantly improve
33To guarantee the concavity of the utility function and nonnegative utility, 1 >  > " is needed.
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distribution without hurting other types. So the effect on distribution dominates that on individual welfare.
In summary, when  is low fertility restrictions starting from a high level may increase average steady state
welfare because they have a minor impact on individual welfare but relatively large effect on distribution.
The results are robust to setting  in the range [0:27; 0:4]34. Similar with ; as  is below 0.27, W 
may increase when the limit on fertility is large enough as illustrated in the second panel of Figure 5.6 for
the case  = 0:2. A low  means that parents care little about future generations. As a response, they
would have fewer kids, more consumption and lower marginal utility of consumption. In this case, fertility
restrictions have a minor effect on individual welfare and, as a result, the change of the ability distribution
is the dominant effect determining social welfare. However, this low degree of altruism also implies that
the model predicts counterfactually low fertility rates. In particular, the simulated unrestricted fertility range
is between 1.14 to 3.12 per household which is below the minimum of Brazilian’s fertility data, 3.449. A
similar result is obtained when " is particularly large, as illustrated in the third panel for " = 0:52:
We also performed robustness checks for the cost of raising children  over the feasible range (0:15; 0:32).
The lower bound is required by the concavity of utility function while the upper bound is required to guar-
antee the labor supply to be nonnegative. The result is robust to all  2 (0:19; 0:32). When  is lower than
0:19, fertility of everyone is too high and population becomes infinite in the long run and total social welfare
is not well defined.
5.6 Conclusion
This chapter studies optimal fertility choices and fertility policies when children’s earnings are random
and parents are altruistic. We characterize equilibrium allocations in endowment economies with complete
and incomplete markets. In the complete markets case, consumption and fertility are not deterministic as is
the case when fertility is exogenous. This novel result is a natural consequence of a key insight provided by
34Boundedness of utility requires  < 1 ". Given  = 0:243 and " = 0:35; the upper bound for  is 0:4 .
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Barro and Becker (1989): when fertility is endogenous consumption is proportional to the net cost of raising
a child. We generalize this result to the case of idiosyncratic shocks.
Our analysis shows that the incomplete markets models can replicate various features of the evidence
on fertility and income distribution. For example, fertility decreases with ability and social mobility occurs
in equilibrium. The negative relationship between ability and fertility arises in this framework due to the
combination of four factors: incomplete markets, time cost of raising children, less than perfect persistence
of abilities and an intergenerational elasticity of substitution larger than 1.
We further show that incomplete markets could lead to inefficiently high fertility rates when children
are a net financial burden to parents. However, this feature of the equilibrium allocation does not imply that
restricting fertility is welfare improving. On the contrary, we find that fertility restrictions are detrimental
to every individual’s welfare, even to those whose fertility choices are not directly affected, and therefore
detrimental to social welfare if welfare is defined as classical (Bentham) utilitarianism. If social welfare is
defined as average (Mills) utilitarianism, then fertility restrictions may improve social welfare but only if the
distribution of abilities improves strongly. We also perform policy experiments using calibrated version of
the model. These experiments suggest that, in general, fertility policies such as taxes or subsidies that affect
the cost of raising children do not increase social welfare.
Our models abstracts from a number of aspects that are potentially important for fertility decisions such
as bequests and human capital accumulation. Liao (2013) provides a model with human capital and find
similar results using a calibrated deterministic model. We are extending our results to production economies
in ongoing work (Cordoba et al. 2015).
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CHAPTER 6. STOCHASTIC DOMINANCE AND DEMOGRAPHIC
POLICY EVALUATION: A CRITIQUE
6.1 Introduction
A classical literature on the measurement of inequality claims that stochastic dominance provides a ro-
bust criterion to rank income distributions. This literature originated in papers by Kolm (1969) and Atkinson
(1970), and was extended by Dasgupta et al. (1973), Rothschild and Stiglitz (1973), Saposnik (1981, 1983),
and Foster and Shorrocks (1988a, 1988b) among many.35 As summarized by Foster and Shorrocks (1988a),
first order stochastic dominance (FSD) "can be regarded as the welfare ordering that corresponds to unan-
imous agreement among all monotonic utilitarian functions." As such, FSD seemingly provides a robust
criterion for policy evaluation because it only requires minimal knowledge of the social welfare function. A
natural prescription of this literature would be to look for policies that improve the distribution of income in
the FSD sense.
An important application of stochastic dominance is the one by Chu and Koo (1990) (CK henceforth).
They use FSD to evaluate the consequences of changing the reproduction rate of a particular income group.
Using a Markovian branching framework with differential fertility among income groups, they show that an
exogenous reduction in the fertility of the poor results in a sequence of income distributions that condition-
ally first-degree stochastically dominate (CFSD) the original distribution. CFSD implies FSD. CK argue
that stochastic dominance "provides us with very strong theoretical support in favor of family-planning
programs that encourage the poor in developing countries to reduce their reproductive rate (pp. 1136)."
Numerical simulations of CK’s model further confirm that more general fertility reduction programs that
disproportionately targets lower income groups, such as the One Child Policy, or policies that promote fer-
35A more complete list of references can be found in Davidson and Duclos (2000) and Atkinson and Brandolini (2010). A more
precise terminology is "welfare dominance" as used by Foster and Shorrocks (1988b). We use stochastic dominance because this
is the term used in the paper that is the focus of our critique.
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tility of high income groups, should increase social welfare.36 These policies generally result in a sequence
of income distributions that dominates the distribution without the program in the first order stochastic sense.
CK’s results are nevertheless puzzling. Basic economic principles suggest that absent externalities or
market failures individuals’ decisions should be efficient. In fact, various authors have shown that fertility
choices made by altruistic parents, i.e. parents who care about the number and welfare of their children, are
socially optimal under certain conditions. Early papers in this category include Pazner and Razin (1980),
Willis (1985), Becker (1983), Eckstein and Wolpin (1985). Golosov et al. (2007) further show that market
allocations are Pareto optimal in a variety of models of endogenous fertility. These findings suggest that
family planning programs aiming at reducing the fertility of the poor do not necessarily have the strong
theoretical support claimed by CK. Lam (1993, pp 1043) expresses similar skepticism.
Unfortunately CK do not fully spell out the decision problem of individuals, a common feature of the
literature cited in the first paragraph. However their two main assumptions, grounded on empirical evidence,
are in fact hard to rationalize by frictionless models of fertility. First, they assume intergenerational mobility
across income and consumption groups but complete market models, such as the Barro-Becker model,
predict no mobility.37 Second, they assume that fertility decreases with individual income, a feature that
is also difficult to rationalize by efficient models of fertility (see Cordoba and Ripoll, 2015). It is possible
that behind these two assumptions there are some implicit frictions explaining why fertility is suboptimal in
CK’s model and intervention is welfare enhancing.
This chapter revisits the question of optimality of family planning programs, as envisioned by CK, but
explicitly takes into consideration the household decision problem. For this purpose we use a version of the
Barro-Becker fertility model enriched to study issues of income distribution. Individuals in our model differ
36On policies seeking to increase the fertility of high income groups, the New York Times reports about the Chinese pol-
icy of “upgrading" the quality of their population in order to increase its international competitiveness. It suggests a strat-
egy that includes stigmatizing unmarried women older than 28, who are typically highly educated, as “leftover" women. See
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/12/opinion/global/chinas-leftover-women.html? Last accessed 3/15/2013
37Mobility is still hard to obtain by models of incomplete markets. For example, Alvarez (1999) finds lack of mobility in the
Barro-Becker model even in the face of uninsurable idiosyncratic risk. Using a non-altruistic framework, Raut (1990) also finds
that the economy reaches a steady state, with no mobility, in two periods.
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in their innate abilities, are altruistic toward their descendants, and choose their own fertility optimally. Abil-
ities are random, determined at birth and correlated with parental abilities. Insurance markets are available
but parents cannot leave negative bequests to their children. Due to the assumed market incompleteness,
mobility arises in equilibrium and fertility differs across ability groups.
The equilibrium of the model satisfies the two assumptions postulated by CK. First, fertility decreases
with ability in the presence of uncertainty about children’s abilities. To the extent of our knowledge, this
result is novel and of independent interest by itself. Although there is a literature documenting and studying
a negative relationship between fertility and ability38, obtaining such negative relationship within a fully
dynamic altruistic model with uncertainty is novel. The negative relationship arises from the interplay of
two opposite forces. On the one hand, higher ability individuals face a larger opportunity cost of having
children due to the time cost of raising children. On the other hand, higher ability individuals enjoy a
larger benefit of having children when abilities are intergenerationally persistent. We find that the effect of
ability on the marginal cost dominates its effect on the marginal benefit if the intergenerational persistence
of abilities is not perfect. This explains why fertility decreases with ability. Second, the equilibrium of
the model exhibits mobility. In particular, the equilibrium is characterized by a Markov branching process
satisfying the Conditional Stochastic Monotonicity property. This requirement means that if a kid from a
poor family and a kid from a rich family both fall into one of the poorest classes, it is more likely that the
poor kid will be poorer than the rich kid.
Given that the equilibrium of our model satisfies the assumptions postulated by CK, direct application
of their Theorem 2 implies that a reduction in the fertility of the poor generates a sequence of income
distributions that dominates the original distribution in all periods in the first order stochastic sense. In
particular, average income and consumption increase for all periods. This result comes from two forces.
First, average ability of (born) individuals increases because the poor have proportionally more low ability
38See for example Becker (1960), Jones and Tertilt (2006), Kremer (1993), Hansen and Prescott (2002), Cordoba and Ripoll
(2010).
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children as a result of the assumed conditional stochastic monotonicity property. Second, consumption and
income of the poor strictly increases because they spend less time and resources raising children. However,
contrary to CK’s claim, we find that individual and social welfare fall. Our main results, Propositions 7
and 8 show that fertility restrictions of any type, not only for the poor, unequivocally reduce individual and
social welfare in our model, in spite of the strong degree of market incompleteness. Hence we conclude that
stochastic dominance alone is not a sound criterion to rank social welfare as claimed by Chu and Koo in
particular, and by a larger literature in general.
The primary reason why stochastic dominance fails to rank welfare properly is because it does not take
into account the fact that indirect utility functions are not invariant to the policies in place. As we show, a
policy that restricts fertility in our model reduces the set of feasible choices and invariably reduces welfare of
all individuals in all generations, even those whose fertility is not directly affected. This is because altruistic
parents care not only about their own consumption and fertility but also care about the consumption and
fertility of all their descendants. Furthermore, the welfare of those individuals who are not born under the
new policy also falls, or at least does not increase. Social welfare falls because the welfare of all individuals,
born and unborn, either falls or remain the same. This is the case, for example, if social welfare is defined as
classical (Bentham) utilitarianism, a weighted sum of the welfare of all present and future individuals. The
result also holds for versions of classical utilitarianism that are consistent with the Barro-Becker concept
of diminishing altruism. An interpretation of our results is that the positive effect on welfare of fertility
restrictions, namely higher average consumption, is dominated by the negative effect of an smaller dynasty
size.
CK define social welfare as average (Mills) utilitarianism rather than classical utilitarianism. Under this
definition, social welfare can increase even if the welfare of all individuals falls if population falls even
more. The net effect of fertility restrictions on social welfare depends in this case on the relative strength of
two opposite forces. On the one hand, the distribution of abilities and incomes improves for all periods, as
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stressed by CK. On the other hand, the welfare of all individuals falls. Propositions 9 and 10 provide two
examples in which the later force dominates and social welfare, defined as average welfare, falls not only
in present value but also for all periods. These are counterexamples to the claim that stochastic dominance
is a sufficient condition to rank social welfare, even when welfare is defined as average utilitarianism. We
further provide a variety of numerical simulations to illustrate that our results are more general, not just
extreme examples.
Our results challenge the policy implications of CK’s paper but also the broader literature, mentioned
in the first paragraph, claiming that stochastic dominance alone provide robust normative implications. We
show that carefully modeling the microfoundations of the problem makes a difference and can reverse the
conclusions obtained by simple stochastic dominance criteria. Our findings are an application of the Lu-
cas’ critique. CK’s results are based on the assumption that reduced form parameters and indirect utility
functions are invariant to policy changes. Specifically, fertility rates as well as indirect utility functions of
individuals are assumed to be invariant to the policies in place. However these are not structural parameters
but function of deeper parameters, those governing preferences, technologies and policies in place. Policy
evaluations based on the assumed constancy of the parameters may be misleading. In his classic critique,
Lucas argued that the observed negative relationship between unemployment and inflation cannot be ex-
ploited by policymakers to systematically reduce unemployment. The analogous argument in our context is
that the observed negative relationship between fertility and income cannot be exploited by policymakers to
improve social welfare.
In addition to the papers already mentioned, our work is related to Alvarez (1999). He studies an econ-
omy with idiosyncratic shocks, incomplete markets and endogenous fertility choices by altruistic parents.
Our endowment economy is a version of his model, one with non-negative bequest constraints. In equilib-
rium no individual leaves positive bequests. This is a stronger degree of market incompleteness than that in
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Alvarez and it explains why mobility arises in the equilibrium of our model but not in his. As a result, our
model maps exactly into CK’s Markovian model.
Golosov et al. (2007) proves that equilibrium outcomes are efficient in fertility models of Barro and
Becker, but their first welfare theorem does not apply to our model in which fertility is inefficient due
to the constraint on intergenerational transfer. Schoonbroodt and Tertilt (2014) have shown that, under
certain assumptions, incomplete markets models result in inefficiently low fertility. In those cases it is
natural to expect that policies seeking to reduce fertility even more, such as One Child Policy, would reduce
social welfare. We show in a companion paper, Cordoba and Liu (2014), that under different assumptions
incomplete markets models can result in too much fertility compared with the complete market fertility. In
those cases it is not obvious that policies limiting fertility are welfare reducing. We show that restricting
fertility in incomplete markets models, even if fertility is inefficiently high, is generally welfare detrimental.
There is a related literature that studies fertility policies in general equilibrium. A recent example is
Liao (2013) who studies the One Child Policy using a calibrated deterministic dynastic altruism model with
two types of individuals, skilled and unskilled, in the spirit of Doepke (2004). Although Liao’s model can
generate fertility differentials, Doepke (2004) documents that this channel alone is relatively weak. Part of
the issue is that the model only generates upward mobility in equilibrium. Our model, in contrast, generates
significant upward and downward mobility that can lead to significant fertility differentials. The mechanisms
are different and therefore complementary. In addition, we are able to derive sharp analytical results. For
example, we prove that fertility policies, like the one child policy, decrease every individual’s welfare for
sure while Liao’s calibrated result suggests it is true for almost all generations but not all.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 6.2 revisits the basic connection between fertility,
distribution of income and social welfare in models with exogenous fertility. The section reviews the result
of CK and provides further analysis. Section 6.3 endogenizes fertility and shows that fertility generally
decreases with ability and income. Section 6.4 studies social policies. It shows the basic limitation of CK’s
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assumptions and argues that fertility policies typically reduce social welfare. Numerical simulations and
robustness checks are performed in this section. Section 6.5 concludes. Proofs are in the Appendix.
6.2 Distribution and Social Welfare with Exogenous Fertility
Consider an economy populated by a large number of individuals who live for one period. Individuals
differ in their labor endowments, or earning abilities. Let 
  f!1; !2; :::; !ng be the set of possible
abilities, where 0 < !1 < ::: < !n: The technology of production is linear in ability: one unit of labor
produces one unit of perishable output. In this section, the income of an individual is equal to his/her ability.
Let f (!) be the fertility rate of an individual with ability !: It satisfies the following assumption.
Assumption 1. f (!i) is decreasing in ability.
6.2.1 Abilities
Ability is determined at birth and correlated with the ability of the parent. Ability is drawn from the
Markov chain M where Mij = Pr(!child = !ij!parent = !j) for !i and !j 2 
: As in CK, assume that M
satisfies the following condition:
Assumption 2. Conditional Stochastic Monotonicity (CSM):
PI
i=1Mi1PJ
j=1Mj1

PI
i=1Mi2PJ
j=1Mj2
 ::: 
PI
i=1MinPJ
j=1Mjn
; 1  I  J  n
Assumption 2 means that if a poor kid and a rich kid both fall into one of the poorest classes, it is more
likely that the poor kid will be poorer than the rich kid. Assumption 2 assures intergenerational persistence
of abilities: higher ability parents are more likely to have higher ability children. CSM implies first order
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stochastic dominance. To see this notice that when J = n the condition becomes:
IX
i=1
Mi1 
IX
i=1
Mi2  ::: 
IX
i=1
Min, 1  I  n:
Two examples of Markov chains satisfying Assumption 2 are an i.i.d. process and quasi-diagonal matrices
of the form:
M 01 =
266666666666666666664
a+ b c 0 0 :: 0 0
a b c 0 :: 0 0
0 a b c :: 0 0
:: :: :: :: :: 0 0
0 0 0 0 a b c
0 0 0 0 0 a b+ c
377777777777777777775
:
where (a; b; c) 0; a+ b+ c = 1 and b > 0:5:
We further assume that M has a unique invariant distribution, , where  satisfies:
 (!j) =
X
!i2

 (!i)M(!j ; !i) for all !j 2 
:
6.2.2 Fertility and the distribution of abilities
Let Pt (!) be the size of population with ability ! at time t = 0; 1; 2; :::, and Pt 
X
!2

Pt (!) be total
population at time t: The initial distribution of population, fP0 (!i)gni=1 ; is given. Assuming that a law of
large number holds, the size of population in a particular income group evolves according to:
Pt+1 (!j) =
X
!i2

f (!i)Pt (!i)M(!j ; !i) for all !j 2 
: (70)
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Let t (!)  Pt (!) /Pt be the fraction of population with ability ! 2 
 at time t: Since income is equal to
ability,  also characterizes the income distribution of the economy. The law of motion of  is given by:
t+1 (!j) =
Pt
Pt+1
X
!i2

f (!i)t (!i)M(!j ; !i) for all !j 2 
 (71)
Let  (!) = lim
t!1t (!) : As shown by CK, the limit is well defined.
A central topic of the chapter is to characterize t and  as well as their relationship to fertility. The
following proposition provides a simple but important benchmark. The first part states that when fertility
is identical across types the limit distribution of incomes is equal to ; the invariant distribution associated
to M . This result provides a baseline distribution in absence of fertility differences. In that case, the
distribution of income just reflects the genetic distribution of abilities, what can be termed nature rather
than nurture. The second part of the Proposition shows that fertility differences alone does not necessarily
affect the long-run distribution of income, . In particular, fertility differences are irrelevant for the income
distribution when abilities are i.i.d.
Proposition 1. When  equals : Suppose one of the following two assumptions hold: (i) f (!) = f for
all ! 2 
; or (ii) M(!0; !) is independent of ! for all !0 2 
. Then  (!) =  (!) for all ! 2 
:
Fertility differences affect the distribution of incomes when abilities are persistent. The following Propo-
sition is an application of CK’s Theorem 2. It states that if the fertility of the poor is higher than the fertility
of the rest of the population then  is different from ; and moreover,  dominates  in the first order
stochastic sense.
Proposition 2. SupposeM satisfies Assumption 1 and f (!1) > f (!i) = f for all i > 1: Then
PI
i=1 
 (!i) >PI
i=1  (!i) for all 1  I  n:
Proof. See Chu and Koo (1990, pp.1136).
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Comparing Propositions 1 and 2, it follows that a reduction in the fertility of the poor results in a limit
distribution that dominates the original distribution. More generally, CK show that if fertility decreases with
income and the initial distribution of incomes is at its steady state level, 0 (!i) ; then a reduction in the
fertility of the poor results in a sequence of income distributions that first order stochastically dominates
0 (!i), that is,
PI
i=1 t (!i) <
PI
i=1 

0 (!i) for all 1  I  n and t > 0.
6.2.3 Social Welfare
CK consider average utilitarian welfare functions of the form:
W =
1X
t=0
X
!2

p(t)U(!)t (!) (72)
where U(!) is the utility of an individual with ability ! and p(t) is the weight of generation t in so-
cial welfare. A particular case emphasized by CK is one where the planner cares only about steady state
welfare: p(t) = 0 for all t and lim
t!1p(t) = 1. In that case,
W

=
X
!2

U(!) (!) (73)
The following corollary of Proposition 2 provides the theoretical support to family planning programs for
the poor, as claimed by CK.
Corollary 3. Suppose social welfare is defined by (72) where U(!) is a non-decreasing function of ability.
Furthermore, suppose M satisfies Assumption 2 and f (!1) > f (!i) = f for all i > 1. Then (i)
reducing the fertility of the poor increases social welfare; (ii) fertility policies that do not change the
observed distribution of abilities, t, does not change social welfare.
Corollary 3 holds because reducing fertility of the poor improves the observed distribution of abilities
but does not alter U(). In the next two sections we show counterexamples to Corollary 3 when fertility is
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endogenous. This is an crucial consideration because if fertility of the poor is to be restricted, one needs
to rationalize why the poor choose to have more children in the first place. As a preview of the results, we
show a case in which fertility is restricted by fertility policies, the observed distribution of incomes, t, does
not change in any period but social welfare as well as individual welfare decreases for all individuals in all
periods compared to the unrestricted case. The reason why the previous Corollary fails to account for this
possibility is that it presumes that U(!) is invariant to policies, it lacks microfoundations. However, U(!)
is in fact an indirect utility function and therefore it is not invariant to policies.
6.3 An Economic Model of Fertility
We now consider the endogenous determination of fertility. Assumptions are the same as in the previous
section. In particular, the initial distribution of population across abilities, fP0 (!i)g!i2
 ; is given, abilities
are random, determined at birth and described by a Markov chain M satisfying Assumption 1, and having a
unique invariant distribution, : The technology of production is linear in labor: one unit of labor produces
one unit of perishable output. Let !t = [!0; !1; :::; !t] 2 
t+1 denote a particular realization of ability
history up to time t, for a particular family line. There is neither capital nor aggregate risk.
6.3.1 Individual and aggregate constraints
Markets open every period. The resources of an individual of ability !t at time t are labor income and
transfers from their parents. Labor income equals !t (1  ft) where  is the time cost of raising a child.
Let bt (!t) denote transfers, or bequests, received from parents. Resources are used to consume and to leave
bequests to children. Insurance market exists as parents can leave bequest contingent on the ability of their
children. Let qt(!t; !t+1) be price of an asset that delivers one unit of consumption to a child of ability !t+1
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given that the history up to time t is !t.39 The budget constraint of an individual at time t with history !t is:
ct
 
!t

+ ft
 
!t
 nX
i=1
qt(!
t; !i)bt+1
 
!t; !i
  !t  1  ft  !t+ bt  !t : (74)
We assume that parents cannot leave negative bequests to their children:
bt+1
 
!t; !i
  0 for all !t 2 
t+1; !i 2 
 and all t > 0:
Furthermore, suppose b0 (!i) = 0 for all !i 2 
:
Since output is perishable, aggregate consumption must be equal to aggregate production. Alternatively,
aggregate savings must be zero. Savings are equal to the total amount of bequests left by parents. Since
bequests are non-negative then aggregate savings are zero if and only if all bequests are zero. Therefore, in
any equilibrium the budget constraints (74) simplifies to:
ct
 
!t
  !t  1  ft  !t for all !t 2 
t+1 and all t  0. (75)
This is balanced budget constraint for every period and state. The lack of intergenerational transfers sig-
nificantly simplifies the problem and explains why social mobility arises in the equilibrium. Otherwise, as
shown by Alvarez (1999), parents will use family size to buffer against shocks and use transfers to smooth
consumption across time and states regardless of ability which prevents any social mobility. Absent trans-
fers, ability becomes the key determinant of consumption and fertility, as we see below.
In addition to budget constraints, individuals must satisfy time constraints. In particular, the time spent
in raising children cannot exceed the time available to an individual, which is normalized to 1. Thus,
0  ft
 
!t
  1

: (76)
39The price also depends on the aggregate distribution of abilities at time t.
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6.3.2 Individual’s Problem
The lifetime utility of an individual born at time t is of the Barro-Becker type (Barro and Becker 1989
and Becker and Barro 1988):
Ut = u (ct) + f
1 
t EtUt+1, t = 0; 1; 2; :::: (77)
where u (c) = c ;  2 (0; 1) ; is the utility from consumption, ft is the number of children, Ut+1 is the
utility of the time t + 1 generation, and Et is the mathematical expectation operator conditional on the
information up to time t. The term f1 t is the weight that parents place on their ft children. When  = 0
parents are perfectly altruistic toward children. We assume 0   < 1:
The following restrictions on parameters are needed in order to have a well-behaved bounded problem.
Assumption 3. 1   >  and 1  > :
The first part of the assumption is identical to the one discussed by Barro and Becker (1988) to assure
strict concavity of the problem. The second part guarantees bounded utility as the effective discount factor
in that case satisfies f1 t   1 < 1:40
The individual’s problem is to choose a sequence

ft
 
!t
	1
t=0
to maximize U0 subject to (75) and (76).
The problem can be written in sequence form, by recursively using (77), to obtain:
U0 (!0) = sup
fPt+1(!t 1;!t)g1t=0
E0
1X
t=0
tPt
 
!t 1
1 "
u
 
!t
 
1  Pt+1
 
!t 1; !t

Pt (!t 1)
!!
(78)
subject to
0  Pt+1
 
!t 1; !t
  Pt  !t 1 = for all !t 1 2 
t, !t 2 
 and t  0; P0 > 0:
40An upper bound for Ut is u(!n)1  1 :
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In this formulation, P0
 
! 1

= 1. Pt+1
 
!t

=
tQ
j=0
fj
 
!j

. With a little abuse of notation, letPt+1
 
!t 1; !t

=
Pt+1
 
!t

where !t =
 
!t 1; !t

: Fertility rates can be recovered as ft
 
!t

=
Pt+1(!t 1;!t)
Pt(!t 1) :
An alternative way to describe the household problem is by the following functional equation:
U (!) = max
f2[0; 1

]
u (! (1  f)) + f1 E U  !0 j! (79)
The next proposition states that the principle of optimality holds for this problem. This result is novel
because the functional equation is not standard due to the endogeneity of fertility. In particular the discount
factor is endogenous. Alvarez (1999) shows that the principle of optimality holds for a dynastic version
of this problem while we show that it holds for the household version of the problem.41 Our household
problem is simpler because of the lack of intergenerational transfers in equilibrium.
Proposition 4. The functional equation (79) has a unique solution, U (!). Moreover U (!) = U0 (!) for
! 2 
:
6.3.3 Optimal Fertility
The optimality condition for an interior fertility choice is:
!u0 ((1  f)!) =  (1  ) f E U  !0 j! (80)
Let f = f(!) be the optimal fertility rule and c = c (!)  (1  f(!))! the optimal consumption rule.
The left hand side of this expression is the marginal cost of a child while the right hand side is the marginal
benefit. The marginal cost is the product of the cost per child, !, and the marginal utility of consumption.
41The analogous dynastic problem is:
V (N;!) = max
N02[0; 1

N ]
u
 
!   N 0=NN1  + E U  N 0; !0 j! :
In this problem the number of family members is a state variable, N , all member have the same ability, !; and make the same
choices. The household problem does not impose these constraints.
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The marginal benefit to the parent is the expected welfare of a child, E [U (!0) j!], times the parental weight
associated to the last child,  (1  ) f(!) .
Corner solutions are not optimal in the incomplete market case under the assumed functional forms be-
cause the marginal benefit of a child is infinite while the marginal cost is finite. In particular,E [U (!0) j!] >
0 for all ! while limf!0 f  = 1: Having the maximum number of children is also sub-optimal because
the marginal cost is infinite when parental consumption is zero, while the marginal benefit is finite.
Consider now the relationship between fertility, f, and parental earning ability, !. According to (80),
both marginal benefits (MB) and marginal costs (MC) are affected by abilities. MB increase with ! be-
cause of the postulated intergenerational persistence of abilities: high ability parents are more likely to have
high ability children. Regarding MC, there are two effects. On one hand, MC tends to rise with ! because
high ability parents have high opportunity cost of raising children as their wage rate is high. On the other
hand, MC tends to fall because higher ability implies more consumption and lower marginal utility of con-
sumption. When  2 (0; 1); the first effect dominates the second one so MC increases with !. The need
for a small curvature,  2 (0; 1), different from the one typically used in Macroeconomics, suggests a ten-
sion between the theory and the empirical since estimates of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution are
typically lower than 1. But the correct interpretation of 1=(1 ) is an elasticity of intergenerational substi-
tution (EGS), one controlling inter-personal consumption smoothing rather than intra-personal consumption
smoothing (Cordoba and Ripoll 2011, 2014).
Since both MB and MC increase with ! when  is smaller than 1; it is not clear in principle whether
fertility increases or decreases with ability. The following Proposition consider three cases: i.i.d abilities
across generations, perfect intergenerational persistence of abilities with no uncertainty and random walk
(log) abilities42
42Although a random walk does not satisfy some of the assumptions above, it helps to develop some intuition.
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Proposition 5. Persistence and the fertility-ability relationship. (i) Fertility decreases with ability if
abilities are i.i.d across generations. In this case f (!) satisfies the equation f(!)

(1 f(!))1  = A!
 
where A is a constant. Furthermore, fertility is independent of ability in one of the following two
cases: (ii) M is the identity matrix (abilities are perfectly persistent and deterministic); or (iii) ln!t =
ln!t 1 + "t where "t  N(0; 2).
According to Proposition 5, fertility decreases with ability when abilities are i.i.d. The intuition is that
without intergenerational persistence, the ability of the parent only affects her/his marginal cost but not
her/his marginal benefit as E [U (!0) j!] = E [U (!0)] for all ! 2 
: On the other extreme, fertility is
independent of ability when abilities are perfectly persistent across generations (cases ii and iii). This is
because in those cases both the marginal cost and the marginal benefit are proportional to !.
To understand the second extreme, it is instructive to write the first order condition in an alternative way.
First, use equation (80) to express (79) as:
Ut = u (c (!)) +
1
1  f (!)!u
0 (c (!)) (81)
Then use (81) to rewrite (80) as:
u0 (c (!)) (f (!)) = E

u0
 
c
 
!0
 !0
!

1

+
1    


1

  f  !0! : (82)
This equation is useful because it only requires marginal utilities, rather than total utility as in equation (80),
and corresponds to the Euler Equation of the problem describing the optimal consumption rule. Although
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savings are zero in equilibrium, fertility allows individuals to smooth consumption across generations.43 If
!0 = !; (136) becomes one equation with one unknown and f (!) = f:
Given that fertility becomes only independent of ability in the extreme case of perfect persistent, it is
natural to conjecture that fertility decreases with ability when persistence is less than perfect. We were able
to confirm this conjecture numerically but analytical solutions were not obtained.
6.3.4 Dynamics of the Income Distribution
Given the optimal fertility rule f (), initial distribution 0 () of population across abilities, and ini-
tial population P0, distributions of income for all periods can be obtained using equations (70) and (71).
Furthermore, average earning abilities and average income are given by:
Et =
X
!2

!t (!) ; It =
X
!2

! (1  f (!))t (!)
In the next section we use the microfounded model to perform welfare evaluations of family planing
programs. The model also allows us to assess whether Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 are somewhat
associated. We show they are. A mobility matrix with less than perfect persistence of intergenerational
abilities can give rise to a negative relationship between fertility and ability. The following Proposition
revisits Proposition 1 at the light of the micro-founded model. It plays an important role in section 6.4 when
providing counter-examples to CK’s claims.
Proposition 6. Persistence, fertility and ability distribution. (i) If M(; !) is independent of ! then
f (!) decreases with ! and t (!) =  (!) for ! 2 
 and t > 0; (ii) if M is the identity matrix then
43Equation (80) can also be written in the form of a more traditional Euler Equation. Let 1 + r0 be the gross return of "investing"
in a child. It is given by 1 + r0  U(!0)=u0(c0)
!
. In this expression, U(!0)=u0(c0) is the value of a new life, in terms of goods, while
! is the cost of creating a new individual. Then (80) can be written as:
u0(c) =  (1  ) f E u0(c0)  1 + r0 j! : (83)
This is an Euler Equation with a discount factor  (1  ) f : It suggests that optimal fertility choices are similar to saving
decisions and that children are like an asset, as pointed out by Alvarez (1999). However, two important differences with the
traditional Euler Equation are that the individual controls both the discount factor and the gross return.
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f (!) = f for all ! 2 
 and t (!) =  (!) = 0 (!) for all ! 2 
 and all t; (iii) if ln! follows a
Gaussian random walk then f (!) = f; and given !0 the variance of abilities diverges to1.
In words, if abilities are i.i.d. across generations, then fertility decreases with ability but the observed
limit distribution of abilities is independent of fertility choices and equal to  (!). Furthermore, with cer-
tainty and perfect intergenerational persistence of abilities the observed distribution of abilities in any period
is identical to the initial distribution of abilities. Finally, if (log) abilities follow a random walk then there is
not limit distribution of abilities since its variance goes to infinite.
6.3.5 Fertility Policies and Individual Welfare
Consider now a family planning policy that sets lower and/or upper bounds on fertility choices. Let
f(!)  0 and f(!)  1= be the lower and upper bound respectively. Bounds potentially depend on
individual abilities. The indirect utility U r (!) of the constrained problem is described by the following
Bellman equation:
U r (!) = max
f2[f(!);f(!)]
u ((1  f)!) + f1 E U r  !0 j! : (84)
Let f r (!) denotes the optimal fertility rule. The following Proposition is one of the main results of the
chapter. It states that binding fertility restrictions for at least one state reduces the indirect utility, or welfare,
of all individuals even those whose fertility is not directly affected. The Proposition also states that fertility
restrictions of any type (weakly) reduce the fertility of all individuals except perhaps those whose fertility
rates are at or below the lower bound.
Proposition 7. U r (!)  U(!) with strict inequality if f(!) > f(!) or f(!) < f(!) for at least one
! 2 
: Furthermore, f r(!) = f(!) if f(!)  f(!) and f r(!)  f(!) otherwise.
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Fertility restrictions reduce welfare because it restricts individuals’ choices without providing any com-
pensation. Furthermore, fertility restrictions that only affects a particular group, say the lowest ability indi-
viduals, results in lower welfare for all individuals because, regardless of current ability, there is a positive
probability that a descendant of the dynasty will fall into the group directly affected in finite time. Propo-
sition 7 implies that policies such as the One Child Policy, which imposes a uniform bound on all ability
levels, or policies that compel individuals to increase their fertility, such as the "leftover" women stigma in
China, are detrimental to individual welfare, according to our model. Given that welfare of all individuals
falls, the marginal benefits of having children also falls while the marginal cost remains the same. As a
result, fertility must fall for all types except perhaps for those who are constrained by the policy to increase
their fertility. We next study the consequences of fertility restrictions on social welfare.
6.4 Family Planning and Social Welfare Reconsidered
Given that fertility policies reduces the welfare of all individuals, as stated in Proposition 7, it is natural
to infer that social welfare should also fall. The answer, however, depends on how social welfare is defined
and whether the policy reduces or increases population. In this section we focus on fertility policies that
impose upper limits on fertility rates such as limiting the fertility of the poor or the One Child Policy.
6.4.1 Analytical Results
According to Proposition 7, upper limits on the fertility of any ability group reduce fertility of all ability
groups. Therefore, upper limits on fertility unequivocally reduce population of all ability groups at all times
after time 0. Given that both population and individual welfare fall for all ability types, we are able to show
that fertility limits unequivocally decrease social welfare if social welfare is of the classical, or Bentham,
utilitarian form. Classical utilitarianism defines social welfare as the total discounted welfare of all (born)
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individuals:44
W =
1X
t=0
X
!2

p(t)U(!)Pt (!) : (85)
In this formulation p(t)  0 is the weight the social planner assigns to generation t. Since individuals are
altruistic toward their descendants, p(t) > 0 means that the planner gives additional weight to generation
t on top of what is implied by parental altruism. A particular case in which the planner weights only the
original generation, and therefore adopts its altruistic weights, is the one with p(0) = 1 and p(t) = 0 for
t > 0 :
W0 =
X
!2

U(!)P0 (!) (86)
The following Proposition states the main conclusion of the chapter: restricting fertility decreases classical
utilitarian welfare.
Proposition 8. Imposing upper limits on fertility choices reduces social welfare as defined by (85).
An identical result is obtained if the planner exhibits positive but diminishing returns to population, say
if Pt (!) in expression (85) is replaced by Pt (!)1 p where p 2 (0; 1) : This formulation seems the natural
extension of the Barro-Becker preferences for a planner.
An alternative definition of social welfare is average, or Mills, utilitarianism as defined by equation (72)
for the general case, and with (73) as a special case. This definition of welfare, the one used by CK, is
analogous to (85) but uses population shares, t (!), rather than population, Pt (!). Under this definition,
social welfare could increase even if the welfare of all individuals falls. The net effect depends on the relative
strength of two potentially opposite forces: on the one hand individual welfare falls but on the other hand
the distribution of abilities, , may improve, as in CK. We next show analytical examples in which social
welfare falls even under this definition. These are formal analytical counterexamples to CK’s claims that
fertility limits on the poor are welfare enhancing.
44The results are similar if the welfare of the unborn is explicitly considered as long as the unborn enjoy lower utility than the
born.
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The following Proposition states that fertility restrictions of any type reduce average utilitarian welfare
if abilities are i.i.d.
Proposition 9. Suppose M(; !) is independent of ! for all ! 2 
. Then upper limits on fertility choices
reduce social welfare as defined by (72).
Proposition 9 relies on the earlier finding in Proposition 1 that, when abilities are i.i.d, the observed
distribution of abilities, t; is independent of fertility choices, even if the poor have more children, and the
limit distribution of abilities is the invariant distribution of M . We show in the appendix that t (!i) =
 (!i) for all t if 0 (!i) =  (!i) : Therefore, in the i.i.d case the effect of any fertility policy on social
welfare, as defined by (72), is only determined by its effect on individual welfare, U .
A particular implication of Proposition 9 is that limiting the fertility of the poor reduces welfare which
contradicts CK’s claim stated in Corollary 3. The i.i.d case in Proposition 9 satisfies CK’s Assumptions 1
and 2 since fertility rates are decreasing, as stated in Proposition 5, and i.i.d abilities satisfies conditional
stochastic monotonicity. Corollary 3 fails to properly describe the effect of the policy on social welfare
because it implicitly assumes that U is unaffected by the policy change.
The following is a deterministic example showing that average utilitarian welfare unequivocally falls
with "uniform" fertility restrictions such as the one child policy.
Proposition 10. Suppose M is the identity matrix and f (!) = f . Then fertility restrictions reduces social
welfare as defined by (72).
Proposition 10 provides another example in which fertility restriction do not affect : Since in the deter-
ministic case all ability groups have the same fertility choices, and the fertility restriction affect all ability
groups equally, then it follows that t = 0 for all t so that the effect of the policy on social welfare is only
determined by the effect on individual welfare U .
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We now turn to numerical simulations to investigate more generally the effects of policies restricting
fertility choices on social welfare.
6.4.2 Calibration and Simulations
Benchmark Calibration The following parameters are needed to simulate the model: the Markov process
of abilities M , preference parameter ; altruistic parameters  and , cost of raising children ; and social
planner weight p (t) :
Income groups, fertilities of different income groups, and the Markov chain are taken from Lam (1986)
who provides estimates for Brazil. Average incomes for five income groups are
 !
I = [553; 968; 1640; 2945; 10991] :
They describe income classes of Brazilian male household heads aged from 40 to 45 in 1976. Average
fertility of each income group are
 !
f = [6:189; 5:647; 5:065; 4:441; 3:449] =2: We divide fertility by two to
obtain fertility per-adult. Using income and fertility data, we calculate earning abilities of different groups
as !i =
I(!i)
1 f(!i) and normalize the lowest ability to be 1. The Markov chain provided by Lam is:
M =
2666666666666664
0.50 0.25 0.15 0.10 0.05
0.25 0.40 0.20 0.20 0.10
0.15 0.20 0.35 0.20 0.20
0.05 0.10 0.20 0.35 0.25
0.05 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.40
3777777777777775
This chain does not satisfy conditional stochastic monotonicity property although its diagonal elements
dominate other elements implying certain level of earning persistency across generations. We also consider
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the Markov chain provided by CK, which satisfies CSM, and obtain similar results. Initial population is
normalized to 1. The initial distribution of abilities, 0; is approximated by the stationary distribution
implied by M and
 !
f .
Our altruistic function, f1 , is calibrated following Manuelli and Seshadri (2009) (MS henceforth).45
For  we initially used MS’s parameter of 0:38. However, the fertility rates implied by the calibrated model
were too high and the range of fertilities too small compared to Brazilian fertility data. We set  = 0:68
to better fit the fertility data. Another key parameter of the model is the time cost of raising a child, . We
choose  = 0:2 which implies a maximum number of 10 children per couple, or that each parent spend
10% of their time on every child. We perform robustness checks for this and other parameters. For the
social planner weights we assume p (t) = t with  = 0:1: The set of parameters used for the benchmark
exercises are summarized in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1 Parameters Setting
Parameters Concept Values
 individual discount factor 0.29
 elasticity of substitution 0.68
 altruistic parameter 0.35
 per child time cost 0.2
 weight of social planner 0.1
Results The simulated model reproduces a negative relationship between fertility and ability similar to the
Brazilian data.46 Because abilities are persistent but not perfectly persistent across generations, the increase
of the marginal cost of children dominates that of the marginal benefit as ability increases. As shown in the
first panel of Figure 6.1, fertility per household falls from 9 to 2 as earning abilities increase from 1 to 12.
45Their altruistic function takes the form e Be 0+1 ln f where B = 25 is the age of fertility. So the proper mapping is
=e Be 0 and 1   = 1.
46By construction, our calibration targets the dispersion of fertilities but not the sign of the relationship between fertility and
income.
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This inverse relationship between fertility and ability in dynastic altruistic model with stochastic earning
abilities is very hard to obtain as documented by Jones et al. (2010). Four factors are crucial in our model
to fulfill this task. They are imperfect persistence of abilities across generations, EGS larger than 1 (low
curvature of the utility function), time cost of raising children and incomplete markets.
The second panel plots average ability, !; and average income; y; as the upper bound of fertility in-
creases. As predicted by CK, tighter fertility limits, which affect lower income groups more severely, in-
crease average income and ability.
The remaining panels in Figure 6.1 illustrate the effect of fertility limits on various welfare measures.
On the horizontal axis is the uniform fertility upper limit imposed on all ability groups, a limit that goes
from 0 to 10 children per household. It shows that steady state average welfare, W , average welfare of all
generations, W , welfare of the initial generation, W0; and total welfare of all generations, W; all increase
as the upper bound on fertility is relaxed. These results confirm the main message of the chapter: fertility
restrictions, on the poor or other groups, do not have strong theoretical support for improving people’s
welfare.
We also study the welfare effects of imposing lower bounds on fertility rates. This type of restrictions
disproportionately affects the rich, or high ability individuals, because their unconstrained fertility is typi-
cally lower. Figure 6.2 shows that this policy increases average ability since high ability individuals have
proportionally more high ability children. On the other hand, the policy reduces average income because
individuals, especially those with high ability, spend more time raising children and this effect dominates
the effect of an improved ability distribution. All four welfare measures unanimously decrease as the lower
bound on fertility increases.
In summary, the results above show that fertility restrictions, on the poor and on the rich, do not result
into higher social welfare although they may improve the distribution of abilities and income.
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Robustness Checks We now report the results of various robustness checks. For this purpose we change
one parameter at a time while keeping all the other parameters at their benchmark values and study the effect
on the various welfare measures of imposing an upper limit on fertility. We find that the qualitative results
obtained above are mostly robust although there exists a set of parameters for which average steady state
welfare, W ; improves with fertility restrictions. The set of parameters studied is further restricted by the
need to have finite utility.
The results are robust to setting  below 0:74. If  is larger than 0.74, relaxing fertility restrictions
slightly reduce steady state average welfare, W ; but only when there is a tight upper limit on fertility, of
between 1 and 2, as illustrated in the first panel of Figure 6.3 for  = 0:9: A high elasticity of intergener-
ational substitution significantly reduces the gains of smoothing consumption through fertility choices. In
addition, low fertility allows higher consumption and low marginal utility of consumption. As a result, a
relaxation of fertility restrictions has a minor impact on individual utility and the change in the distribution
of abilities determines the change in social welfare. However, further relaxation of the upper limit increases
W

.
We also find that if  is sufficiently low, a tighter fertility restriction may increase W  as illustrated in
the second panel of Figure 6.3 for the case  = 0:2. A low  means that parents care little about future
generations, have fewer kids, higher consumption and lower marginal utility of consumption. In this case,
fertility restrictions have a minor effect on individual welfare and, as a result, the change of the ability
distribution is the dominant effect determining social welfare. However, this low degree of altruism also
implies that the model predicts counterfactually low fertility rates. A similar result is obtained when  is
particularly large, as illustrated in the third panel of Figure 6.3 for  = 0:53.
Finally, if the cost of raising children, ; is sufficiently large then a tighter fertility restriction may
increase W  as shown in the last panel of Figure 6.3 for the case  = 0:28. In this case the high cost of
raising children itself prevents households from having many children and therefore fertility restrictions are
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not very harmful for individual welfare. The change in social welfare is therefore primarily determined by
the change in the distribution of abilities.
6.5 Conclusion
Stochastic dominance, or welfare dominance, seemingly provides a robust criterion for policy evalu-
ation. It allows ranking policies by simply looking at the resulting income distribution without requiring
much knowledge of individuals’ preferences and constraints, or knowledge of the social welfare function.
Chu and Koo (1990) exploit such apparent generality to provide a striking policy recommendation. They as-
sert that stochastic dominance "provides us with very strong theoretical support in favor of family-planning
programs that encourage the poor in developing countries to reduce their reproductive rate (pp 1136)." Such
fundamental claim has surprisingly remained unchallenged. In this chapter we show that stochastic domi-
nance alone does not provide the strong theoretical support claimed by CK. Our findings challenge not only
CK’s main normative conclusion but also the larger classical literature on the topic of welfare dominance
which is the foundation of such conclusion.
Our main contribution is to provide explicit micro-foundations to CK’s model. The key features are al-
truism, random abilities, labor costs of raising children, non-negative bequest constraints, and an endowment
economy. The model is particularly useful because its equilibrium exactly maps into the Markov branching
framework of CK. It also successfully replicates two basic features of the evidence on fertility and income
distribution: fertility decreases with ability and social mobility occurs in equilibrium. These features are not
easily obtained by altruistic models of fertility.
Although fertility policies do not directly address the underlying frictions leading to inefficient fertility,
these policies could in principle increase social welfare much in the same way as monetary policy could
increase social welfare even if the policy by itself does not address price rigidities.
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The welfare effect of family planning policies can potentially depend on how social welfare is defined.
When social welfare is defined as the classical utilitarianism, in spite of the fact that policies and family
planning programs directed toward reducing the fertility of the poor may result in superior income distrib-
utions in the first order stochastic sense, we find first order stochastic dominance does not provide a strong
theoretical support to these policies, contrary to CK and to a larger literature mentioned in the introduction.
The main reason for this failure is that stochastic dominance does not account for the fact that indirect utility
functions are not invariant to fertility policies.
When social welfare is defined as average utilitarianism, policies restricting fertility choices could in-
crease social welfare under certain parameters which require people to discount future very heavily or the
degree of altruism toward children to be very low. Average utilitarianism social welfare is not well micro-
founded as parents acting as the social planner at the household level would maximize a weighted average
of the total utility of the family but not average utility.
In this chapter we evaluate policies restricting fertility choices. We perform other policy experiments,
such as fertility related taxes and subsidies, in Cordoba and Liu (2014) and find those policies in general
do not increase social welfare as well. Our model abstracts from a number of aspects that are potentially
important to fertility decisions such as bequests and wealth inequality. We study these extensions in Cor-
doba et al. (2015). The models are significantly more complicated, and do not map into a simple Markov
branching framework, but our early results confirm the findings that policies restricting fertility typically do
not increase social welfare.
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APPENDIX A. EFFICIENT POPULATION ON A FINITE PLANET
Proof of Proposition 1 The first order condition with respect to Nt+1 is
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MB; while the third term is the marginal benefit, denoted by MC. At steady state,
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This simplification focuses on the non-degenerate population when population is nonzero. If population
is zero, it may not hold. Plugging functional form of production function, we get
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Manipulating terms, population is solved as
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Obviously, z cancels out once population N is plugged into the formula of steady state consumption. As a
result, consumption does not respond to TFP.
Proof of Proposition 2 To solve the golden rule level of population, the derivative of steady state social
welfare with respect to population is
@V
@N
= N1 u0
 
F
 
K;N   N
N
!
F2
 
K;N   N (1  )N   F   K;N   N
N2
+ (1  )N u
 
F
 
K;N   N
N
!
= N
 
c 
 "F2   K;N   N (1  )
N
  F
 
K;N   N
N2
#
+ (1  )

c1 
1   +A

where
c =
F
 
K;N   N
N
= z KN  (1  )1 
so
@V
@N
=  z KN 1  (1  )1 N  c + (1  )  c1 
1   +A

=

1  
1     

zk (1  )1 
1 
+ (1  )A
1 
1  > 1 > ; so
@V
@N > 0 for all k; so it is optimal to have the highest sustainable population.
Proof of Proposition 3: First order conditions:
at+1 : u
0 (ct)ntqt = (nt)V 0t+1(at+1)
nt : u
0 (ct) (qtat+1 + wt) = 0(nt)Vt+1(at+1)
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Envelop condition
V 0t (at) = u
0 (ct) (qt + rt)
so foc with respect to at+1 becomes
u0 (ct) =
(nt)
nt
u0 (ct+1)

qt+1 + rt+1
qt

so
qt+1 + rt+1
qt
=
1

 
F
 
K;Nt+1   Nt+2

F
 
K;Nt   Nt+1
 ! Nt+1
Nt
" 
Plugging foc with respect to nt into the objective function, postponing one period and plugging it into
foc with respect to nt and use Euler equation,
(nt)
nt
u0 (ct+1)

qt+1 + rt+1
qt

(qtat+1 + wt)
= 0(nt)

u (ct+1) +
1
1  "u
0 (ct+1) (wt+1 + (qt+1 + rt+1) at+1   ct+1)

Manipulate terms,
qt+1 + rt+1
qt
wt =
   "
1  ct+1 + (1  ")
A
c t+1
+ wt+1
Plugging wage and the resource constraint into the first order condition of population, and use the Euler
equation,
F2
 
K;Nt+1   Nt+2

+
   "
1  
F
 
K;Nt+1   Nt+2

Nt+1
+ (1  ")A
 
F
 
K;Nt+1   Nt+2

Nt+1
!
= 
 
F
 
K;Nt+1   Nt+2

F
 
K;Nt   Nt+1
 ! 1


Nt+1
Nt
" 
F2
 
K;Nt   Nt+1

which is the optimality condition of the social planner’s problem.
Proof of Proposition 4 Fixed amount of land and the time-independent equilibrium prices at steady state
imply total labor L is time independent, so the steady state fertility n is always 1. The first order
conditions are:
cot : (c
y
t )
 1
= Rt+1
 
cot+1
 1
: (87)
nt : 
ut
cyt
(wt+ bt+1=Rt+1) = 

n (nt)
(nt)
nt
Vt+1(bt+1): (88)
bt+1 : 
ut
cyt
=Rt+1 =
(nt)
nt
V 0t+1(bt+1): (89)
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By Envelop condition (89) can be written as:
ut
cyt
= Rt+1
(nt)
nt
ut+1
cyt+1
: (90)
Using (87), it follows that:
cot+1 = Rt+1c
y
t : (91)
The budget constraint and ut can be written as
wt (1  nt) + bt   bt+1=Rt+1 = cyt + cot+1=Rt+1 = 2cyt : (92)
and
ut =

1
2
2
(wt (1  nt) + bt   bt+1=Rt+1)2 Rt+1 (93)
Note that from (88) and the budget constraint:
(nt)Vt+1 =

n (nt)
ut
cyt
 
bt + wt   cyt   cot+1=Rt+1
 (94)
Lagging the previous equation one period and using (90),

n (n
y
t 1)
ut
cyt
(Rtwt 1+ bt) = ut +A+ 
1
n (nt)
ut
cyt
 
bt + wt   cyt   cot+1=Rt+1

n (n
y
t 1) = 1  : Collecting terms,
cyt + c
o
t+1=Rt+1 =
2
n   2
(Rtwt 1  wt)  2

n
n   2
A (cyt )
1 2
Rt+1
(95)
(i) If A = 0 or a rich economy so that A (cyt )1 2 ' 0 :
cyt + c
o
t+1=Rt+1 =
2
n   2
(Rtwt 1  wt) (96)
The solution for present value consumption is
cyt =

n   2
(Rtwt 1  wt) (97)
At steady state,
cyt =

1    2 (R  1) (1  ) f (k) (98)
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and by resource constraint for output (11)
cyt (1 +R) = (1  ) f(k) (99)
(90) and (93) becomes:
(cyt )
2 1
Rt+1 = Rt+1
(nt)
nt
 
cyt+1
2 1
Rt+2: (100)
This equation resembles the Euler equation in Barro and Becker (1988) (BB henceforth) but is different
from BB. In particular, the terms R do not appear in BB. This is because the model now adds life-cycle
features while in BB individuals live only one period. Plugging the functional form of the altruism function,
the steady state condition of (100) can be reduced to R = 1 : If steady state per capita capital k is not zero,
then the formula of consumption (98) and the resource constraint (100) require the following condition to
hold at steady state.
 (1  )
1    2



  1

=
1  
1 + 1=
Otherwise the equilibrium population has to be infinite. (ii) If A 6= 0; the equilibrium solution for n and
R still holds except that consumption is not determined by (97). (95) and the resource constraint (99) give
consumption as
cy =
24 1  

 
 1  1 (1+ 1)1  (1  )  (1    2)
A
R
35 12
Proof of Corollary At steady state, cy is independent of z and k is decreasing in z: Since kt = KLt ; a
smaller steady state capital k implies a bigger population of labor L: By Lt = Nyt (1  nt) ; Ny and
N (= 2Ny) are bigger at steady state.
Proof of Proposition 5 The social planner’s allocations

cyt ; c
o
t+1; nt
	
are characterized by
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:

cot+1
cyt+1
ut+1
ut
n "t = 1
Nyt c
y
t +N
y
t 1c
o
t = F
 
K;Nyt   Nyt+1

(1  ") [ut +A] + utcyt

F2
 
K;Nyt   Nyt+1
  cyt   ut
=  1 ut 1
cyt 1
n"t 1

F2
 
K;Nyt 1   Nyt

+ 

ut
cyt
= Rt+1
(nt)
nt
ut+1
cyt+1
In the complete market problem, the Euler equation (derived from foc w.r.t b and Envelop Thm) and
the focs with respect to cyt and cot+1 give
cot+1 = Rt+1c
y
t
Combine these two equations,

cot+1
cyt+1
ut+1
ut
n "t = 1
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Foc with respect to n and Euler equation imply

n (n
y
t 1)
ut
cyt
Rtwt 1 = ut +A+

n (nt)
ut
cyt
wt   2 
n (nt)
ut
By Euler equation, ut
cyt
= Rt+1
(nt)
nt
ut+1
cyt+1
;

ut
cyt
RtF2
 
K;Nyt 1   Nyt

 = R 1t
nt 1
(nt 1)
ut 1
cyt 1
RtF2
 
K;Nyt 1   Nyt


so

nt 1
(nt 1)
ut 1
cyt 1
F2
 
K;Nyt 1   Nyt


= (1  ") [ut +A] +  ut
cyt
F2
 
K;Nyt   Nyt+1
  2ut
which is the third equation in social planner’s problem. In equilibrium of both models, resource
constraint needs to be satisfied.
Proof of Proposition 6 When credit constraint binds, bt+1 =b
¯
. Plugging (94) into the value function and
use the lifetime budget constraint (7). Postpone Vt by one period and plug it back into (88),

ut
cyt
(wt+ b
¯
=Rt+1) = 

n (nt)
(nt)
nt
ut+1

1 +
nt+1
n

1
cyt+1
(wt+1+ b
¯
=Rt+2) +
A
ut+1

(101)
where by (87) and (7)
cyt =
1
2
(wt (1  nt) + b
¯
  ntb
¯
=Rt+1)
and by (93)
ut = (c
y
t )
2
Rt+1:
Plugging consumptions into the resource constraint (11) and manipulate terms, we get
nt (b
¯
  nt+1b
¯
=Rt+2)+Rt+1 [(1  ) zkt (1  nt) + b
¯
  ntb
¯
=Rt+1] = (1  nt+1) zkt+1nt (1 + ) :
Every young individual’s budget constraint (5) and (13) imply
kt+1 =
1
qt

1
2
wt (1  nt) + 1
2
b
¯
+
1
2
ntb
¯
=Rt+1

1
nt
1
1  nt+1 (102)
By (8) and (51),
Rt+1 =
qt+1 + zk
 1
t+1
qt
:
At steady state, fertility rate n is still 1: The rest of the system that describes the steady state with
binding credit constraint consists of equation (101), (102), (8) and (51). At steady state, the system
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can be simplified as
1  
1   
1
cy
(w+ b
¯
=R) = 

1 +
A
u

where
cy =
1
2
(w (1  ) + b
¯
  b
¯
=R)
and
u = (cy)2 R
k =
1
2q

w + b
¯
(1 + 1=R)
1
1  

R = 1 +
r
q
and
w = z (1  ) k; r = zk 1
Proof of Proposition 7 Consider the budget constraint in steady state:
b =
cy + co=R  w (1  n)
(1  n=R) =
Rcy + co   wR (1  n)
R  n
A nonpositive first best bequest b  0 requires cy + co=R  w (1  n). At steady state,
w (1  ) = (1  ) (1 +R) cy
and co = Rcy; so this condition implies
2 < (1  )

1 +
1


The steady state versions of equations are:
n
1  n = (n)

n
2
+
n
1  n +
n
2
A
u

: (103)
1 = (1  ) zk 1 1
2q
: (104)
u = ((1  ) zk (1  n) =2)2 R
R =
q + r
q
(105)
r = f 0 (k) = zk 1 (106)
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By (104), (105) and (106), the steady state interest rate R is a constant.
R =
1 + 
1  
and utility is
u =
A
1 


1 
2
1    1
(107)
Proof of the Corollary Equations
u = (cy)2

1 + 
1  

: (108)
By the equation of consumption and the expression of w;
cy = (1  ) zk (1  ) =2 (109)
(107) and (108) indicate both the homothetic part of utility u, and steady state consumption of a young
agent cy are independent of z: (109) then implies k is decreasing in z:
Log Linearization of the Dynamic System
Log linearize around the steady state to express the system as Xt+1 = A 1BXt where
A =
2664
A11 0 A13 A14
A21 0 A23 0
A31 0 A33 A34
A41 A42 0 0
3775 ; B =
2664
B11 0 B13 B14
B21 B22 B23 B24
B31 0 B33 B34
0 B42 0 B44
3775 and Xt =
2664
kt
qt
nt
Rt+1
3775 : The com-
ponents of the matrix are
A11 =  
A13 =  b
¯
n2
R
1
(1  n) zkn (1 + ) +
n
1  n
A14 =
1
(1  n) zkn (1 + )b¯
n2
R
B11 =  (1  )
1 + 
R
n
B13 = 1  1
(1  n) zkn (1 + )

(1  ) zk ( n)R   n
2
R
b
¯

B14 =   1
(1  n) zkn (1 + )R
 [(1  ) zk (1  n) + b
¯
]
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A21 = 1
A23 =   n

1  n
B21 =
 (1  ) zk (1  n)
(1  ) zk (1  n) + b
¯
+ nb
¯
=R
B22 =  1
B23 =  1 + 1
(1  ) zk (1  n) + b
¯
+ nb
¯
=R

n
R
b
¯
   (1  ) zkn

B24 =   1
(1  ) zk (1  n) + b
¯
+ nb
¯
=R
n
R
b
¯
A31 =
 
1
u
  1
1+ 1
1 
1
cy (w
+b
¯
=R)+ A
u
A
u2
!


1
2

w (1  )
+b
¯
  b
¯
=R
2 1
R (1  ) zk (1  )
+
1
1 + 11 
1
cy (w
+ b
¯
=R) + Au

1   (1  ) zk
 1
cy

  1
2cy

w+
b
¯
R

(1  )

A33 =  
 
1
u
  1
1+ 1
1 
1
cy (w
+b
¯
=R)+ A
u
A
u2
!


1
2

w (1  )
+b
¯
  b
¯
=R
2 1
R

w +
b
¯
R

+
1
1 + 11 
1
cy (w
+ b
¯
=R) + Au

1  
1
cy
(w+ b
¯
=R)

1 +
1
2cy

w +
b
¯
R

A34 =
 
1
u
  1
1 + 11 
1
cy (w
+ b
¯
=R) + Au
A
u2
!


1
2

w (1  )
+b
¯
  b
¯
=R
2
R
  1
1 + 11 
1
cy (w
+ b
¯
=R) + Au

1  
1
cy
b
¯
R

1
2cy

w+
b
¯
R

+ 1

B31 = (1  ) zk
"
1
u
 
1
2 (w
 (1  ) + b
¯
  b
¯
=R)
2 1
R (1  )
  1w(1 )+b
¯
 b
¯
=R (1  )  1w+b
¯
=R
#
B33 =  

w +
b
¯
R

1
u


1
2
(w (1  ) + b
¯
  b
¯
=R)
2 1
R
+
1
w (1  ) + b
¯
  b
¯
=R

w +
b
¯
R

+ 
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B34 =
1
2
1
u


1
2
(w (1  ) + b
¯
  b
¯
=R)
2 1
R (w (1  ) + b
¯
+ b
¯
=R)
  1
w (1  ) + b
¯
  b
¯
=R
b
¯
R
  1
w+ b
¯
=R
b
¯
1
R
A41 =
1
q + zk 1
z (  1) k 1
A42 =
1
q + zk 1
q
B42 = 1
B44 = 1
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APPENDIX B. ACCOUNTING FOR THE INTERNATIONAL QUANTITY-QUALITY
TRADE-OFF
maxV (b) = max
c(t);b0;n
1
1   fU (c) + ug
1  +  (F )1e
 F(n; F )V
 
b0

where
U (c) =


1  T
Z T
0
e t (t)
1 
1  c (t)1  dt
 1
1 
subjecting to
b  q (s)$ (s) +
Z s
0
(c (a) + es (a)) q (a) da
q (s)$ (s) +W (s; n) 
Z T
s
c (a) q (a) da+ q (F )nb0
Z s
0
((ep + es (a)) =pE)
 da
=
 h (s)
es(a)  0; $ (s)  !
W (s; n) =
Z R
s
wh (s) e(a s)q(a)l(n)da
h (s) =
Z s
0
(ep + es (a))
 da
=
pE
(n; F ) = 1  e 1n
n(n; F ) = 1e
 1n
and
q(F ) = e rF (F )
To solve the individual’s problem consider the associated Lagrangian:
L = 11  fU (c) + ug1  +  (F )1e F(n; F )V (b0)
+1

b  q (s)$ (s)  R s0 (c (a) + es (a)) q (a) da
+2
h
q (s)$ (s) +W (s; n)  R Ts c (a) q (a) da  q (F )nb0i
+3
R s
0 ((ep + es (a)) =pE)
 da
=   h (s)+ 4es(a) + 5 [$ (s)  !] :
where
M 
Z T
0
e t (t)
1 
1  c (t)1  dt
When the borrowing constraint binds, Q(s) = 0. We focus on this case.
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First order condition to c (a) ;
@U (c)
@c (a)
= 1q (a) for a  s (110)
@U (c)
@c (a)
= 2q (a) for s < a < T
When a  s
c (a) = fU (c) + ug   M 11 


1  T
 1

1
1 
e
(r )a
  (a)
1

 
1  
  1

1 for a  s (111)
c (a) = fU (c) + ug   M 11 


1  T
 1

1
1 
e
(r )a
  (a)
1

 
1  
  1

2 for s  a < T
cS (a) = e
(r )a
  (a)
1

 
1  c (0) (112)
cW (a)
c (0)
= e
(r )a
  (a)
1

 
1  G
1
 (113)
First order condition to b0 and the Envelop Theorem,
 (F )1e
 F(n; F )child1 = 2q(F )n
At steady state,
G  1
2
=
1
1
e (r )F
n
1  e 1n =

cS (s)
cW (s)
 
(114)
First order condition to h(s) gives
3
2
=
W (s; n)
h (s)
=
Z R
s
we(a s)q(a)l(n)da (115)
and
1
3
=
Gh (s)
W (s; n)
=
GR R
s we
(a s)q(a)l(n)da
(116)
First order condition to es(a),
3
@h(s)
@es(a)
+ 4 = 1q (a) (117)
When es (a) > 0; (117) implies
3p
 
E h (s)





 1

e^ (a) 1 = 1q (a)
so
e^ (a) = e^ (0) q(a) 
1
1  (118)
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When es (a) > 0; plugging @h(s)@es(a)and
1
3
into (117),
e (0) =

h (s) 

 p E W (s; n)=G
 1
1 
:
6.5.1 Value function
In this section, we simiplify the objective function into a two-period model by substituting consumptions.
V =
fU (c) + ug1 
1   + u0 +  (F )1e
 F(n; F )V 0; 0 <  < 1:
At steady state, the value function can be written as
V (b) =
1
1   (F )1e F(n; F )
"
fU (c) + ug1 
1   + u0
#
(119)
Following Cordoba and Ripoll (JME), let
 (a) =
8><>:
e pca for a  ac
 (ac) e
 ps(a ac) for ac  a  as
 (as)
e p(a as) 
  for as  a  T
ac = 5; as = F = 25: Then we require as = F  s s
¯
= 6.
Derive terms,
U (c) =


1  TM
 1
1 
and
M = c (0)1 
26666664
I

 + pc
1 
1 

 ; 0; ac

+ (ac)
1 
1 

 e
psac
1 
1 

 I

 + ps
1 
1 

 ; ac; s

+G
1 

24  (ac) 1 1   epsac 1 1   I

ps
1 
1 

 + ; s; as

+ (as)
1 
1 


R T
as

e p(t as) 
1 
 1 
1 


e tdt
35
37777775 (120)
6.5.2 Schooling
e (a) =
8<:
be (a) for a  min(s; s)
ep for min(s; s)  a  spbe (a) for sp  a  s (121)
where
sp  min fs; s;max [s;ba]g : (122)
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ba is defined by ba = sup fa : be (a) = epg (123)
First order condition to s gives
fU (c) + ug 


1  T
 1
1 

1
1  

M

1  e s (s)
1 
1 
h
cS (s)1    cW (s)1 
i
 1
 
cS (s) + es (s)

q (s) + 2
@W (s; n)
@s
+ 2c
W (s) q (s)
= 0
Then
 fU (c) + ug 


1  T
 1
1 

1
1  

M

1  e s (s)
1 
1  cW (s)1 
+2c
W (s) q (s)
=   
1   fU (c) + ug
 


1  T
 1
1 
M

1  e s (s)
1 
1  cW (s)1 
Plugging formulas of 1 and 2 and combining terms, first order condition to s becomes
ers (s) 1 cW (s)  w
"
 h (s) q(s) + (hs (s)  h (s)) e vs
 R F
s e
aq(a)da
+l(n)
R R
F e
aq(a)da
!#
(124)
= = u(s) + cS (s)  es (s)
where
u(s)  1
1  

cW (s)1    cS (s)1 

(125)
h(s; E) =
Z s
0

e(a)
pe

da


.
ers (s) 1 cW (s) 
@
@s
Z R
s
wh (s) ev(a s)q(a)l(n)da

| {z }
net marginal benefit of s
= u(s) + cS (s)  es (s)| {z }
marginal cost of s
so that the optimal years of schooling equates its marginal benefit to marginal costs. LHS of (124) is the
marginal return to schooling consists of four parts of cost: an additional year of private educational cost, one
year of return to experience, one year of wage, and one more year of being constrained to consume a low
amount as students.
Solve for two integrals:
Z F
s
e(v r)a (a) da =  (ac) epsacI (r + ps   v; s; F )
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Z R
F
e(v r)a (a) da =  (as)

1
1   e
pasI (p  v + r; F;R)  
1   I (r   v; F;R)

which can be plugged in (124) and be used to solve for W (s; n).
W (s; n) = wh (s) e vs
"
 (ac) e
psacI (r + ps   v; s; F )
+l (n) (as)
h
1
1 e
pasI (p  v + r; F;R)  1  I (r   v; F;R)
i # (126)
h (s) is solved as
h(s; E) =

e (0)
pE
 24 R min(s;s)0 q(a)  1  da+ R ssp q(a)  1  da
+

ep
e(0)

(sp  min(s; s))
35=
If s >s
¯
; since e^ (a) = e^ (0) q(a) 
1
1  ;
e^ (s) = e^ (0)
h
e rs (ac) e ps(s ac)
i  1
1 
:
In the numerical exercise, we have s >s
¯
, so
Z min(s;s)
0
q(a)
  
1  da
= I

  (r + pc) 
1   ; 0; ac

+  (ac)
  
1  e
  
1  psacI

  (r + ps) 
1   ; ac; s

Z s
sp
q(a)
  
1  da = [ (ac) e
psac ]
  
1  I

  (r + ps) 
1   ; sp; s

h(s; E) =

e (0)
pE

26666664
I

  (r + pc) 1  ; 0; ac

+ (ac)
  
1  e
  
1  psacI

  (r + ps) 1  ; ac; s

+ [ (ac) e
psac ]
  
1  I

  (r + ps) 1  ; sp; s

+

ep
e(0)

(sp  min(s; s))
37777775
=
(127)
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From the solution of h (s) solved above, we have
Z s
0

e^(a)
pe

da = h(s; E)


=

e (0)
pE

26666664
I

  (r + pc) 1  ; 0; ac

+ (ac)
  
1  e
  
1  psacI

  (r + ps) 1  ; ac; s

+ [ (ac) e
psac ]
  
1  I

  (r + ps) 1  ; sp; s

+

ep
e(0)

(sp  min(s; s))
37777775
6.5.3 Consumption and bequests
Substituting (111) into the first budget constraint:
b =
Z s
0
(c (a) + es (a)) q (a) da =
Z s
0
c (a) q (a) da+
Z s
0
es (a) q (a) da
Using (111), Z s
0
cS (a) q (a) da =
Z s
0
e
(r )a
  (a)
1

 
1  c (0) q (a) da
= c (0)
24 I  + pc 1  1  ; 0; ac
+ ( (ac) e
psac)
1 


1  I

 + ps
1 


1  ; ac; s
 35
E is the present value of the optimal private expenditures in education as given by:
E =
Z s
0
es (a) q (a) da
Plug (118) into E, e^ (a) = e^ (0) q(a)  11  if es (a) > 0:
E = e (0)
24 I   (r + pc) 1  ; 0; ac+  (ac)  1  e  1  psacI   (r + ps) 1  ; ac; s
+ (ac)
  
1  e
  
1  psacI

  (r + ps) 1  ; sp; s

35(128)
 ep (ac) epsacI ((r + ps) ; sp;min (s; s))
Substitute cS (a) in terms of c (0) into the first budget constraint,
b  E = c (0)
24 I  + pc 1  1  ; 0; ac
+ ( (ac) e
psac)
1 


1  I

 + ps
1 


1  ; ac; s
 35 (129)
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By (129) and (111),
c (0) = fU (c) + ug   M 11 


1  T
 1

1
1 

  1

1

  1

1 (130)
=
b  E
fU (c) + ug   M 11 


1 T
 1

1
1 
24 I  + pc 1  1  ; 0; ac
+ ( (ac) e
psac)
1 


1  I

 + ps
1 


1  ; ac; s
 35
6.5.4 Lifetime earnings W (s; n)
W (s; n) =
Z T
s
cW (a) q (a) da+ q (F )nb0
By (111),

W (s; n)  q (F )nb0 12 fU (c) + ug 
= M
1
1 


1  T
 1

1
1 
24  (ac) 1  1  epsac 1  1  I

 + ps
1 


1  ; s; 25

+ (as)
1 


1 
R T
25 e
 a
h
e p(a as) 
1 
i 1 


1 
da
35

  1

2 (131)
=
W (s; n)  q (F )nb0
fU (c) + ug   M 11 


1 T
 1

1
1 
24  (ac) 1  1  epsac 1  1  I

 + ps
1 


1  ; s; 25

+ (as)
1 


1 
R T
25 e
 a
h
e p(a as) 
1 
i 1 


1 
da
35
Since we consider only steady state situations, let b = b0 in the two previous equations, (130) and (131).
Dividing one by the other, we derive the following optimal level of transfers:

(s) (132)
=
 (ac)
1 


1  e
psac
1 


1  I

 + ps
1 


1  ; s; 25

+ (as)
1 


1 
R T
25 e
 a
h
e p(a as) 
1 
i 1 


1 
da
I

 + pc


1 
1  ; 0; ac

+  (ac)


1 
1  e
psac


1 
1  I

 + ps


1 
1  ; ac; s

b =
W (s; n)G 
1
 + E
(s)

(s) + q (F )nG 
1

(133)
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Once b is obtained, one can use them to solve for (a) and c(a): In particular,
cW (s)
cS (s)
=

1
2
 1

= G
1
 (134)
2 =
1
G
(135)
6.5.5 Fertility
First order condition of fertility can be written as
 (F )
1 
1 c 1e
 F n(n; F )V (b0)
W (s; n)
  2 q(F )b
0
W (s; n)
=  2Wn(s; n)
W (s; n)
Wn(s; n)
W (s; n)
=
 (as)
h
1
1 e
pasI (p  v + r; F;R)  1  I (r   v; F;R)
i
l0 (n)
 (ac) e
psacI (r + ps   v; s; F )
+l (n) (as)
h
1
1 e
pasI (p  v + r; F;R)  1  I (r   v; F;R)
i
Plug steady state V, (4) into the left hand side of the above equation,
 Wn(s; n)
W (s; n)
=  12  (F )
1 
1 c 1e
 F n(n; F )
W (s; n)
V
 
b0
  q(F )b0
W (s; n)
where
l(n) = 1  
h
(n+ )   
i
ln(n) =  (n+ ) 1 < 0
6.5.6 Integrals
Define sp such that it lies between s and s.
I1(d; t1; t2) =
Z t2
t1
e dada =

e da
d
t1
t2
6.5.7 Solution Algorithm
We solve the model by first assuming an initial value of s, n and e(0) given ep, pE , s, s and F: The optiaml
educational expenditure when public education is available, be(s); optimal public expenditure e (s) ; es (s)
and G can be gotten immediately by (44), (41), (114).
e^ (s) = e^ (0) q(s) 
1
1  = e^ (0)
h
e rs (ac) e ps(s ac)
i  1
1 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es (a) =

e^ (a)  ep if s
¯
 a  s
e^ (a) else
Then by (44), ba satisfying
ep = e^(0)q(a^)
  1
1 
Since s
¯
 a^  s,
ep = e^(0)
h
 (ac) e
 (ps+r)a^+psac
i  1
1 
) a^ = 1
ps + r

(1  ) ln

ep
e^(0)

+ ln (ac) + psac

After ba is solved, sp, h(s); E; W (s; n); 32 ; 
; b, cW (s) can be derived through (122), (46),ll (128), (126),(115), (132), (133), (134) successively. After all these variables are available, we are able to update s, n and
e(0) by iterating (45),
e^ (0) =

h (s)
 
 p E W (s; n)=G
 1
1 
(32), and (124).
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APPENDIX C. ALTRUISM, FERTILITY AND RISK
Inefficiently high fertility in a closed economy
Section 5.2 shows that fertility could be inefficiently high in a small-open incomplete-markets economy.
We now show that a similar could be obtained in a closed economy. Suppose the production function is
f(k; l) where k is capital and l is labor. In a closed economy, interest rates and wages are given by
rt = f1 (bt; 1  nt)   and wt = f2 (bt; 1  nt) .
where  is the rate of depreciation. Substituting out prices, the first order condition with respect to fertility
becomes
u0 (ct) [f2 (bt; lt)+ bt+1]  0 (nt)Ut+1 (bt+1) (136)
Furthermore, the corresponding Euler equation is
u0 (ct)nt   (nt)u0 (ct+1) (f1 (bt+1; lt+1) + 1  )
If bequest constraints do not bind, then steady state fertility is determined by
1 =  (f1 (b; 1  n) + 1  )n " (137)
If bequest constraint binds, then interior solution of fertility is determined by (136). The following proposi-
tion provides a case in which steady state fertility is larger when bequest constraints binds.
Proposition D.1. Assume the economy is closed and f (k; l) = Ak +Bl where A; B > 0: If the marginal
productivity of capital A is large enough such that (1 ")1  (A+ 1  )" > 1 +  "1 " 1, then
steady state fertility when the constraint b b binds is higher than the unconstrained fertility level.
Proof Equation (136) at steady state, together with the budget constraint and equilibrium prices results in
u0 (c) (f2 (b; l)+ b) =
0 (n)
1   (n) [f (b; 1  n) + (1  ) b  nb]
u0 (c)
1   :
Using the specific production function, utility function and altruistic function specified above and
collect terms, this equation becomes
B =
 (1  ")
1   [B + (A+ 1  ) b]n
 "   b  (b+B)    "
1  n
1 "
=
 (1  ")
1   Bn
 " + b

 (1  ")
1   (A+ 1  )n
 "   1     "
1  n
1 "

(138)
 B   "
1  n
1 ":
Denote the right hand side of this equation byRHS (n) :Notice thatRHS0 (n) < 0; lim
n!0
RHS (n) =
1; and lim
n!1RHS (n) =  1: An interior solution for fertility exists if and only ifRHS
 
1


< B;
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e.g.
1 +
   "
1  
" 1 >
 (1  ")
1   (A+ 1  )
"  B1  
" 1
b
:
By the assumption, the term in the square bracket of (138) is positive. As a result, an exogenous
increase in b increases the right hand side but does not affect the left hand side, and thus leads to a
bigger steady state fertility. Hence if b is restricted to be higher than the unconstrained optimal choice
b, e.g. b <b, then the steady state fertility in the unconstrained case (complete markets) is smaller
than that in the constrained case (incomplete markets).
Proof of Proposition 1 For the case when (1 + r)! > !, see Barro and Becker (1989). In this proof, we
focus on the case (1 + r)! < !: First order conditions for bequests and fertility are:
u0 (ct)nt =  (nt)U 0t+1 (bt+1)
u0 (ct) (! + bt+1)  0 (nt)Ut+1 (bt+1) with equality if nt < n:
0 (0) = 1 excludes the possibility of zero children. Using the envelope condition U 0t (bt) =
u0 (ct) (1 + r) ; the first condition with respect to bequest becomes:
u0 (ct)nt =  (nt)u0 (ct+1) (1 + r)
Therefore,
Ut (bt) = u (ct) +  (nt)Ut+1 (bt+1)
 u (ct) +  (nt)
0 (nt)
u0 (ct) (! + bt+1)
= u (ct) +
 (nt)
0 (nt)nt
u0 (ct) (! + (1 + r) bt   ct)
Forward this inequality one period and use the specific functional forms for utility and altruistic func-
tions to obtain
Ut+1 (bt+1)  u (ct+1) +  (nt+1)
0 (nt+1)nt+1
u0 (ct+1) (! + (1 + r) bt+1   ct+1)
= u0 (ct+1)
1
1  "

   "
1  ct+1 + (1 + r) bt+1 + !

> u0 (ct+1)
1
1  " (1 + r) (! + bt+1)
= u0 (ct)
1
0 (nt)
(! + bt+1)
for all nt: The last inequality sign is due to the assumption that (1 + r)! < !: Hence
Ut+1 (bt+1) 
0 (nt) > u0 (ct) (! + bt+1)
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for all nt 2 [0; n] implies nt = n is optimum. Consumption growth follows from the Euler equation.
Proof of Proposition 3 When contingent assets are available, first order condition to fertility nt is"
!t +
KX
i=1
q(!t; !i)bt+1(!
t; !i)
#
u0 (ct) =  (1  ")n "t Et

Vt+1
 
bt+1;!
t+1
 j!t (139)
where consumption is given by (53)
ct = !t (1  nt) + bt   nt
KX
i=1
q(!t; !i)bt+1(!
t; !i)
first order condition to bt+1(!t; !i) :
u0 (ct) q(!t; !i)nt = n1 "t M (!i; !t)
@Vt+1
 
bt+1;!
t+1

@bt+1
which together with envelop condition @Vt(bt;!
t)
@bt
= u0 (ct) and the actuarially fair price of bt+1(!t; !i)
gives the Euler equation
u0 (ct) = n "t (1 + r)u
0 (ct+1) (140)
Notice that all children from the same family enjoy the same consumption which is independent of
!t+1. Substituting (139) into the objective function and use the budget constraint,
Vt
 
bt;!
t

= u0 (ct)

ct (   ")
(1  ) (1  ") +
1
1  " (!t + bt)

Forward this equation by one period, then use it and (27) to rewrite (139) as,
!t (1 + r) + (1 + r)
KX
i=1
q(!t; !i)bt+1(!
t; !i) =
   "
1  ct+1 + E

bt+1(!
t; !i)j!t

+ E (!t+1j!t)
After some manipulations, the consumption of every child endowed with ability !0 given parental
ability ! is
ct+1 = c (!t) =
1  
   " [!t (1 + r)  E (!t+1j!t)]
for all t and !t. Furthermore, using (27) fertility can be solved as:
nt = n (!t 1; !t) = 
1
" (1 + r)
1
"

!t 1 (1 + r)  E (!tj!t 1)
!t (1 + r)  E (!t+1j!t)

"
When !t (1 + r) < E (!t+1j!t), the proof follows the same logic with the second part of Proposi-
tion 1.
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Proof of Proposition 4 We first show that there exists a solution U () that solves the functional equation
(79). Define a set of mappings.
S = fU : 
! Rj kUk Mg
where M = u(!K)
1 " 1 , and k  k is the sup norm. S is a complete metric space. Define operator T as
TU (!)  max
0 n  1

u ((1  n)!) + n1 "E U  !0 j! (141)
for all ! 2 
 and U 2 S. Given U () and !, the right hand side of (141) has a solution that attains
the maximum. First show that T is a contraction. It suffices to show that T satisfies two properties,
monotonicity and discounting. Standard argument can show that given U and ~U 2 S satisfying U
(!)  ~U (!) for all ! 2 
, TU (!)  T ~U (!) for all ! 2 
. The following arguments prove
discounting property holds. For any given constant b,
T (U (!) + b) = max
0 n  1

u ((1  n)!) + n1 "E U  !0+ bj!
 max
0 n  1

u ((1  n)!) + n1 "E U  !0 j!+ b 1

1 "
= TU (!) + " 1b
" 1 < 1 by assumption. By Contraction Mapping Theorem, there exists a unique fixed point
U : 
 ! R that solves the functional equation TU = U . The existence of a solution U () has been
proved. Next we show U (!0) = V 0 (!0) for all !0 2 
; that is to show U (!0) is the supremum of
the sequential problem (58) for any given !0 = !0.
U (!0) = max
n2[0; 1

]
u (!0 (1  n)) + n1 "E0 [U (!1) j!0]
> u (!0 (1  n0 (!0))) + E0
 
n0 (!0)
1 " u
 
!1
 
1  n1
 
!1

+2n0 (!0)
1 "E0n1
 
!1
1 "
E1 [U (!2) j!1]
!
>   
> E0
TX
t=0
t
t 1Y
j=0
nj
 
!j
1 "
u
 
!t
 
1  nt
 
!t

+ T+1E0
TY
j=0
nj
 
!j
1 "
U (!T+1)
for all feasible plan

nt
 
!t
	1
t=0
. Let
 1Q
j=0
nj
 
!j
1 "
= 1. The last term
T+1
TY
j=0
nj
 
!j
1 "
U (!T+1) 
 
" 1
T+1 u (!K)
1  " 1
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The right hand side of this inequality converges to 0 as T goes to infinite. Hence for all feasible plan
nt
 
!t
	1
t=0
U (!0) > E0
1X
t=0
t
t 1Y
j=0
nj
 
!j
1 "
u
 
!t
 
1  nt
 
!t
 (142)
Given " > 0, choosing a sequence of positive real numbers ftg1t=1 such that
P1
t=0
 
" 1
t
t  ":
Let n (!t) be the solution that attains U (!t), then for all t
U (!t) < u (!t (1  n (!t))) + n (!t)1 "Et [U (!t+1) j!t] + t
Starting from period 0, iteratively substituting the value function U (!t+1) into the above inequality
shows that for all !0;
U (!0) < E0
TX
t=0
t
t 1Y
j=0
n (!j)1 " u (!t (1  n (!t))) + T+1E0
TY
j=0
n (!j)1 " U (!T+1)
+ E0
TX
t=0
t
t 1Y
j=0
n (!j)1 " t
The choice of ftg guarantees that the last term is no more than " as T !1. We have shown that
lim
T!1
T+1E0
TY
j=0
n (!j)1 " U (!T+1) = 0
Hence for any given " > 0, there exists a feasible plan

nt
 
!t
	1
t=0
= fn (!t)g1t=0 such that
U (!0) < E0
TX
t=0
t
t 1Y
j=0
n (!j)1 " u (!t (1  n (!t))) + " (143)
By (142) and (143),
U (!0) = sup
fnt(!t)g1t=02[0; 1 ]
E0
1X
t=0
t
t 1Y
j=0
nj
 
!j
1 "
u
 
!t
 
1  nt
 
!t

= sup
fN^t+1(!t 1;!t)g1t=0
E0
1X
t=0
ttN^
 
!t 1
1 "
u
 
!t
 
1  N^t+1
 
!t 1; !t

N^t (!t 1)
!!
Therefore
U (!0) = V
 (!0)
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Proof of Proposition 5 (i) In this case, equation (80) can be written as n(!)"
(1 n(!)) = A!
 1 where A =
(1 ")
 E [u (!
0)] is a constant. Using the implicit function theorem, it follows that
n0 (!) =   (1  ) =!
"
n(!) +

1 n(!)
< 0:
(ii) In deterministic case, !0 = !: Equation (62) simplifies to:
n" = 

1

+
   "
1  

1

  n

(144)
The left hand side of equation (151) is strictly increasing in n while the right hand side is strictly
decreasing in n. Obviously n > 0. An interior solution with n < 1= exists since 1 " > . (iii)
Let n denotes the optimal fertility given !. Plug functional form of u () into equation (81)
U (!) = h (n)!1  (145)
where
h (n)  1
1   (1  n
)1  +
1
1  "n
 (1  n)  (146)
We make a guess on the value function and let it take the form: U (!) = A!1  whereA is a constant,
independent of !: Equating this guess with (152) results in:
A = h (n) (147)
Thus, in order for A to be independent of !; we must verify that the results n is independent of !:
Notice that,
E

U
 
!0
 j! = E A!01 j! = A!1 e (1 )22"2
The last equality holds because the assumption that !0 is lognormal distributed with ln! and " as
the mean and variance of ln!0: Plug this equality into (80) to obtain:
 (1  n)  !1  = A (1  ")n "e
(1 )22
"
2 !1 
! cancels out of this equation and therefore n is independent of ! confirming our guess. This
expression together with (153) and (154) gives a rule to solve the optimal fertility n.
 (1  )
 (1  ")n " e
  (1 )
22"
2 = 1  n + n

1  " (1  )
Manipulate terms
 (1  )n"
 (1  ")

e 
(1 )22"
2   n1 "

= 1  n
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The solution of n does not depend on ! which confirms the guess on U (!). In case (ii) and (iii),
fertility is independent of ability.
Proof of Proposition 6 (i) If fertility is exogenously the same for every individual,
Nt+1 = Nt
X
!i2

nt (!i) = Ntn
By equation (71),
t+1 (!j) =
nNt
Nt+1
X
!i2

t (!i)M(!j ; !i) =
X
!i2

t (!i)M(!j ; !i)
Taking limit to both sides of the expression with , we get
 (!j) = lim
t!1
X
!i2

t (!i)M(!j ; !i) =
X
!i2

 (!i)M(!j ; !i)
Hence  () =  () is the invariant distribution of M: (ii) M( ; !i) is independent of !i implies
M(!j ; !i) = M(!j ; :) for every !j 2 
: By (71),
t+1 (!j) =
M(!j ; :)
Nt+1
X
!i2

n (!i)t (!i)Nt
= M (!j ; :) =
X
!i2

t (!i)M(!j ; :)
for all t  0; these equalities imply t+1 (!j) =
X
!i2

t (!i)M(!j ; !i) and hence  (!j) =
t+1 (!j) =  (!j) = M (!j ; :) for all !j :
Proof of Proposition 7 Part (i) directly applies Proposition 5(i) and Proposition 6 (ii). For part (ii), we can
apply Proposition 5 (ii), in which fertility is independent of ability when M is identity. We use this
result to prove the distribution of every period as well as the limit distribution is the same with the
initial one.
t+1 (!j) =
Nt
Nt+1
X
!i2

n (!i)t (!i)M(!j ; !i)
=
Ntn
Nt+1
X
!i2

t (!i)M(!j ; !i)
=
X
!i2

t (!i)M(!j ; !i) = t (!j)
The last equality holds because M is identity matrix. Therefore  (!) = t (!) = 0 (!) for
all ! and all t. Part (iii) follows Proposition 5 (iii). The conditional variance of ln!t diverges
218
to infinite because ln!t = ln!0 +
tP
i=1
"i; E (ln!tj!0) = ln!0; V ar (ln!tj!0) = t22" and
limt!1 V ar (ln!tj!0) =1:
Proof of Proposition 9 Notice that
U (!) = max
nt2[0;1=]
u ((1  n)!) + n1 "E U  !0 j!
 max
[n
¯
(!);n(!)]
u ((1  n)!) + n1 "E U  !0 j! := U1  !0
 max
[n
¯
(!);n(!)]
u ((1  n)!) + n1 "E U1  !0 j! := U2  !0
::
 max
[n
¯
(!);n(!)]
u ((1  n)!) + n1 "E U r  !0 j! = U r  !0
where the first inequality is strict if a constraint is binding for any particular !; the remaining in-
equalities follow from the contraction mapping recursion, and the final inequality uses the contraction
mapping theorem. Furthermore, a strict inequality for a particular ! translates into a strict inequality
for all !0s sinceM is a regular Markov chain meaning that, regardless of initial ability there is positive
probability that someone in the dynasty will reach a binding state in finite time. The second part of the
proposition follows because fertility restrictions do not change the marginal costs of having children
but it decreases the marginal benefits by reducing U (!) for all ! (see equation (80)). Hence an upper
bound of fertility makes people have fewer children than the unrestricted case as long as fertility upper
bounds affect at least one of those types.
Proof of Proposition 10 LetN rt (!) be the size of population with ability ! at time t in presence of fertility
upper limits. By Proposition 9, for all !j
N1 (!j) =
X
!i2

n (!i)N0 (!i)M(!j ; !i)

X
!i2

nr (!i)N
r
0 (!i)M(!j ; !i) = N
r
1 (!j)
where initial population is not affected by policiesN0 (!i) = N r0 (!i). Given the inequalityN1 (!j) 
N r1 (!j), an inductive argument shows
Nt+1 (!j) =
X
!i2

n (!i)Nt (!i)M(!j ; !i) 
X
!i2

nr (!i)N
r
t (!i)M(!j ; !i) = N
r
t+1 (!j)
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for all !j and all t  0. Apply this result,
W r
 
p

=
1X
t=0
X
!2

p(t)U
r(!)N rt (!)

1X
t=0
X
!2

p(t)U(!)N
r
t (!)

1X
t=0
X
!2

p(t)U(!)Nt (!) = W
 
p

Proof of Proposition 12 When M (; !) is independent of !, the proof of Proposition 6 (ii) gives
t+1 (!j) = M(!j ; :) for all t  0
Initial ability distribution 0 (!) is given and not affected by the policy in place. So restriction of a
fertility upper bound only reduces individual utility by Proposition 9 but does not affect the ability
distribution of any period. It decreases social welfare defined by (68).
Proof of Proposition 13 This Proposition relies on Proposition 7 (ii)’s results, n (!) = n and t (!) =
 (!) = 0 (!) when M is an identity. Similar with Proposition 12, restriction does not alter
distribution, which together with Proposition 9, finishes the proof.
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APPENDIX D. STOCHASTIC DOMINANCE AND DEMOGRAPHIC POLICY
EVALUATION: A CRITIQUE
Proof of Proposition 1 (i) If fertility is exogenously the same for every individual, divide both sides of (70)
by Pt+1.
Pt+1 (!j)
Pt+1
=
Pt
Pt+1
X
!i2

f (!i)
Pt (!i)
Pt
M(!j ; !i) for all !j 2 
:
Using the definition of t,
t+1 (!j) =
Pt
Pt+1
X
!i2

f (!i)t (!i)M(!j ; !i)
=
fPt
Pt+1
X
!i2

t (!i)M(!j ; !i) =
X
!i2

t (!i)M(!j ; !i):
The last equality holds because
Pt+1 = Pt
X
!i2

ft (!i) = Ptf:
Taking limit to both sides of the expression with , we get
 (!j) = lim
t!1t+1 (!j) = limt!1
X
!i2

t (!i)M(!j ; !i) =
X
!i2

 (!i)M(!j ; !i):
Hence  () =  () is the invariant distribution of M:
Proof of Proposition 1 (ii) M( ; !i) is independent of !i implies M(!j ; !i) = (!j) for every !j 2 
:
By (70),
t+1 (!j) =
1
Pt+1
X
!i2

f (!i)M(!j ; !i)t (!i)Pt = (!j) for t  0:
Proof of Proposition 4 We first show that there exists a solution U () that solves the functional equation
(79). Define a set of functions.
S = ff : 
! Rj kfk Mg
where M = u(!n)
1  1 , and k  k is the sup norm. We can show that S is a complete metric space. Define
operator T as
TU (!)  max
0 f  1

u ((1  f)!) + f1 "E U  !0 j! (148)
for all ! 2 
 and U 2 S. Given U () and !, the right hand side of (141) has a solution that attains the
maximum by the Weierstrass Theorem. We first show that T is a contraction. It suffices to show that
T satisfies two properties, monotonicity and discounting. Standard arguments can show that given U
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and ~U 2 S satisfying U (!)  ~U (!) for all !, TU (!)  T ~U (!) for all !. The following arguments
prove discounting property holds. For any given constant b,
T (U (!) + b) = max
0 f  1

u ((1  f)!) + f1 "E U  !0+ bj!
 max
0 f  1

u ((1  f)!) + f1 "E U  !0 j!+ b 1

1 "
= TU (!) +  1b:
By Contraction Mapping Theorem, there exists a unique fixed point U : 
 ! R that solves the
functional equation TU = U . The existence of a unique solution U () has been proved.
Next we show U (!0) = U0 (!0) for all !0 2 
; that is to show U (!0) is the supremum in problem
(78) for any !0. Define
 1Q
j=0
fj
 
!j
1 
= 1: Then for any feasible plan

ft
 
!t
	1
t=0
,
U (!0) = max
f2[0; 1

]
u (!0 (1  f)) + f1 E0 [U (!1) j!0]
> u
 
!0
 
1  f0
 
!0

+ f0
 
!0
1 
E0 [U (!1) j!0]
> u
 
!0
 
1  f0
 
!0

+ f0
 
!0
1 
E0

u
 
!1
 
1  f1
 
!1

+f1
 
!1
1 
E1 [U (!2) j!1]

>   
> E0
TX
t=0
t
t 1Y
j=0
fj
 
!j
1 
u
 
!t
 
1  ft
 
!t

+ T+1E0
TY
j=0
fj
 
!j
1 
U (!T+1) :
Notice that the last term satisfies
T+1
TY
j=0
fj
 
!j
1 
U (!T+1) 
 
 1
T+1 u (!n)
1  " 1 :
The right hand side of this inequality converges to 0 as T goes to infinite. Hence for all feasible plan
ft
 
!t
	1
t=0
U (!0) > E0
1X
t=0
t
t 1Y
j=0
fj
 
!j
1 
u
 
!t
 
1  ft
 
!t

: (149)
We now show that U (!0) is the smallest upper bound. Given "1 > 0, choose a sequence of positive
real numbers ftg1t=1 such that
P1
t=0
 
 1
t
t  "12 : Let f (!t) be the solution that attains
U (!t), then for all t
U (!t) < u (!t (1  f (!t))) + f (!t)1 E0 [U (!t+1) j!t] + t:
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Starting from period 0, iteratively substituting the value function U (!t+1) into the above inequality
shows that for all !0
U (!0) < E0
TX
t=0
t
t 1Y
j=0
f (!j)1  u (!t (1  f (!t))) + T+1E0
TY
j=0
f (!j)1  U (!T+1)
+ E0
TX
t=0
t
t 1Y
j=0
f (!j)1  t:
The choice of ftg guarantees that the last term is no more than "12 as T ! 1. We also have shown
that
lim
T!1
T+1
TY
j=0
f (!j)1  U (!T+1) = 0:
So for any given "1 > 0, there exists a feasible plan

f
 
!t
	1
t=0
such that
U (!0) < E0
TX
t=0
t
t 1Y
j=0
f (!j)1  u (!t (1  f (!t))) + "1
2
: (150)
By (142) and (143),
U (!0) = sup
fft(!t)g1t=02[0; 1 ]
E0
1X
t=0
t
t 1Y
j=0
fj
 
!j
1 
u
 
!t
 
1  ft
 
!t

:
Therefore
U (!0) = U
 (!0) :
Proof of Proposition 5 (i) In this case, equation (80) can be written as f(!)
(1 f(!))1  = A!
  where A is a
constant. Using the implicit function theorem, it follows that f 0 (!) =   =!

f(!)
+
(1 )
1 f(!)
< 0:
Proof of Proposition 5 (ii) In deterministic case, !0 = !; c (!0) = c (!) for all ! 2 
 and equation (136)
simplifies to:
f = 

1

+
1    


1

  f

: (151)
The left hand side of equation (151) is strictly increasing in f while the right hand side is strictly
decreasing in f. Obviously f > 0. An interior solution with f < 1= exists since 1  > .
Proof of Proposition 5 (iii) Let f (!) denotes the optimal fertility given !. Plug functional form of u ()
into equation (81),
U (!) = h (f (!))!: (152)
where
h (f (!))  1

(1  f (!)) + 1
1  f
 (!) (1  f (!)) 1 : (153)
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We make a guess on the value function and let it take the form: U (!) = A! where A is a constant,
independent of !: Equating this guess with (152) results in:
A = h (f (!)) : (154)
Thus, in order for A to be independent of !; we must verify that the results f (!) is independent of
!: Notice that,
E

U
 
!0
 j! = E A!0j! = A!e222 :
The last equality holds because the assumption that !0 is lognormal distributed with ln! and " as
the mean and variance of ln!0: Plug this equality into (80) to obtain
 (1  f (!)) 1 ! = A (1  ) f (!)  e
22

2 !;
where ! cancels out of this equation and therefore f (!) is independent of ! confirming our guess.
This expression together with (153) and (154) gives a rule to solve the optimal fertility f, as given
by
f
 (1  )

e 
22
2   f1 

= 1  f:
Proof of Proposition 6 Part (i) follows from Proposition 1 and Proposition 5. As for part (ii), whenM is the
identity matrix, fertility is independent of ability and t+1 (!j) =
X
!i2

t (!i)M(!j ; !i) = t (!j) :
The first equality uses the proof of Proposition 1. More generally, t (!) = 0 (!) for all ! and
all t and  (!) = 0 (!). Part (iii) follows Proposition 5 (iii). The conditional variance of ln!t
diverges to infinite because ln!t = ln!0 +
tP
i=1
i; E (ln!tj!0) = ln!0; V ar (ln!tj!0) = t22 and
limt!1 V ar (ln!tj!0) =1:
Proof of Proposition 7. Notice that
U (!) = max
ft2[0;1=]
u ((1  f)!) + f1 E U  !0 j!
 max
[f(!);f(!)]
u ((1  f)!) + f1 E U  !0 j! := U1  !0
 max
[f(!);f(!)]
u ((1  f)!) + f1 E U1  !0 j! := U2  !0
::
 max
[f(!);f(!)]
u ((1  f)!) + f1 E U r  !0 j! = U r  !0
where the first inequality is strict if a constraint is binding for any particular !; the remaining in-
equalities follow from the contraction mapping recursion, and the final inequality uses the contraction
mapping theorem. Furthermore, a strict inequality for a particular ! translates into a strict inequality
for all !0s sinceM is a regular Markov chain meaning that, regardless of initial ability there is positive
probability that someone in the dynasty will reach a binding state in finite time. The second part of the
proposition follows because fertility restrictions do not change the marginal costs of having children
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but it decreases (or has no effect on) the marginal benefits by reducing U (!) for all ! (see equation
(80)). Hence an upper bound of fertility makes people have fewer children than (or the same number
of children with) the unrestricted case.
Proof of Proposition 8 Let P rt (!) be the size of population with ability ! at time t when there are restric-
tions on fertility. By Proposition 7
P1 (!j) =
X
!i2

f (!i)P0 (!i)M(!j ; !i)

X
!i2

f r (!i)P
r
0 (!i)M(!j ; !i) = P
r
1 (!j)
where P0 (!i) = P r0 (!i). The following inductive argument guarantees that if P rt (!i)  Pt (!i)
then P rt+1 (!i)  Pt+1 (!i) for all !j and all t  0,
Pt+1 (!j) =
X
!i2

f (!i)Pt (!i)M(!j ; !i) 
X
!i2

f r (!i)P
r
t (!i)M(!j ; !i) = P
r
t+1 (!j) :
Therefore,
W r =
1X
t=0
X
!2

p(t)U
r(!)P rt (!)

1X
t=0
X
!2

p(t)U(!)P
r
t (!)

1X
t=0
X
!2

p(t)U(!)Pt (!) = W
 
p

Proof of Proposition 9 When M (; !) is independent of !, the proof of Proposition 1(ii) shows that
t+1 (!j) =  (!j) fort  0:
Moreover, 0 () is invariant to policy changes. So restrictions on fertility only reduces individual
utility, by Proposition 7, but does not affect the ability distribution of any generation. Therefore, it
decreases social welfare as defined by (72).
Proof of Proposition 10 This Proposition relies on Proposition 6 (ii)’s results, f (!) = f and t (!) =
 (!) = 0 (!) when M is the identity matrix. Similar to Proposition 9, fertility restrictions do not
alter the distribution of abilities, which together with Proposition 7, finishes the proof.
